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Abstract
After a long delay in drafting, a new Criminal Procedure Code for Russia was
passed in 20oi and went into effect in 2oo2. The new Code contains some
striking innovations, most notably changes at the trial stage, which imple-
ment the constitutional requirement of adversarial principles. However, it
also preserves several remnants of the past, particularly its preservation of the
formal pretrial investigation, during which evidence is analyzed and compiled
in a dossier, which then dominates the trial of the case. The result is that old
and new constantly contend with each other. Implementation of the new
adversarial procedures is also made difficult by the enormity of the changes
demanded by them. This article examines these and other issues in the new
Code's implementation over its first five years of operation.
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i. Introduction
Russia's legal system shares many of the characteristics of civil law sys-
tems. Its criminal procedure system has, therefore, naturally tended to
follow the traditions of civil law countries. In the civil law tradition, the
criminal process is dominated by a formal pretrial investigation phase, in
which an official case file or dossier-which is expected to contain all of
the evidence in the case--is compiled before trial by a judicial or quasi-
judicial state official. To a degree that varies depending on the country
involved, the case file's contents play a major role at trial. To the extent
that evidence other than that contained in the case file is produced at
trial, it is the judge who elicits it by summoning and questioning witnesses
and the accused.
For lack of a better term, this system has been characterized as 'neo-
inquisitorial' or 'investigatory', which reflects its main features and mode
of operation: the state-objectively and on behalf of everyone concerned,
including the accused-actively investigates the circumstances of a crime
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to determine what happened. On the premise that the state conducts an
objective and complete investigation intended to collect both inculpa-
tory and exculpatory evidence, neither the early involvement of defense
counsel nor other procedural protections for the rights of the suspect
have traditionally been thought to be essential to the fairness of the
process. However, greater procedural protections for suspects have been
added in the modern era in most civil law countries because of Articles 5
and 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ECHR).
The alternative system, represented by the Anglo-American adver-
sarial tradition, lacks the formal pretrial investigation phase. Rather, it is
dominated by a single event-the trial. It is at this stage-and this stage
alone-that evidence 'counts'. If the mantra of the civil law tradition is
'what is not in the file is not in the world',' then the mantra of the adver-
sarial tradition might well be 'what is not proven by first-hand evidence
presented at trial is not in the world'. Information may acquire weight as
evidence of guilt only if it is accepted as evidence by a judge when presented
in a public trial by witnesses who appear and testify in person. At the trial,
it is the adversaries themselves-the prosecution and the defense-who
play the most active roles, presenting the evidence for consideration by
the judge or jury. Each party is expected to present only such evidence as
supports its own view of the case. The judge is a relatively passive figure,
intervening only as necessary to ensure that the parties follow proper
procedures and enjoy equal rights in their presentation of evidence and
their advocacy on behalf of their clients, the state and the accused.
Such organization of the trial naturally affects the pretrial stages
of the case. First, it is the parties' responsibility to conduct the neces-
sary investigations and gather the evidence that each wishes to present
at trial. Thus, there is no single, state-run pretrial investigation; rather,
there are independent, separate and parallel prosecution and defense
investigations. Second, since the sole test of any evidence is its ability to
gain acceptance at trial, it does not matter how formal the investigative
process is or who conducts it. Third, since the dynamic recognized by the
adversarial approach is that the state is not neutral but has its own partisan
interests in seeking to convict those it suspects of committing crimes, it
is thought important for fairness that suspects have strong independent
protections of their rights from the time of their very first contact with
law enforcement officials.
Q zod non est in actis, non estin mundo. See Bernhard Grossfeld andJosef Hoeltzenbein, "Language,
Poetry, and Law: Order Patents", io Law andBusiness Review oftheAmericas (2oo4), 669-69i, at
670.
Russia's Criminal Procedure Code
The Russian system has long followed the civil law tradition in crimi-
nal procedure. So even a cursory glance at the 2001 Criminal Procedure
Code (CrPC) and the provisions of Russia's 1993 Constitution that the
Code implements discloses what appears to be a major break with the
past.2 Article 123(3) of the Constitution declares that "[jludicial proceed-
ings shall be conducted based on adversarial principles and equality of
the parties" and Article 15 of the new Code declares these principles ap-
plicable to criminal cases. Adversarial principles' and 'equality of rights
of the parties' are concepts with some room for interpretation and some
continental definitions vary considerably from their understanding at
common laws However, the Constitution and the new Code move Russia
decisively towards the Anglo-American adversarial mode of proceeding.
Unlike the old Code, which declared that the "[clourt, procurator, inves-
tigator and inquiry officer are required to take all measures provided by
law for a complete, objective and full investigation of the circumstances
of the case",4 Article 15(3) of the new Code requires the court to "create
the conditions necessary for the parties to perform their procedural duties
and to exercise the rights granted to them". Even before the new Code
was passed,5 the Constitutional Court, relying on the Constitution, had
2 See "Ugolovno-protsessual'nyi kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii" (as amended through 30 December
2006). A 2004 English translation of the Code (current through 4July 2003) in parallel Russian
and English columns, edited by Vasilii Vlasihin and William Burnham with commentary by
William Burnham, is available from the US Department of'Justice's OPDAT Program (see infra
note 15). William Burnham and Vasilii Vlasihin (eds.), The Russian Federation Code of Criminal
Procedure as Amended through July 4, 2003 (US Department ofJustice and US Embassy in Mos-
cow, Moscow, 2004). A second edition current through 2007 is forthcoming. For a different
English translation set alone, see William Burnham, "Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian
Federation (as amended throughJune 29,2o4), EnglishTranslation with Commentary", 40(1-4)
Statutes andDecisions of the USSR and Successor States (2004), 7-89, 5-97, 6-99 and 5-88.
3 For example, the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted the right to adversarial
proceedings under the European Convention on Human Rights primarily as a protection of
the right of the accused to be heard. The Court's case law has revolved around three rather
specific issues: failures to take into account defense submissions; exparte submissions by the
prosecution to the court; and prosecution failures to disclose evidence to the defense. See Stefan
Trechsel, Human Rights in CriminalProceedings (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2oo5), 89-94.
For a classic statement of the American view, see William Burnham, Introduction to the Law
andLegal System of the United States (West Group, St Paul, MN, 4 th ed. 2oo6), 8o-85, defining
adversarial proceedings as those: "() where the decision-maker is neutral and passive, and is
charged solely with the responsibility of deciding the case; (2) the parties themselves develop
and present the evidence and arguments on which the decision will be based; (3) the proceed-
ing is concentrated, uninterrupted and otherwise designed to emphasize the clash of opposing
evidence and arguments presented by the parties; and (4) the parties have equal opportunities
to present and argue their cases to the decision-maker."
4 Art.2o, "Ugolovno-protsessual'nyi kodeks RSFSR", Vedomosti Verkhovnogo SovetaRSFSR (i96o)
No.4o item 593 (as amended through 29 December 2001).
5 For a summary of the political origins of the new Code, see Peter H. Solomon,Jr., "The Criminal
Procedure Code of 2001: Will it Make RussianJustice More Fair?", in Widliam Alex Pridemore
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held that a court "may not take upon itself what are the special procedural
functions of the parties".6 It further explained that "adversarial principles
dictate that there be a strict separation of the functions of the court in
its decision of the case and the function of the prosecution and defense,
each of which is allocated its respective role in the process".7
The 2001 Code defines these "special procedural functions of the
parties" in ways that closely resemble the common law adversarial tradi-
tion. Live witness testimony at trial-not prior written statements given
to an investigator-are generally required (although, as will be shown,
with significant exceptions).' It is the parties and not the judge who have
the primary responsibility for calling and questioning the witnesses and
presenting all the other evidence at trial, with the judge acting as a pas-
sive arbiter of the contest between the parties. 9 Moreover, Russia has
resurrected for some cases that most passive of all decision makers, the
jury.'I The defense has the right to interview witnesses and collect other
evidence and the judge has no right to refuse to permit testimony by
(ed.), RulingRussia. Law, Crime and justice ina ChangingSociety (Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham,
MD 2005), 77-98, at 80-82.
6 PostanovIenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.i9 -Pof28 November 1996, VestnikKonstitutsionnogo
Suda (VKS) (1996) No.5, in which it was found that the 'protocol' method of handling minor
cases that required the judge to formulate the charges and then handle the trial and decide
on guilt and punishment is unconstitutional. See, also, Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda
No.7-P of 2o April 1999, VKS (1999) No.4 , in which it was found that the court's power to
return suasponte a poorly investigated case to the prosecution for supplemental investigation is
unconstitutional; and Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.i-P of i4January 2000, VKS
(2000) No.2 (petition of Smirnova), in which it was held that the power of a judge during the
trial of one defendant to initiate a criminal case against a new defendant/suspect and order
detention is unconstitutional.
7 Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.i-P, op.cit. note 6. The history of the drafting of
Art.123(3) of the 1993 Constitution on "adversarial principles" is unclear as to what the fram-
ers had in mind, as they seemed to assume that everyone knew what they were talking about.
Discussions centered only on whether to include a proviso permitting exceptions to adversarial
principles to be made by federal statute in certain kinds of cases, such as civil cases where
parties relying on their own resources could well be mismatched. In place of the proviso, the
phrase guaranteeing "equality of the parties" was inserted. Konstitutsionnoe sovesbcbanie: Steno-
grammy. Materialy. Dokumenty. 2o aprelia-io noiabria 1993 g V 20 tomakb, Vol.13 (Iuridicheskaia
literature, Moscow, 1995-1996), 95-98, available at <http://www.constitution.garant.rultom.
php?pg=oooooo96&tom=13>. At the very least, this history confirms that Russian adversarial
principles include the notion that it is the parties or their representatives who have the major
role in presenting evidence in judicial proceedings rather than the judge. See ibid., at 97, in
which Constitutional CourtJudge Morshchakova acknowledges that inequality based on bet-
ter lawyers is part of adversarial justice. It is not known how adding "equality of the parties"
was intended to cure this problem. See Burnham, op.cit note 3, 119, which states that "inequal-
ity of resources is a special problem in an adversary system where the parties have so many
responsibilities for gathering evidence and presenting the case".
8 See sections 3.4.1., 3.4.2. and 4.
9 Id.
10 See section 4.3.
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defense witnesses who appear at trial." In addition, the Code recognizes
the partisan nature of the investigation of suspects, who are, consequently,
given a wide array of rights in their earliest contacts with law enforce-
ment officials."
Despite these major steps down the road towards an adversarial
system of criminal procedure, the conversion has been incomplete in
practice. One problem is the failure of the new Code to be sufficiently
concrete and specific in setting out the new adversarial responsibilities of
the participants, combined with a lack of training to develop the skills and
traditions necessary to discharge those responsibilities. Another problem is
that, while some parts of the new Code set out adversarial features, other
parts of the Code work against them. In this category, the main problem
is that the Code creates an adversarial structure for trial but retains the
formal pretrial investigation stage and its product--the dossier or case
file-which continues to dominate later judicial stages of the case. I3
It is our purpose in this article to describe the principal features of
the Code and its implementation five years after its entry into force, I4 in
the process highlighting some of these problems and outlining what we
believe should be done about them. We discuss some of the relevant case
law of both the Russian courts and the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) and several amendments that have been made to the Code
since its enactment. Our analyses of the text and law are also informed
by William Burnham's work since 1999 as a foreign law expert with the
working group that drafted the 2001 Code, headed by then State Duma
Deputy Elena B. Mizulina. This involved attendance at conferences and
mark-up sessions held during 1999-20o and at some of the 'monitoring'
events held by the working group in various regions of Russia from 2002-
2006. In addition, issues of the Code's implementation were discussed
at a conference marking the fifth anniversary of the Code's passage, held
in November 20o6 at the Moscow State Law Academy.5 We were also
informed by Jeffrey Kahn's research on Russia's compliance with the Eu-
ix See section 3.4.4.
12 Id.
13 See sections 3 and 4.
14 The new Code entered into force on I July 2002.
15 Attendance at these events was made possible by the US Department of Justice's Office of
Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT) program. Thomas
Firestone, resident legal advisor and OPDAT representative at the US Embassy in Moscow,
assisted with particular issues in this article. However, none of the opinions expressed here
should be considered to represent the views of OPDAT or the US Government. The assistance
of Nikolai M. Kipnis, a law professor at the Moscow State Law Academy and an advocate,
for ongoing assistance with issues as they arose in writing this article is especially acknowl-
edged.
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ropean Convention on Human Rights, his experience training Russian
lawyers on its application in Russia and his field research on the practical
implementation of the Code by means of courtroom observations and
interviews with Russian practitioners, judges and academics in Moscow
and Krasnoiarsk.' 6
2. Pretrial Procedure, Part I: Initiation and Control
2.1. Initiating a Criminal Case
Prosecution of crimes under the new Code is mandatory I7 This is a
continuation of the Soviet practice and a reflection of Russia's civil law
roots.' Article 21, entitled 'Obligation to Prosecute', requires pursuit of
every case in which evidence of a crime has come to light. This provision
is enforced in two ways. First, Article 24(2) of the Constitution-which
insures a right to information in the possession of the authorities that
affects one's rights-has been held to permit a crime victim to view the
information on which the refusal to initiate the case was based.' 9 Second,
refusal can be appealed by the victim, first to the procurator and then in
Interviews and observations were conducted by Jeffrey Kahn between 15 October and 5 No-
vember 2005 for OPDAT. Of course, the extent to which practices observed by either of the
authors or described by their interviewees and correspondents take place throughout Russia
is not known. The professional breakdown ofJeffrey Kahn's interviews is as follows (although
it should be noted that some interviewees possess multiple professional competences): twelve
defense attorneys; three prosecutors or investigators; seven judges or former judges; six academ-
ics; and two others. Because some individuals expressed reluctance to speak candidly about
sensitive aspects of the Russian criminal justice system, all but public figures were granted
anonymity. All interviews and personal correspondence referenced in this article are on file
with the authors.
17 Art.21(2) and comment i on Art.21(2) in Dmitrii N. Kozak and Elena B. Mizulina (eds.), Kom-
mentariik ugolovno-protsessual'nomu kodeksu RossiiskoiFederatsii (lurist", Moscow, 2003). Mizulina
is the Duma member who led the effort to enact the new Code. Kozak was President Putin's
special assistant on judicial reform, who worked with Mizulina to ensure that the president's
wishes were taken into account in the drafting of the new Code.
18 See, for example, Art.i 7 (l), 1955 Law on Prosecutor's Supervision: the prosecutor must "take
measures to the effect that not a single crime should remain undiscovered and not a single
criminal avoid responsibility", cited in Samuel Kucherov, The Organs of SovietAdministration of
Justice.- Their History and Operation (Brill, Leiden, 1970), 43o . For a discussion of Russia's civil
law roots, see William Burnham, Peter B. Maggs and Gennady M. Danilenko, Law andLegal
System of the Russian Federation (Juris, Huntington, NY, 3rd ed. 2004), 1-7.
19 See, Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.3-P of 18 February 2000, VKS (20oo) No.3
(petition of Kekhman). See, also, PA. Lupinskaia (ed.), Ugolovno-protsessual'noepravo Rossiiskoi
Federatsii (lurist", Moscow, 2003), which states that "anyone whose rights or freedoms are af-
fected by refusal to initiate a criminal case has the right to review" the contents of the case
file.
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court. The decision not to initiate the case can be reversed if the refusal
was "illegal or not well-founded"."'
Mandatory prosecution rests on a rationale-commonly called the
'legality principle' in continental European systems-that is based on the
idea that everyone should be equal before the law.2IThis maybe contrasted
with the approach in adversarial systems, which grants broad discretion
to the prosecutor as to whether to bring charges (and which charges to
bring) against a suspect.2 2 The drafters of the Code consciously chose to
continue mandatory prosecution given what they perceived to be the
dangers associated with abuse of prosecutorial discretion as practiced in
common-law systems.
Notwithstanding Russia's rule of mandatory prosecution, the Russian
Criminal Code provides that "an action (omission) does not constitute a
crime, even though it formally includes the elements of an act proscribed
by this Code, if it is not socially dangerous because of its insignificance" . 3
This has been used as a basis for the dismissal of at least some prosecu-
tions.24 However, "social danger" dismissal does not have 'rehabilitative'
effects, as would a case dismissed for lack of proof of an element, thus
suggesting that social danger is not really an element of a crime.25 In
any event, declining to initiate charges is most often justified simply for
reasons of lack of sufficient proof of the more ordinary elements of the
20 See Art.I48(5 and 7), CrPC. The procedure is set out inArt.124 (procurator) and Art.125 (court),
CrPC.Judicial reviewwas held to be constitutionally required by PostanovIenie Konstitutsion-
nogo Suda No.13-P of 13 October 1995, VKS (995) No.6 (petition of Samigullina).
Stephen C. Thaman, Comparative CriminalProcedure:A CasebookApproach (North Carolina Aca-
demic Press, Durham, NC 2002), 23, which states that: "[in Europe this is called the legality
principle, in contrast to the opportunity principle, which reigns in France and in Common Law
countries" (emphasis in original).
22 Robert H. Jackson, "The Federal Prosecutor", 31(1) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
(1940), 3-6, at 5, which states that: "[one of the greatest difficulties of the position of prosecu-
tor is that he must pick his cases, because no prosecutor can even investigate all of the cases
in which he receives complaints [...] If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows
that he can choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous power of the prosecutor:
that he will pick people that he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases that need to be
prosecuted."
23 See Art.14(2), "Ugolovnyi kodeks Rossiiskoi Federatsii", Federal Law No.63-FZ, signed 13June
1996 (as amended through 30 December 2oo6).
24 In re Isaikin, Gnatiev etal., cited in "Obzor sudebnoi praktiki", Biulleten'Verkbovnogo Suda (BVS)
(1997) No.4, io, in which the prosecution of juveniles for stealing USD 5 worth of watermelons
was dismissed for absence of social danger.
25 Arts.24(I) and 27(I), CrPC, which set out rehabilitative grounds; and Postanovlenie Konstitutsion-
nogo Suda No.i8-P of 28 October 1996, VKS (996) No.5, ii (petition of Suhkov), in which the
social danger dismissal is held not to be rehabilitative. Rehabilitation means that the person's
name is cleared and he is entitled to reparations for having been wrongfully prosecuted. See
Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko, op.cit note 18, 507 and 527.
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case rather than lack of social danger.21 While the 'social danger' concept
remains in the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code's only provi-
sion for dismissal of cases on this basis was repealed in 2003.7 However,
the Criminal Code is rather specific in its provision for "freedom from
criminal liability" if an offender who commits a minor or medium gravity
crime (up to five years in prison) "has voluntarily appeared and confessed,
has facilitated the discovery of the crime, has compensated for the harm
caused by the crime, and as a result of active repentance (AeSenbHoe
pacKamHI4e) (raskaiane) has ceased to be socially dangerous" or if the victim
and the offender have agreed to a "settlement" (npwMwpeHMe) (primerenie)
of the matter.28 In addition, several crimes have their own circumstances
under which liability will be reduced or abolished entirely29
There are two routes to the initiation of a criminal case: arrest first
or investigation first. The former route applies to offenses committed
inflagrante delicto or where there is 'hot pursuit' of the suspect. Article
9i(i) of the Code permits a law enforcement officer to arrest a person
"on suspicion of having committed a crime for which incarceration is a
potential penalty" if the person "is caught in the act of committing or
immediately after committing the crime [...] if victims or eyewitnesses
point out the person as the one who committed the crime" or "if clear
physical traces of the crime are found on the person's body or clothes,
in his possession or in his dwelling".30 After a brief detention and any
urgent action needed to preserve evidence, the case is turned over to a
criminal investigator and a formal case is initiated. This person is formally
z6 Postanovtenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.i8-P, op.cit note 25. Social danger as a concept in
criminal law is discussed in Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko, op.cit note 18, 550-554.
27 See Art.26(i), CrPC (which authorizes one form of "social danger" dismissal), repealed by
Art.i(x), Federal'nyi Zakon "0 privedenii Ugolovno-protsessual'nogo kodeksa RF i drugikh
zakonodatel'nykh aktov v sootvetstvie s Federal'nym zakonom '0 vnesenii izmenenii i do-
polnenii v Ugolovnyi kodeks RF'" No.16i-FZ, signed 8 December 2003. Unlike the framers
of the Criminal Code, who wholeheartedly approved of the concept (see William Burnham,
"Russia's New Criminal Code: AWndow onto Democratic Russia", 26(4) Review of Centraland
East European Law (2000), 365-424, at 370-375), many in the Criminal Procedure Code working
group were opposed to it. Part of the reason is its Soviet pedigree, coming as it does from the
concept of 'class danger'.
z8 Art.75-76, Criminal Code RE A more wide-open provision for relief from criminal liability for
any first-time offender committing a minor or medium gravity crime was repealed in 2003.
See Art.l(24), Federal'nyi Zakon "0 vnesenii i dopolnenii v Ugolovnyi kodeks RF" No.162-FZ,
signed 8 December 2003.
29 See Burnham, op.cit. note 27, 396-397.
30 Limiting full custodial arrest solely to cases punishable by incarceration is not a universal rule.
See, for example,Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 US 38 (2oo0, in which the court upheld a
driver's full custodial arrest for not wearing a seatbelt, a misdemeanor offense punishable only
bya fine.
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considered a "suspect"(no9o3peBaeMbif) Oodozrevaemyt).3' When such a
suspect has been arrested and a court order authorizing continued de-
tention obtained, there must be a means of assuring that the authorities
follow through with formal charges. Thus, an investigation sufficient to
file charges must be conducted and the suspect formally charged under
Article 171 within ten days of his or her arrest, or the suspect must be
released.32 The filing of charges changes the status of the suspect to that
of an accused (o6eMHieMbli) (obviniaemyz).
The second route to initiation of a case is when the evidence does
not come from a law enforcement official on the scene.33 In these cases,
an investigation must be conducted before the suspect is arrested. After
investigating, the investigator may then decide to initiate a criminal case.34
If continuing investigation reveals "sufficient evidence establishing grounds
to charge a person with commission of a crime", the investigator "shall issue
an order charging such person as an accused"35 This order states that the
person is being charged with a particular crime and sets out the facts of
the crime as determined by the investigation thus far. The accused is then
summoned to appear before the investigator so that the charges can be
formally presented and the investigator can interrogate the accused36
Under both routes, a procurator is required to approve the initia-
tion of the criminal case.37 This is an innovation of the new Code. Many
investigators view this change as a gratuitous slur on their competence
and their reputations, given that one impetus for requiring approval was
reports that investigators were engaged in 'contract' initiations of criminal
cases, typically procured by business types as a means to harass competi-
tors. 38 However, the procuracy believes it is a good idea and reports suc-
31 Art.94(I), CrPC provides: "[a] suspect must be released if: 0 the suspicions of the commission
of a crime are not confirmed; 2) there are no grounds for pretrial detention; or 3) the arrest of
the person was in violation of Art.91 of this Code."
32 Art.ioo, CrPC.
33 Sources include a written or oral complaint (Art.i 4 1), the voluntary surrender and confession
of an offender (Art.14z), an official report (Art.143) and information obtained through the mass





36 Arts.17 ,7, CrPC. If the accused is already in custody (e.g, when aflagrante arrestee is suspected
of other crimes) the accused is notified through the administration of the detention facility.
Art.172(3-4), CrPC.
37 Art.146(1), CrPC.
38 Address of Boris Gavrilov, assistant head of the Investigative Committee of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, given at the Conference on the 5 th Anniversary of the Criminal Procedure
Code, Moscow State Law Academy, 16 November 2oo6.
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cess in preventing almost io% of "baseless" initiations of criminal cases.3 9
Whatever the statistical truth of the matter, many believe that the police
fabricate cases for a variety of reasons.40 False arrests and fabricated cases
are often attributed to unofficial or informal police quotas. 41
Whether and to what extent greater control over investigations is
thought necessary, as this article was going to press, the Duma passed new
legislation lessening the control procurators have exercised over crimi-
nal investigations in the past, including eliminating the requirement of
procurator approval of case initiation.42
Initiation of a criminal case is important because it starts the clock
running against the investigator to complete the preliminary investigation
and deliver the matter to the procurator to be filed in court.43 Generally
39 Address ofAnatolii P Korotkov, head of the Methodological Administration of the Procurator
General's Office, given at the Conference on the 5 th Anniversary of the Criminal Procedure
Code, Moscow State Law Academy, 16 November 20o6. The Gavrilov-Korotkov debate is
summarized at <http://www.legislature.ru/monitor/upk/pressaseminarupk.html>.
40 In the 17 May issue of Ezhenedel'nyi Zburnal, Iurii Sinel'shchikov, a former first deputy Moscow
procurator, was quoted as saying that, while it is difficult to know what percentage of criminal
cases are fabricated, it is a common practice. "For example, a businessman needs to be removed:
his competitor can pay the police to fabricate a case against him. There are instances in which
the police themselves want to extort money out of a businessman. Evidence is planted on him
[...I after that, scare tactics are employed, such as detention, search, and arrest threats. The
businessman buys them off." See Charles Gurin, "Poll Discloses Rampant Police Abuse", 1(i6)
Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor (2004).
41 Gurin further quotes prosecutor Sinel'shchikov in ibid.: "[slometimes it is necessary simply to
raise the rate of solved crimes. For that purpose, a person is grabbed and put in prison.' Indeed,
an anonymous active-duty Moscow policeman told Ezhenedel'nyi Zhurnal that the system still
calls for each police precinct in the capital to solve 40-50 criminal cases per month. But in fact
only 20-30 cases are solved, making it more likely that cases will be fabricated." In general, the
police do not fare well in surveys of public attitudes. An April 2007 poll of i,6oo respondents in
153 population centers in 46 regions of Russia by the respected Russian Public Opinion Research
Center (VTSIOM) indicates that at least 50% of respondents do not approve of the work of
organs of law enforcement, although this is an improvement from a negative rating by 58% of
respondents a year ago. See VTSIOM, "Otnoshenie Rossiian k osnovnym obshchestvennym i
gosudarstvennym institutam", VTSIOMPressRelease (25 May 2007) No.698, available at <http://
wciom.ru/novosti/press-vypuskipress-vypusksingle/8257.html>.
42 Federal'nyi Zakon "0 vnesenii izmenenii v Ugolovno-protsessual'nyi kodeks RF i Federal'nyi
Zakon 'O prokurature RF'" No.87 -FZ, signed 5June 2007; and Federal'nyi Zakon No.9o-FZ,
signed 6 June 20o7, amending Art.37(2)(4 ) and Art.i 4 6(i), CrPC. However, even under the
new law, the procuracy must be notified of the initiation of a new criminal case and has the
power to declare the initiation "illegal" or "unfounded" within 24 hours. The new law also
reorganizes procuracy investigators under an 'Investigations Committee', to be headed by a
Deputy Procurator General specially appointed by the president and confirmed by the Fed-
eration Council. For a summary of the law, see Ekaterina Zapodinskaia, "Prokuroram vydaly
uvol'nitel'nuiu,"Kommersant" (ioJuly 20o7) No.ii9, available at <http://www.kornmersant.ru/
doc.aspxDocslD=781371&NodeslD=7>. The measure is widely viewed as an anti-corruption
measure, though it is not coincidental that it also serves to centralize power over criminal
investigations under one person directly answerable to the president.
43 Art.162(2), CrPC.
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speaking, the investigator has two months to complete the preliminary
investigation, though this is extendable. 44 US advisors queried why inves-
tigations should be limited this way The response was that it is neces-
sary to ensure that progress is made on investigations, both to enforce
investigator job performance standards and to ensure that the object of
the investigation is not under suspicion for an inordinately long period of
time. However, it seems overly rigid to impose a time limit on all investiga-
tions and, moreover, to place such a limit in a statutory code as opposed
to an internal regulation of some sort. It would also seem to unnecessarily
encourage early arrests and greater overall reliance on confessions as a
substitute for more careful investigation.
2.2. Detention Pending Trial
By whichever of the two ways a case is initiated, the next question that
arises in the criminal prosecution is whether detention is warranted while
the investigation is conducted pending trial. Article 22(2) of the Constitu-
tion provides that "no person may be detained for more than forty-eight
hours" without a "judicial order"-a command repeated in Article io(i)
of the new Code and implemented by several other articles. 45 The old
Soviet Code granted the final power to order pretrial detention to the
procurator.46 Amendments adopted in 1992 provided for judicial review
of procurator decisions. 47 While this was an improvement, the obvious
difficulties of mounting an appeal from jail and the need to stay in jail
until a court hearing could be obtained made this an incomplete remedy
Moreover, nothing was done about the initial lengths of time an arrestee
could be held. The procurator merely had to be notified that an arrestee
was in detention within forty-eight hours, at which point he/she then
had an additional forty-eight hours to act. Alternatively, the procurator
could extend the period of detention pending charges for up to ten days
44 Art.i62(), CrPC. The local procurator may extend the time permitted for the preliminary
examination to up to six months. Art.162(4), CrPC. In "especially complex" cases, this time
limit may be extended to twelve months by the chief procurator of the constituent unit of the
Russian Federation in which the case has been opened. Art.162(5), CrPC. Thereafter, further
extensions (without limit) may be made "only in exceptional cases" and only by the procurator
general or his deputies. Art.162(3) excludes from this time period any time during which the
preliminary investigation was suspended on grounds specified in the Code.
45 See Arts.29(2), 91(2), 94(2-3), 1oi(1), 107(2) and IO8(7), CrPC.
46 See Arts.ii, 89, 96 and 97, CrPC RSFSR.
47 See Art.220(z-2), CrPC RSFSR, supplemented by Art.1389, Zakon RF "0 vnesenii izmenenii i
dopolnenii v ugolovno-protsessual'nyi kodeks RSFSR" No.2825-I, signed 23 May 1992. See, also,
Supreme Court, Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda "0 praktike sudebnoi proverki
zakonnosti i obosnovannosti aresta ill prodleniia sroka soderzhaniia pod strazhei" No.3 of 27
April 1993, BVS (1993) No.7, 6, which instructs courts on how to apply these provisions; and
Todd Foglesong, "Habeas Corpus orWho Has the Body?Judicial Review ofArrest and Pre-trial
Detention in Russia", 14(3) Wisconsin International Law Review (1996), 541-585, at 548-549.
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under "exceptional circumstances".4 The new Code, then, implemented
the constitutional limit of forty-eight hours, took the power of ordering
pretrial detention away from the procurator and switched from a system
of post hoc judicial review that had to be instigated by the detainee to a
system requiring an affirmative judicial authorization of detention pend-
ing trial in every case as an initial matter.
The route to this change was not exactly straightforward, however.
The 'Transitional Provisions' of Part II of the Constitution provided that
"[ulntil the criminal procedure legislation of the Russian Federation is
brought into conformity with the provisions of this Constitution, the for-
mer procedure for arrest, custodial confinement and detention of persons
suspected of committing crimes shall be preserved".49 Because of a lack of
progress on a new criminal procedure code, the old detention regime had
continued all through the 199os. However, even when the 2001 Code was
ready for passage, the drafters feared that the judicial system was not yet
ready to handle the additional work, so they inserted a proviso delaying
the effects of the new detention portions of the Code until 2004.50
The Constitutional Court, however, held the delaying provisions
unconstitutional in a 2002 decision, issued just a few months before the
effective date of the new Code.5" In the Malenkin case, the Court held that
Part II of the Constitution only contemplated a "period of time essential
for [the] introduction of appropriate legislative amendments" and, given
the passage of time, suggested that the "temporary norms are becoming
permanent".5 In support, the Court not only relied on the "direct effect"
of Article 22(2) of the Constitution but also observed that, since the
Constitution was ratified, Russia had taken on the additional obligation
of implementing the ECHR.5 The Court also emphasized that prompt
48 Arts.i2z and 90, CrPC RSFSR, as amended.
49 "Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Vtoroi razdel, Zaldiuchitel'nye i perekhodnye chasti",
proclaimed 52 December 1993 Russia lodged a two-part reservation at the time of its acces-
sion to the ECHR, both parts of which relate to the conformity of its Soviet-era laws to Art.5
of the Convention. The first concerns application of the Criminal Procedure Code to persons
over whom the Russian courts have jurisdiction. The second concerns only military detention,
in which case application to a Russian court is not always possible. See Jeffrey Kahn, "Russian
Compliance with Articles Five and Six of the European Convention of Human Rights as a
Barometer of Legal Reform and Human Rights in Russia", 35 University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform (2002), 641-69o, at 658-662.
50 The resistance that produced this delay emanated not just from the procuracy but also, surpris-
ingly, from some trial judges with whom the authors spoke during this period. See, for example,
infra note 56.
5 Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No 6-P of 14 March 20o2, VKS (2002) No.3 (petition
of Malenkin).
52 Ibid., 2- 3 .
53 Ibid. The direct effect of constitutional rights and freedoms is covered byArt.i8 of the Constitu-
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action was particularly necessary given the significance of the rights to
personal security and freedom of movement that were being infringed.54 It
is probably significant that the Court had rejected an identical challenge
filed two and a half years after the ratification of the Constitution on the
grounds that it was premature. 55 The Court required the new provisions
for arrest and detention to be implemented on I July 2002, along with
the bulk of the new Code.56
The mechanism chosen by the Code for gaining judicial approval for
detention beyond forty-eight hours, as required by the Malenkin case, is
a court order for pretrial detention.57 The order must be obtained within
forty-eight hours following the initial arrest or the suspect must be released.
The Code also establishes strict time limits to which police, investigators
and procurators must adhere during the forty-eight-hour period. An official
record of detention must be made within three hours of a suspect being
brought in, a procurator must be informed in writing within twelve hours
of the suspect's arrest58 and the authorities must inform a close relative
of the arrestee of the arrest or permit the suspect to do so.59 The suspect
must be questioned, if at all, no later than twenty-four hours after the
tion. The relevant Convention provisions were Art.5(3-4 ), concerning prompt and exclusively
judicial oversight of pretrial detention in pursuit of a trial within a reasonable time.
54 Ibid., 4.
55 See Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.91-O of 2 April 2001, VKS (2OO) No.4 (peti-
tion of Posokhov). Determinations (onpejgeneHRsI) (opredeleniia) are shorter than decisions
(nocTaHoaneHi4i) (postanovleniia) and usually deal with jurisdictional issues, though they can
have positive content (noa14TBHoe CoepKaHm4e) (pozitivnoesoderzhanie) as well. Interestingly
enough, Posokhov, the petitioner in this case, also filed an application with the European Court
of Human Rights on the basis of the same facts but alleging that he had not been convicted by
a "tribunal established by law" as required by Art.6(6) of the Convention because the judicial
bench of a judge and two lay assessors had been composed in a manner contrary to Russian law.
The European Court unanimously found a violation of Art.6 and awarded Posokhov EUR 5o0
in non-pecuniary damages. Posokbov v. Russia, No.634 86/oo (Eur. Ct. H.R., 4June 2003). See,
alsoJeffrey Kahn, "Russia's 'Dictatorship of Law' and the European Court of Human Rights",
29(1) Review of Central and East European Law (2004), I-14.
56 Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No 6-P, op.cit. note 51, 4. Shortly after this decision was
published, one of the authors met with five Russian judges who specialized in criminal cases.
They were extremely critical of the decision. One argued that judicially-supervised detention
would require a doubling of judges in the system. Another maintained that such a shift of power
from procurator to judge was at present impossible. Neither set of officials, he said, had the
education, experience or mentality for such an abrupt change. Interview byJeffrey Kahn with
judges from Azov, Rostov, Ulianovsk and Vologda, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, 13 March 2002, in
Kahn, op.cit note 49, 669 n.132,
57 Art.94(2-3), CrPC.
58 Art.92(6 and 3), CrPC.
59 Art.96(6), CrPC.
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point of his actual arrest and is entitled to a meeting with his attorney
before interrogation of not less than two hours duration.6o
The Code, however, provides an exception to the forty-eight-hour
limit. It is possible for a court to extend the period for an additional
seventy-two hours if a party seeks time "to present additional evidence
on whether pretrial detention is appropriate" and there is "a judicial
finding that the arrest was legal and well-grounded". 6' This means that,
despite the constitutional limit of forty-eight hours, a suspect may be
held for up to five days. However, the Constitutional Court held the
additional seventy-two hour period to be constitutional on the grounds
that it is the judge--within the forty-eight-hour period required by the
Constitution--who orders the additional period.62 Moreover, additional
time is not always bad for the suspect, whose relatives or lawyer may
need the additional time to gather information to present a better case
for release, thus spending a small amount of additional time behind bars
for a better chance to avoid a much longer time. Statistics on the extent
of the use of the additional seventy-two hour period for the one-year
period from mid-zoo2 to mid-2003 indicate that there were requests for
more time in only around 3.5% of cases. 63 In the first half of 2006, the
Judicial Department reported that such petitions accounted for 3.2% of
the general number of petitions examined by district-level courts (a 4.3%
decrease from the first half of 2005).64
As for flouting of the time limits imposed, it is difficult to obtain
reliable information on the degree of compliance. More than one defense
lawyer volunteered that violations are a common occurrence. One attor-
ney stated that the suspect may simply be handcuffed to a radiator in the
police precinct house for a day before the protocol of arrest is drafted.65
6o See Art.92(4), CrPC (referencing Art.46(2), CrPC). See also infra, 36-39, where access to counsel
is discussed.
61 Art.io8(7)(3). The requirement that there be "a judicial finding that the arrest was legal and
well-grounded" to order an extension of time is interesting, since the Code has no similar re-
quirement if no extension is sought-only that the Court proceed to consider possible grounds
for pretrial detention, which does not address the legality of the initial arrest.
62 Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.53-0, "Ob otkaze v priniatii k rassmotreniiu zaprosa
sudebnoi kollegii po ugolovnym delam Murmanskogo oblastnogo suda o proverke konstitut-
sionnosti punkta 3 chasti sed'moi stat'i io8 Ugolovno-protsessual'nogo kodeksa Rossiiskoi
Federatsii", of 6 February 2004 (unpublished decision available on Garant).
63 Boris Gavrilov, "Novelly ugolovnogo protsessa na fone kriminal'noi statistitki", Rossiiskaia
iustitsiia (2003) Noaso.
64 See Supreme Court, "Obzor deiatel'nosti federal'nykh sudov obshchei iurisdiktsii i mirovykh
sudei v pervom polugodii 2oo6 goda", 3, available at <http://www.cdep.ru/material.asp?materiaL
id=152>.
65 Interview with defense counsel conducted 24 October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
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Cases in the European Court of Human Rights involving undocumented
detention suggest problems as well. In the recent case ofBelevitskiy v. Rus-
sia, the Court found that the petitioner-accused was held for a period of
time for which there were no records, observing that "the unacknowledged
detention of an individual is a complete negation of the fundamentally
important guarantees contained in Article 5 of the Convention and dis-
closes a most grave violation of that provision". 66 In Menesheva v. Russia, the
Court noted that when the petitioner-a nineteen-year-old woman-was
detained, for the first twenty hours of that detention there was no "record
of such matters as the date, time and location of detention, the name of
the detainee, the reasons for the detention and the name of the person
effecting it". It held that this violated Article 5 of the Convention. 7
Another technique is to use detention for an administrative offense
if a crime cannot be charged or to 'stack' criminal offense detention on
top of administrative detention." Manipulation of administrative charges
was also involved in the above-mentioned case, Menesheva v. Russia. When
Menesheva refused plainclothes police entry to her apartment, the police
charged her with the administrative offense of resisting arrest, resulting
in her continued detention for five days, thus using both detention pend-
ing trial on that charge and the sentence on it as a way of keeping her in
custody. As the Court observed, "the true reason why she was taken to the
police station was to force her to give information on Es case and to make
her surrender the key to her flat. Charging her with the administrative
offence was clearly a mere pretext for having her available for that inter-
rogation. ' '69 Our own interviews confirmed similar misuse of administrative
detention to avoid the forty-eight-hour limit.70
2.3. Pretrial Restraint Measures
A major concern of the drafters of the new Code was to decrease the high
level of pretrial detention in custody Consequently, they devoted consider-
able attention to providing alternatives and procedures that would steer
judges away from choosing such detention.
66 Belevitskiy v. Russia, No.7 296 7 /oz (Eur. Ct. H.R., i March 2oo7), paras. 82-85. Article 5 of the
European Convention protects the right to liberty and security of the individual and is the
relevant provision for issues of arrest and detention.
67 Menesheva v. Russia, No.59261/oo (Eur. Ct. H.R., 9June zoo6), para. 87. While these detentions
were under the old Code, the requirement of detention records remains unchanged.
68 Administrative offenses are similar to minor crimes (misdemeanors) in common-law countries.
See Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko, op.cit. note I8,554-556.
69 Menesheva v. Russia, op.cit. note 67, para. 85.
70 Interview conducted 21 October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
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2.3.1. Selection
The new Code provides an entire menu of seven measures permitted to
ensure the defendant's attendance at any later proceedings: release on
personal recognizance; 7' personal surety; home or other supervision if the
arrestee is a minor; military supervision for military personnel; bail; house
arrest; and detention in custody 72 Article io8(i) provides that detention
in custody is permissible only "if it is impossible to use a different, less-
restrictive pretrial restraint measure".
For any of the seven measures of restraint to be imposed, Article
97 requires that there must be "sufficient grounds to believe" that the
accused:
"() will flee to avoid the inquiry, preliminary investigation or trial;
(2) may continue to engage in criminal activities; or
(3) may threaten a witness or other participants in the criminal proceedings, de-
stroy evidence or otherwise obstruct proceedings in the criminal case." 73
After the judge determines under Article 97 that some form of restraint is
necessary, Article 99 controls the issue of what type of restraint should be
imposed. In making such a decision, a number of factors should be taken
into account: "the seriousness of the charges brought, information on
the character, age, health condition, family status, occupation and other
circumstances of the accused."74
Only two restraints-house arrest and custodial detention-require
a court order.75 The remainder may be imposed by a procurator on the
request of the investigator, just as the old Code had provided earlier for all
forms of restraint. House arrest-a new measure of restraint--institutes
certain travel, associational and communication restrictions.76
As for procedure, Article io8 requires that the prosecution's grounds
for detention be set forth in a written motion with materials supporting
71 Literally this term is a "signed commitment not to leave" (noAnHesa 0 Hesble3Ae) (podpiska o
nevyezde). In Art.102, CrPC, what seems to be the same device is called a "commitment of non-
flight and proper conduct". The concept is rendered here as simply "personal recognizance",
the US term for signed commitments to appear at future hearings.
72 Art.98, CrPC. Each is explained in Arts.9 7-11o, CrPC.
73 Art.97, CrPC.
74 Art.99, CrPC.
75 Amendments in 2003 permit the court to order bail as an alternative. See Art.io8( 7)(i),
CrPC.
76 Art.1o 7(1-2), CrPC. The Art.99 factors of "the person's age, health condition, family status
and other circumstances" are repeated here, presumably for emphasis. House arrest prevents
the accused from changing addresses, leaving home or communicating with anyone, includ-
ing witnesses, others involved in the crime and relatives who are not living in the same home.
Conditions of house arrest may be policed by the relevant investigative agency or by court
bailiffs. See Art.It(I), Federal'nyi Zakon "0 sudebnykh pristavakh" No.sO-FZ, signed 21 July
1997 (as amended through 22 August 2004).
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those grounds attached to the motion. 7 The defendant must be brought
before the judge at the hearing on the motion and is entitled to respond
to the motion after its presentation by the prosecution.78 If the accused
is in custody following an arrest, the motion must be made at least eight
hours before the forty-eight-hour time limit on detention expires (unless
an order extending the time period of the arrest has been entered based
on the need to obtain further information, as noted above).79 The defen-
dant must be provided access to the investigation case file to search for
information that might be helpful to his arguments for release or a lesser
measure of pretrial restraint1s Repeat motions for detention are prohibited
unless new circumstances have come to light since the previous motion.8'
Responsibility for deciding requests for detention must be distributed
among all the judges on the same basis that cases are assigned in general;
having a single 'duty' judge handle all detention requests is prohibited.2
Pretrial detention orders may be appealed within three days of their issu-
ance and the appellate decision must also be made within three days.3
Statistics from the Ministry of Justice show a drop of 34.7% in the
number of persons in pretrial detention between 2002 and 2003, thus sug-
gesting judicial control of detention has had a positive effect. However,
77 Art.io8(3), CrPC.
78 Art.Io8( 4 -6), CrPC. fan accused is not already in custody and, having been provided with notice,
does not show up-as when the accused was not arrested or has already been released--arrest
can be ordered. Art.I13, CrPC. The word for this form of arrest (npWBoA) (privod) is not the
same as the more ordinary arrest following commission of a crime (aagep)KaHwe) (zaderzhanie).
flpmaoA (privod) is literally an 'escort' to the place one has been summoned to appear. It is the
same procedure used when witnesses or others summoned to appear fail to do so. An exparte
judicial order for pretrial detention can be entered but only if the accused is the subject of an
international fugitive search. Art.io8(5), CrPC.
79 Art.io8(3), CrPC.
Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.17 3-0 of 12 May 2003, VKS (2003) No.5 (petition of
Koval'). Ordinarily, the defense has the right to review the case file onlywhen the investigation
is over. Art.4 7(4)(1 2), CrPC. The cited determination was based on the Court's decision in an
earlier case in which it gave victims access to the case file in order to contest refusal to initiate
a criminal case.
81 Art.Io8(9), CrPC. See, also, Art.iio, CrPC, which sets forth the procedure for revocation or
alteration of pretrial restraint measures if the grounds for imposing a chosen restraint have
changed.
8z Art.IO8(3), CrPC.
83 Court challenges to pretrial detention orders entered by procurators were some of the first
cases where the general jurisdiction courts began to apply the Constitution directly to hold
statutes unconstitutional, much to the Constitutional Court's chagrin. See Postanovlenie Kon-
stitutsionnogo Suda No.4 -P of 3 May 1995, VKS (1995) No.2- 3 (petition of Avetian), discussed
in Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko, op.cit. note 18, at 161. See, generally, William Burnham and
Alexei Trochev, "Russia's War between the Courts: The Struggle over theJurisdictional Bound-
ary between the Constitutional Court and Regular Courts", 55 AmericanJournalofComparative
Law (2007), 381-452.
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the trend began earlier with a drop Of 29.6% between 20oi and 2002. In
fact, the rate of judicial denials of pretrial detention requests (currently
ii.i%) is the same as the level of procurator denials under the old Code
(i-i2%). Clearly, what has changed is the number of investigator requests
for detention. Cases in which investigators requested pretrial detention
decreased from 144,000 in the first half of 2000 to 66,ooo in the first
half of 2003-a 220% decrease.8 4 While one might think that the drastic
reductions in requests resulted from investigators' fears that their motions
would be denied by judges under the new Code's regime, the answer is
simpler. Better explanations are found in a March 2001 change in the old
Code permitting detention only if the crime charged is punishable by over
two years imprisonment (up from one year) and an amendment to the
Criminal Code effective in October of 2002 that reduced the maximum
punishment for simple theft to two years or lower.85 It is these absolute
limitations on what crimes qualify for detention that is responsible for
reductions in the number of detainees rather than judicial control.16
Judges' application of those factors seemed to be a problem from
the beginning. A Deputy Chairman of the Rostov Oblast' Court, Vladimir
Zolotykh, conducted a study of the first months under the new procedures
and standards as applied in the higher or subject-level trial courts, where
all crimes are punishable by over two years imprisonment. He observed:
"Judicial practice [...] shows that in a number of cases of the work of judges [...]
there appeared signs of a formal approach to the examination.Judges, at times, au-
tomatically complied with investigators' applications for the detention of a suspect
or accused, and this attests to the fact that judges still are not inclined to examine
the procedure for the selection of a measure of pretrial restraint as such a direction
of their activity that is just as important and responsible as the determination of
the merits of the case." T
This situation was not helped by the fact that procurators made equally
'formal' arguments, despite the new Code's requirement that their motions
84 Gavrilov, op.cit note 63, 6. All statistics in this paragraph are from this article.
85 Art.i, Federal'nyi Zakon "0 vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Ugolovnyi kodeks RF, Ugolovno-
protsessual'nyi kodeks RF i Kodeks RF ob administrativnykh pravonarusheniiakh" No.13 3-FZ,
signed 31 October 2002, amending Art.i58 of the Criminal Code and Federal'nyi Zakon "0
vnesenii izmenenii i dopolnenii v Ugolovnyi kodeks RF, Ugolovno-protsessual'nyi Kodeks RF,
Ugolovno-ispolnitel'nyi kodeks RF i drugie zakonodatel'nye akty RF" No.z5 -FZ, signed 9 March
200i. Gavrilov points out that coincident with the 2002 change was an increase of 34.2% in
2003 of the number of arrestees who absconded from lesser measures of pretrial restraint. See
ibid.
86 Art.iO8(), CrPC. Custodial detention is possible for crimes of less than two years imprison-
ment only for those who have violated the terms of less restrictive forms of restraint, who
were fugitives, whose identity cannot be confirmed or who have no permanent address.
87 Vladimir Zolotykh, "Zakliuchenie pod strazhei po resheniu suda: Obobshchenie praktiki
primenenia st. io8 UPK RF', Rossiiskaia iustitsiia (2002) No.ii.
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set out and substantiate why detention is the only appropriate measure.
As Zolotykh observed:
'Although procurators did participate [in the cases studied], their participation was
not infrequently reduced to formality. In the consideration of eleven cases (which
constituted 19.3% [of the cases studied), procurators (and investigators participating
in judicial proceedings) declared only that they supported their motion and in no way
gave reasons for it. In the presence of such passivity by an organ of criminal prosecu-
tion, the court in nine of eleven cases granted the petitions for pretrial restraint,
having carried out, as a matter of fact, the very function of the prosecution.""
Problems like those noted by Judge Zolotykh prompted a 2003 amend-
ment that added a sentence to Article io8(i): "twihen ordering pretrial
detention, the decision of the judge must point out the concrete factual
circumstances that justify the decision." 89 The insertion of this sentence
does not seem to have solved the problem, however. The European Court
of Human Rights in Mamedova v. Russia9° noticed the same practice in an
opinion published three years later. Mamedova was accused of a large-scale
financial fraud and was ordered to be placed in pretrial detention from
July 2004 to August 2005 (i.e., under the new Code). Mamedova "asked
for a more lenient preventive measure" and:
"[Pletitioned the court to take into account that she was charged with a financial
crime, that she had no criminal record, had a permanent place of residence and
employment in Vladimir, family ties, a stable way of life and two minor children
aged four and three. If she wished, she could have absconded after the search in
her flat. The fact that she had not fled from justice proved that she had no such
intention."9'
This attempt and many subsequent attempts byMamedova to seek release
on bail (especially after the prosecution had searched her apartment and
seized all of her papers, rendering it impossible for her to destroy any
evidence) were all denied in cursory and boilerplate judicial orders.9 The
Russian courts repeatedly accepted the prosecution's arguments that the
complexity of the case, gravity of the charges and risk of flight or inter-
ference with the case necessitated continued detention.93 The European
Court observed that: "in most decisions the domestic courts used the
same summary formula and stereotyped wording" and sometimes refused
88 Ibid.
89 Art.i(5 ), Federal Law on Changes and Additions to the Criminal Code RF, op.cit note 27. See,
also, Supreme Court, Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda RF "0 primenenii sudami
norm Ugolovno-protsessual'nogo kodeksa Rossiiskoi Federatsii", No.s of 5 March 2004, BVS
(2004) No.5, 4-8 (providing instruction on application ofArt.io8).
90 Mamedova v. Russia, No.7o64/o5 (Eur. Ct. H.R., i June 2006).
91 Ibid., para. ii.
92 Ibid., para. 23.
93 Ibid., paras. 13, 16-i9, 21-22, 24-25, 27 and 29.
20 Review of Central and East European Law 33 (2008)
even to hear the petitioner in opposition to the motions for extensions
to the period of pretrial detention.94 The European Court had no diffi-
culty in finding a violation of the Convention's requirements concerning
pretrial detention.95
Even for judges who follow proper procedures and try to apply the
appropriate factors, part of the problem may lie in the way the new Code
has organized the factors. The Article 99 factors are only to be considered
"when the grounds specified by Article 97 of this Code exist";96 however,
practitioners and courts tend to muddle the two sets of factors. If none of
the three grounds set forth in Article 97 is present (flight risk, continued
criminal activities or destruction of evidence), the inquiry is at an end
and the detainee must be released. However, judges and procurators have
found it hard to resist jumping ahead to consider "the seriousness of the
charges"--an Article 99 factor--as an independent and sufficient basis
for imposing detention.97 Judge Zolotykh noted the difficulty that his
colleagues experienced in their first forays into deciding such motions:
"[alll of these [Article 971 foundational bases and [Article 991 circumstances
are set in 'one line' as the foundational basis for the election of pre-trial
detention as the measure of restraint. 9
8
Procurators and defense lawyers confirmed that the specific factors
and the wide variety of potential pretrial restraint measures were illusory.
"There are always grounds for pretrial detention if you want to find them at
the time of arrest", one procurator told us.99 In this procurator's experience,
the choice of pretrial restraint boils down to either personal recognizance
or detention in custody 100 One procurator colorfully explained why house
arrest was beyond the technological means of that particular district. The
procuracy office housed z6o officers in a three-story building. However,
the 26o officers shared only one toilet--an outhouse several meters behind
the building. Electronic monitoring or even telephone contacts under
such primitive working conditions, the procurator felt, was a farfetched
94 Ibid., paras. 8o-8i.
95 Ibid., para. 84. See, also, Kalashnikov v. Russia, No.4 7o9 5/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R., 5 July 2002), dis-
cussed infra in section 2.3.2. and note ii9.
96 Ibid.
97 Not coincidentally the seriousness of the charge could be the sole basis for detention under
the old Code in the cases of some 6o-odd crimes. See Art.96, CrPC RSFSR. This was not
changed until the 2001 amendments to the old Code, effective in March of 2OO.
98 Zolotykh, op.cit. note 87.
99 Interview conducted 27 October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
100 Interview conducted 2 November 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
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notion. 0 1 Defense attorneys claimed that procurators routinely seek-and
judges routinely grant--applications for detention in custody when less
severe measures could be imposed, in violation of Article io8(i) of the
Code.Judges, defense attorneys and procurators alike admitted to us that
bail is rarely imposed; one procurator denied encountering a single case
of bail in the last ten years, suggesting little change in practice despite
the change in codes.o 2 Other options are also dismissed as unsatisfactory
(e.g., one judge warned us that defendants under house arrest could use
their telephones to interfere with an ongoing investigation), impractical
(cash bail leaves judges susceptible to allegations of bribery, claimed one
defense attorney, and the absence of the institution of a bail bondsmen
makes surety-based bail difficult) or otherwise ephemeral.103
While salutary reductions in pretrial detention have been achieved
by absolute limitations to offenses punishable by over two years, for
those charged with more serious crimes, the ideal of judicial control of
detention through the individualized application of multifaceted factors
has not been achieved, notwithstanding the best efforts of the drafters
to reform the process.
2.3.2. Duration and Conditions
The drafters of the new Code wished to reduce the traditional long terms
of pretrial detention but were largely unsuccessful in doing so. As Deputy
Elena Mizulina, a principal drafter of the Code, has commented: "such
long periods of detention are the result of the overall system of criminal
punishment in Russia, under which imprisonment can be for terms of 6
months to 30 years and more, and imprisonment for 3 to 5 years is not
considered lengthy"104
The limits on pretrial detention, not surprisingly parallel the limits
on the duration of the preliminary investigation. Detention is not sup-
posed to exceed two months. This deadline, however, is illusory A district
judge may extend this limit for up to six months if the investigation can-
not be completed within the ordinary time period and "there is no basis
for imposing a less restrictive form of restraint". In cases of serious (up
to ten years imprisonment) and very serious crimes (over ten years or the
death penalty) lo5 that are of "exceptional complexity", the same court may
further extend the limit up to a year by granting a motion filed in court by
101 Interview conducted 27 October 2oo5 byJeffrey Kahn.
102 Interviews conducted 17,21, 24, 25 and 27 October and z November 2005 byJeffrey Kahn. Bail
was authorized under prior law as well. See Art.99, CrPC RSFSR.
103 Ibid.
104 Mizulina, "Afterword", in Lupinskaia, op.cit, note 19, 744.
'05 Art.15(4-5), Criminal Code RF.
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the criminal investigator with the approval of a subject-level procurator.I"6
Further, detention beyond twelve months and up to eighteen months may
be approved "only in exceptional circumstances" by a subject-level court
with the consent of the Procurator General of the Russian Federation or
his or her deputy for defendants charged with very serious crimes.,07
Of course, even these time limits are of little use unless they are
enforced. In the past, there have been massive violations."°S One case
decided by the European Court of Human Rights suggests that little has
changed.Io9 The petitioner, Khudoyorov, was charged inJanuary 1999 with
possession of three grams of hashish. °10 He remained in pretrial detention
until the end of May 2004, a period during which time his detention was
extended sixteen times (ten of these occurring under the new Code).'
Khudoyorov was then released because the prosecution had reduced the
charges against him in the course of the trial then underway.112
Official statistics and individual accounts in interviews corroborate
concerns about the scope and duration of pretrial detention. TheJudicial
Department of the RF Supreme Court noted a 29% increase in the num-
ber of petitions to extend the period of pretrial detention examined by
federal district (pa0OH) (raion) courts during the first six months of 2006
in comparison with that period in 2005.II3 Of that number, courts granted
98.2% of the petitions (up from 97.9% in the first six months of 2oo5). I14
io6 Art.io9(2), CrPC.
107 Art.IO9(i-3), CrPC.
1o8 A survey published by the Supreme Court in 1998 disclosed that, in some courts in Moscow,
some defendants had been in detention waiting for trial for three years or more. In more ordi-
nary cases, 25% of the Moscow cases in x996 were tried within three to six months (compared
to 10.7% in 1992) and 35.8% were tried more than six months after being initiated (compared
to 6.9% in 1992). In the St. Petersburg area, 23% of the trials scheduled as of I April 199 7 were
scheduled in apparent violation of the required time limits and cases filed in t996 were being
given trial dates in the second half of 1997. In the Chitinskii Region in March 1997, of 578
defendants in detention, 114 waited more than a year for trial. In Kamchatka Region, of 527
criminal cases involving detainees, 235 took longer than 5 months to reach trial and 31 took over
a year. See Supreme Court, "Obzor sudebnoi praktiki Verkhovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii
o subliudenii srokov rassmotreniia ugolovnykh del sudami Rossiiskoi Federatsii", BVS (1998)
No.2.
109 Khudoyorov v. Russia, No.6847/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R., 12 April zoo6).
Ho Ibid., para. 12. Other charges were brought as well but they were ultimately dropped or a judg-
ment of acquittal was rendered as to them. Ibid., paras. 51-54.
I' Ibid., paras. 13-49.
112 Ibid. See, also, Mamedova v. Russia, op.cit. note 9o , in which the Vladimir court extended deten-
tion eight times to a total of over a year; and Popov v. Russia, No.2685 3/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R., ii
December 20o6), in which the Moscow court extended detention six times for a total of over
a year.
113 See Supreme Court, op.cit note 64.
114 it -1 1
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Consistent with the same time period in 2005, 29.6% of defendants ap-
pearing in federal district courts in the first half of 20o6 arrived directly
from cellblocks where theywaited under pretrial detention.y5 One attorney
told us that, in his experience, the length of detention could range between
several months and four years."I6 One senior judge in Krasnoiarsk told us
that, for most criminal cases in which pretrial detention is ordered, the
average time in detention is about six months, although some cases could
extend up to two years." 7
As for the conditions in pretrial detention facilities, excessive time
in pretrial detention makes for crowded detention centers, which has an
effect on conditions in those centers. The Supreme Court's 1998 survey
reported that: "in many places, the number of persons held in detention
centers exceeds the maximum permitted number by 2 to 3 times, which
causes social-psychological stress in those places of detention. InVolgograd,
in Detention Center No. i, where there is a limit of i,8oo persons, each
month over 3,ooo are confined there.""' The most recent cases heard by
the ECtHR indicate that little progress-if not some regression into even
more abysmal and overcrowded conditions of confinement-has taken
place since that time."9
Conditions of confinement were a large part of Kalashnikov v. Rus-
sia, one of the first cases to be decided on its merits against Russia by
the European Court of Human Rights2 ° The petitioner, Kalashnikov, a
banker in far-eastern Siberia charged with embezzlement, claimed that the
conditions of his detention amounted to torture and inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment. He was in detention from June 1995 until
being convicted in August 1999.12 The Court found that the inmates in
115 Ibid. The Judicial Department does not provide comparable information regarding the work
of the subject-level (ofnaCTHble) (oblastnye) courts.
116 Interview conducted 24 October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
"17 Interview with Valentin Frantsevich Baranovskii, Judge, Krasnoiarsk Krai Court, conducted
25 October zooS by Jeffrey Kahn.
118 Supreme Court, op.cit note io8.
119 See, for example, Belevitskiyv. Russia, op.cit. note 66, which describes conditions in remand center
No.IZ- 77/3 in Moscow between July and November 2001 and April to October 2002; Popov
v. Russia, op.cit. note 112, which describes conditions in remand prison SIZO 77h in Moscow
between May 2002 and February 2004; Mamedova v. Russia, op.cit. note 90, which describes
conditions in detention facility No.IZ-33/I in Vladimir Oblast'betweenJuly 2004 and August
20o5); and Kbudoyorov v. Russia, op.cit note 109, which describes conditions in detention facility
OD-IfT-2 in Vladimir Oblast' between February 20oo and May 2004.
izo Kaasbnikov v. Russia, op.cit. note 95.
121 Ibid., para. 13. The other part ofhis claim was about the length of confinement, on which he also
prevailed before the Court. Over the course ofhis four-year, two-month detention, Kalashnikov
filed more than fifteen motions for release and conducted a hunger strike; all his efforts at release
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his cell were forced to sleep in eight hour shifts; Kalashnikov shared his
bed with two other inmates, as the cells averaged 300% capacity. The cell
was constantly kept lit, lacked adequate ventilation and was overrun with
cockroaches and other insects; no anti-infestation treatment was effected
in his cell. Kalashnikov was allowed outdoor activity for one or two hours
a day, the rest of the time he was confined to his cell, with a very limited
space for himself and a stuffy, smoke-filled atmosphere. Throughout his
detention, the applicant contracted various skin diseases and fungal infec-
tions, scabies and lost his toenails and some fingernails; he was permitted
a hot shower twice per month. The applicant was detained on occasions
with persons suffering from syphilis and tuberculosis. The lavatory facili-
ties were filthy and provided no privacy and inmates were forced to eat
in close proximity to these facilities. 2 Russia pled for a margin of appre-
ciation for the economic difficulties faced by the country Its representa-
tive argued that because Kalashnikov's conditions of confinement "did
not differ from, or at least were no worse than those of most detainees
in Russia", he could not be said to have suffered torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment.I23 The Court experienced little difficulty in holding
that Kalashnikov's treatment had violated numerous Convention articles
and awarded him damages.'12 4
were refused on the same grounds, which routinely cited "the seriousness of the offence with
which he was charged and the danger of his obstructing the establishment of the truth while
at liberty". Ibid., paras. 34, 38, 41, 43, 45, 46, 51, 6o, 68, 70, 72, 73, 74 and 77. Kalashnikov also
contended that, from August 1995 until November 1995, no investigative activity took place
concerning his case (and the basis for his detention) as the two investigators in charge of the
case were on holiday and the person to whom the case was temporarily assigned undertook
no action. Ibid., para. 35. Refusals continued even after the investigation of his case had been
completed, which made it impossible to interfere with the "establishment of the truth". In
one astonishingly Kafka-esque argument, the prosecution sought and received a further delay
in Kalashnikov's trial in order to conduct a psychiatric evaluation of Kalashnikov's ability to
undergo trial, "in view of the length of the applicant's detention". Ibid., para. 71.
122 Ibid., paras. 14-20, 97-03.
123 Ibid., paras. 93-94. Vasilii Vlasihin, one of three experts who appeared in Strasbourg on behalf
of the Russian government in the case (see ibid., para. 5(a)), later described the essence of the
argument presented by the respondent as that "the conditions of confinement were Russian".
E-mail correspondence between William Burnham and Vasilii Vlasihin, 26 May 2007 (on file
with William Burnham).
124 The Court found violations of Art.3 ("no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment"); Art.5(3) (prompt authorization of detention by a judge
and trial within a reasonable time); and Art.6(6) ("everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time"). For all of Kalashnikov's troubles, the Court awarded him
a meager EUR 8,ooo in non-pecuniary damages, costs and expenses.
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3. Pretrial Procedure, Part II:
The Preliminary Investigation
3.1. The Criminal Investigator
The official in charge of the preliminary investigation is the criminal in-
vestigator (cnegoBaTenb) &edovatel). 125A though the police and "operative
investigators" (onepaMBaHKw) (operativniki) are involved in the actual execu-
tion of most investigative actions, they act at the direction and under the
supervision of the criminal investigator once a criminal case is initiated.126
In turn, the criminal investigator is supervised by the procurator.
The historical model of the Russian criminal investigator is the
investigating magistrate of Western Europe. Russian investigators are
supposed to have the same higher legal education as practicing lawyers
or judges and have been expected to conduct a "complete and objective
investigation of all sides" of the case. 127 However, while all have some legal
education, only 6o% have graduated from the standard four- or five-year
law curriculum.'2 Moreover, in terms of temperament and inclination,
the Russian criminal investigator has also varied considerably from the
continental Western European ideal. 129 Despite their charge to undertake
125 Art.i~i, CrPC provides that criminal investigators be allocated to the following federal organiza-
tions: the procuracy (§2(1)); the Federal Security Service (FSB, successor to the KGB) (§2(2) and
4); the Ministry of Internal Affairs (§2(3)); or the Tax Police (§2(4)). Art.5i1(5-6) also suggests
the possibility of investigation by criminal investigators "of the agency that detected" or "of
the agency that has investigative jurisdiction over" crimes itemized in these sections. See, also,
Boris Gavrilov, "Sledstvennyi apparat organov vnutrennykh del", Otecbestvennye Zapiski (2003)
No.z, ii, available at <http://www.strana-oz.ruPnumid=Ii&article=485>.
i26 "Operativniki" also can act independently of the criminal investigator if there is no criminal
case that has been initiated. See Federal'nyi Zakon "Ob operativno-rozysknoi deiatel'nosti"
No.x4 4 -FZ, signed 12 August 1995. The results of tactical investigative operations (e.g., stings,
'controlled buys' of illegal substances, the use of informers or surveillance, etc.) "may not be
used in the proof process unless those results meet the evidentiary requirements imposed by
this Code". Art.89, CrPC.
127 Art.213(3), CrPC RSFSR.
,28 Often, criminal investigators are law students studying in the evening divisions of law schools
or by correspondence. See Foglesong, op.cit. note 47, 552. There is also evidence of relatively lax
supervision by lawyer-procurators, since, on average, one procurator supervises between fifteen
and twenty investigators, each managing approximately fifteen cases. Federal agencies have
had great difficulty in retaining qualified criminal investigators in recent years. Between 1993
and 2002, the number of persons who left criminal investigation agencies more than doubled.
Although the number ofpersons with higher legal education remained the same (6o%) in 2oo2,
only 43% of personnel had over three years of criminal investigation experience, down from
55% in 1993. Gavrilov, op.cit note 125.
129 There are, of course, indications that continental Western European systems also depart from
their own ideal in practice. Abraham Goldstein and Martin Marcus, "The Myth of Judicial
Supervision inThree 'Inquisitorial' Systems: France, Italy and Germany", 87(2) aleLawJournal
(1977), 240-283, at 266, which states that "prosecutors [...I have proven to be relatively passive
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a comprehensive investigation of both incriminating and exculpatory
evidence, few Russian criminal investigators have shown much interest
in collecting anything other than incriminating evidence.
It is in part because of this reality that the new Code deletes the "com-
plete and objective investigation" requirement and places the investigator
on the "prosecution side" of the criminal process. 30 As Deputy Mizulina
observed, these changes are simply an "admission that the investigator
in the current criminal process is not an unbiased investigative judge".13I
The changes also reflect the Code's removal from the "prosecution side"
of its "judicial" duties of deciding on pretrial detention or the power to
order searches of home or private correspondence. Both actions now
require explicit judicial authorization.132 The investigator, however, still
enjoys considerable quasi-judicial powers in conducting the preliminary
investigation and compiling the dossier or case file.
3.2. The Nature and Significance of the Case File
Despite major changes in trial procedure and other reforms, the new Code
retains the formal preliminary investigation and its end product-the dos-
sier or case file. The case file contains evidence collected by the criminal
investigator-statements of witnesses, real and documentary evidence,
and records of searches and other investigative actions. It is compiled by
decidedly non-adversarial methods. Records of interrogations and other
actions are made in non-public sessions by the investigator without the
participation of the defense, except for actions taken with the accused pres-
ent or at the defense's request.33 However, there is noper se problem with
any of this from the standpoint of adversarial principles and equal rights.
As the US Supreme Court has observed, referring to the US system:
"Our system of justice is, and has always been, an inquisitorial one at the investiga-
tory stage (even the grand jury is an inquisitorial body), and no other disposition
and reactive and have left it largely to the police to develop the facts to be entered in the dos-
sier".
130 See Kozak and Mizulina, op.cit. note 17, General Part, Part I, comment 2.
131 Mizulina, op.cit. note 104, 744. See, also, Solomon, op.cit. note 5, 79-80, in which it is argued
that subordination to the police and Ministry of Internal Affairs has made investigators "part
of the culture of policing"; they "were expected to serve the struggle against crime and faced
incentives, including performance evaluations, that emphasized indicting and convicting of-
fenders".
132 See Art.29(a), CrPC (powers of a court generally); Art.io8 (pretrial detention); Art.165 (general
procedures for judicial warrants); Art.182(3) (search of a dwelling); Art.i85(2) (interception of
correspondence); Art.i86 (monitoring or recording communications).
133 Art.4 7(4), CrPC (right to attend); Art.53(2) (permission of the investigator required for defense
counsel to ask questions). Actually, it is more accurate to call these sessions 'secret', since it a
crime to reveal anything learned from them without the investigator's express permission. See
infra text accompanying notes 164 and 250.
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is conceivable. Even if detectives were to bring impartial magistrates around with
them to all interrogations, there would be no decision for the impartial magistrate
to umpire." '34
In general, adversarial principles and the equality of parties apply to tri-
als and other court proceedings, not to investigations. However, if the
products of the non-adversarial investigation--by reason of their having
been processed through an investigative process-can be used at trial as
evidence of guilt, then that is a violation of adversarial principles. When
this happens, the 'investigation' process becomes more than just a vehicle
for finding out information. It serves an 'early trial' function by transform-
ing the information received into 'pre-admitted' evidence ready for use at
trial. If the products of the investigator's work were really only partisan
information gathered by one side of the criminal proceedings, they should
be no more admissible in evidence at trial than similar summaries of evi-
dence or records of investigative activities drawn up by the defense.
In the traditional civil law system, materials in the file are relied
on--to varying degrees depending on the country and the circumstanc-
es-as evidence of guilt. In some continental systems, "courts base their
judgments [... mainly on the dossier, which contains the results of the
pre-trial investigation" and the trial is more a "verification of the results
of the prior stages than an active inquiry" of its own. I35 In such countries,
a trial would not typically involve live presentation of all or--in some
cases-even any of the witnesses. I36 In common law adversarial systems,
none of the contents of such a case file would be admissible in evidence.
Only evidence presented first-hand at trial-where the right of cross-ex-
amination by the defense can be afforded--will count. 37
On the spectrum of immediacy and orality of trial proceedings, Rus-
sia is more towards the adversarial 'live testimony' end of the spectrum
134 McNeilv. Wisconsin, 5O US I7, 181 n.2 (i99i).
'35 This description of Dutch trials is from Christopher Harding, Phil Fennell, NicoJorg and Bert
Swart (eds.), Criminaljustice in Europe:A Comparative Study (Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1995), 287.
i36 Bron McKillop, "Readings and Hearings in French Criminal Justice: Five Cases in the Tribunal
Correctionnel", 46(4) American Journal of Comparative Law (1998), 757-783, at 774-775. In the
five cases observed, "the statements of 17 people, apart from the defendants, were included in
the dossiers but only one of those appeared at a hearing and that was because he was a civil
party claiming damages". See, also, Bron McKillop, 'Anatomy of a French Murder Case", 45(3)
American Journal of Comparative Law (1997), 527-583, at 563. In the murder case, fourteen fact
witness statements were in the case file but only two of those witnesses testified at trial.
137 There is a limited amount of evidence that can be 'pre-admitted' in adversarial systems, such
as prior testimony from a proceeding in which the defense had the right of cross examination.
See, for example, Federal Rule of Evidence 8o4 (b)(), which holds that prior sworn testimony
is admissible but only "if the party against whom the testimony is now offered [ ... had an
opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony" by questioning the witness. The
Federal Rules of Evidence are available at <http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/>.
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than most countries in continental Europe.35 However, Russia claims to
have adopted adversarial principles as its standard. By that standard, its
treatment of the case file contents falls short. Not only are adversarial
principles and equality of treatment violated, but the secrecy with which
the case file contents are gathered deprives the defendant and the public
of the right to an open public trial.
It should be emphasized that the use of the contents of the case file
as 'pre-admitted' evidence is not the only way a case file can dominate
the trial. Judges read the case file before the trial starts, they have it in
front of them to consult and ask questions from during the trial, and they
use it for reference in the process of writing their decision in the case.39
Whether the contents are ever actually presented formally at trial or used
by the judge to justify a decision, they will have had their effect.
3.3. Use of the Case File at Trial under the New Code
Given these standards, how do provisions of the new Code fare? One can
find both 'dossier system' and 'adversarial system' aspects. On the dossier
system side is the fact that the new Code retains the case file and appears
to give its contents a presumptive exalted status as evidence. Article 74(1)
of the Code defines evidence as "any information that provides a basis for
a court [ ...) to determine [ ... the presence or absence of circumstances
that are subject to proof in proceedings in a criminal case". It then lists
all the items that are considered to be "admissible evidence", among them
"testimony given by a victim or witness". However, testimony of a witness
is defined in a specific way as "information communicated by a witness
during questioning conducted in the course of tbepretrialprocess in the criminal
case or in court in accordance with the requirements of Articles 187-I9i".140
The cited articles govern procedures for criminal investigator questioning
of witnesses during the preliminary investigation.
The quasi-judicial screening and verification functions that the
investigator performs are emphasized in the new Code's provisions on
'verification of evidence'. These provisions require not that the inves-
tigator just collect whatever information comes his or her way, but that
the investigator go through the process of verifying the information
138 See supra note 136 (French system), infra note 159 (Austrian, German and Italian systems) and
text at supra note 135 (Dutch system). The ECHR defines "adversariality" rather narrowly. See
Treschel, op.cit. note 3, as there discussed.
139 At the decision-making stage, the influence of the case file's version of the facts is particu-
larly strong, given that its only competition in the mind of the judge is what the judge might
remember from the live testimony at trial. The judge has no verbatim trial record to consult,
only non-verbatim summaries that the court secretary might have been able to jot down during
the trial (the standard practice in civil law systems). See infra text at note 311.
140 Art.7 9 (i), CrPC (emphasis added).
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received. This presumably converts the information into 'admissible
evidence'. Verification is performed "by comparing it to other evidence
available in the criminal case file and also by identifying its source and
obtaining other evidence that corroborates or contradicts the evidence
being reviewed".14' Based on the foregoing, witness statements-having
been 'verified' and converted into 'evidence' by the criminal investigator
during the preliminary investigation-would seem to be sufficient alone
to convict the defendant at trial.
On the other hand, the current Article 240(l) (and its predecessor
provisions) establish the twin requirements of orality (yCTHOCTb) (ustnost)
and immediacy (HenocpegcTBeHHOCTb) (neposredstvennost) as fundamental
principles of the Russian trial. Article 240(l) provides:
'll evidence in the trial of a criminal case shall be subjected to first-hand examina-
tion [ ...I The court must hear the testimony of the defendant, the victim and wit-
nesses, and findings of any expert, must inspect the physical evidence, must read
aloud official records and other documents, and must conduct other judicial actions
to examine the evidence."
However, Article 240 is not quite what it seems. The first sentence of
Article 24o(i) requires that evidence be subjected to "first-handexamina-
tion" at trial, not that it be first-hand evidence. The final phrase confirms
this when it permits the court to "read aloud official records and other
documents" in the case file. In addition, Article 285 provides that "official
records of investigative actions", expert findings and "other documents
included in the criminal case file may be read aloud" at trial, presumably
including witness and victim statements and expert findings.142 In fact,
Article 240 states only a general principle that is modified by later, more
specific provisions. Certainly, Article 240's reference to "hearing [...I the
findings of experts" is not read as requiring that the judge do anything
more than 'hear' them as he or she reads them, since Article 285 explicitly
states that expert findings can be read in place of live testimony43 Thus,
to determine how particular items in the case file are treated, one has to
consult more specific articles of the Code.
141 Art.87, CrPC.
142 This would include medical and other expert conclusions, official descriptions (protocols)
of examinations of the crime scene, search and seizure results, line-ups and forensic experi-
ments.
143 Art.282 provides that the court has discretion, on its own motion or that of a party, to sum-
mon the expert to explain his or her findings in court once those findings have been read into
evidence (but this is not required). See, also, Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo SudaNo.2o2-0 of
22 April 2005, at para. 2.z, (petition of Romanova) (unpublished decision available on Garant),
in which it was found that it is not unconstitutional to accept expert findings in lieu of expert
testimony, since defense has the right to make a motion to have the expert appear and give
testimony
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Regarding the use of the testimony of witnesses or victims contained
in the case file, the drafters of the new Code took to heart the adversarial
critique outlined in the last section and wanted to seriously limit the
practice. Indeed, the original provisions of the new Code on reading prior
testimony effectively imposed a requirement that only live testimony be
used at trial. Article 281 provided that case file testimony could be read
at trial if the witnesses did not appear or contradicted themselves, but
only if all the parties consented. The drafters figured that the defense
was not likely to consent if the prosecution's witnesses did not show up,
so this effectively ensured the defense the right to confront and examine
all prosecution witnesses? 44 Courts hated the consent requirement and
engaged in tortured interpretations to get around its requirements and
there was a firestorm of criticism from law enforcement. 145 As a result,
Article 281 was amended in 2003 restoring exceptions that had existed in
the old Code that permitted reading the statements of witnesses that are
unavailable. 146 There were problems with the drafter's original consent ap-
proach to the extent that it applied to witnesses who appeared at trial and
testified contrary to their prior statement. Permission from the opposing
party to confront its witness with the prior inconsistent statement would
not likely ever be granted, making it impossible to impeach the witness
with that prior statement. However, we would suggest that the drafters
were otherwise on the right track in terms of adversarial principles in
seeking to curtail the use of the contents of the case file at trial. I47
The amended and current version of Article 281 permits the reading
of case file testimony of victims or witnesses under three circumstances.
First, it can be read if the witness's failure to appear is due to death or
severe illness, inability to execute a subpoena on a foreign national or
144 Of course, if the defendant admitted guilt, the defense could well consent for tactical reasons.
Consent could avoid more effective and emotional in-court oral testimony in the event the
witness appeared at an adjourned trial date. Also, consent could help gain a more lenient sen-
tence in return for such cooperation. However, see infra text accompanying note 157 (routine
waiver by counsel).
145 M. Adamaitis, "Soglasie storon ne tozhdestvenno soglasiiu odnoi storony", Rossiiskaia iustitsiia
(2003) No.2, which discusses judicial decisions that interpreted Art.z81 to require the defense
to give reasons justifying non-consent and as permitting reading on consent of only one party;
one decision maintained that it violated adversarial principles not to permit reading of testimony
See, also, 0. Pavlovskii, "Sostiazatel'noe pravosudie nuzhdaetsia v dopolnitel'nom istochnike
prava", Rossiiskaia iustitsiia (2003) No.7, which points out how defense could be hurt by the
consent requirement; and Iu. Briukov, "Novoe ugolovno-protsessual'noe zakonodatel'stvo i
praktika prokurorskogo nadzora", Rossiiskaia iustitsia (2003) No.6, which notes that the first
deputy procurator general urged an amendment to permit reading, arguing that it is permitted
under the ECHR.
146 Art.i(T) (amending Art.280, Federal'nyi Zakon "0 vnesenii i dopolnenii v Ugolovno-
protsessual'nyi kodeks RE" No.9 z-FZ, signed 4July 2003.
147 However, see infra note 157 and accompanying text.
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"natural disaster or other extraordinary circumstances precluding atten-
dance in court". 48 Second, if the witness or victim fails to appear at trial,
the statement may be read aloud in open court "with the consent of the
parties" (the former sole exception).49 Third, on either party's motion, the
statement may be read if there are "substantial contradictions" between
the live testimony offered in court and the prior statement.' 50
By far the most commonly invoked exception is the first one, since
it is a common occurrence for witnesses not to appear for trial. In Soviet
times, the rate of witness appearances was quite high. However, with the
passing of Soviet power and the general relaxation of public order and at-
titudes towards authority, the rate of witness appearances has gone down
considerably '5' As a result, the pressure is on judges to find an exception
permitting use of the written statement. In this respect, the open-ended
"other extraordinary circumstance precluding attendance in court" of
Article 281 has proven useful.52
However, courts had long ago gotten used to just reading the case
file contents without finding any exception. An example is a case from
the mid-199os, where the defendant was convicted of theft based on a
confession in the case file that he gave before the criminal investigator,
which he recanted at trial as coerced by "the application of improper in-
vestigative methods". Not a single witness-including the alleged victim
of the crime-appeared to testify at the trial and, the Supreme Court
noted, there was "no indication of the reasons for their absence". The
Supreme Court Criminal Division reversed and ordered a new trial.I53
148 Art.281(2), CrPC.
149 Art.2816), CrPC.
150 Art.281(3), CrPC. The defendant's prior testimony may be also be read when the defendant
refuses to give testimony at trial after his earlier voluntary cooperation during the preliminary
investigation (Art.276)(3)) and in the small number of criminal cases in which the defendant
is tried in abstentia per Art.24 7(4 ), CrPC.
15I See infra notes 156-158.
152 Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.233 -O of 27 October 2ooo, VKS (2oos) No.2 (peti-
tion of Shchennikov), in which the Court suggested that the exception for unavailability is
constitutionally based. It observed that, unless the witness were truly unavailable as defined
by the law, reading the testimony of an absent witness would violate adversarial principles and
equality of the parties and would constitute doubtful evidence that must be interpreted in
the defendant's favor, since the requisite certitude necessary for relying on the evidence is not
present. Art.49(3) of the Constitution provides that "[any remaining doubts about guilt shall
be resolved in favor of the defendant". The Court also noted that Art.6(3)(d) of the ECHR
requires production of the witnesses against the defendant at trial but does not make clear
whether in its view it would be a violation of the ECHR if the absent witness was unavailable
for one of the reasons set out in the Code. Moreover, there is no distinction made between
witnesses central to the prosecution's cases and more peripheral witnesses.
153 Supreme Court, In re Zavlialov, Opredelenie SKVerkhovnogo Suda of 1s September 19 9 5 , BVS
(i996) No.ii.
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What is most telling about the case is that the conviction had earlier been
affirmed by an intermediate appellate court, thereby suggesting that at
least the lower courts did not exactly view this as an obvious error or an
aberration. In a more recent case under the new amended Code, all the
Supreme Court Criminal Division required to permit the reading of four
witnesses' testimonies were the facts that the witnesses lived 650 kilo-
meters away and that some efforts had been made to get them vouchers
for transportation.54 In another case, the Court reversed a jury acquittal
because the judge had not permitted the reading of the testimony of
eyewitnesses to murder, finding, at least as to one of the witnesses, that
the court had not made a proper determination of whether one of the
witnesses was too sick to attend. 55
Courtroom observations conducted in October 2oo3 in Moscow am-
ply document the high frequency of non-appearance of witnesses. 56 Those
observations also demonstrate difficulties with the second exception to live
attendance and testimony discussed above--party consent. As suggested
earlier, one would think that the defense would not often consent. Yet
in the cases observed in the Basmann Inter-Municipal Court in Moscow,
the appointed defense lawyers consented routinely7 In one rare case,
the judge proposed to read the testimony of five absent witnesses and
defense counsel gave consent, although the defendant himself objected?5s
These instances of blanket consent by appointed counsel suggests that,
while consent is consistent with adversarial theory, the competence level
of appointed defense lawyers makes the consent exception unrealistic in
practice.
The problem with the third exception, which permits reading prior
testimony in the event that there are contradictions, is in determining
what constitutes a "substantial contradiction". Some judges consider that
if a witness hesitates at all or leaves out anything that was in his or her
prior statement to the investigator, then that is a sufficient "contradiction"
154 Supreme Court, Kassatsionnoe opredelenie SK po ugolovnym delam Verkhovnogo Suda No.89 -
0o6-40 of io November 2oo6.
155 Supreme Court, In re Tarasov et at., Opredelenie prezidiuma, "Po delu Tarasova i drugykh,"
(prigovor Dal'novostochnogo okruzhnogo voennogo suda) No.2-054/2oo2, "Obzor sudebnoi
praktiki Verkhovnogo Suda za III kvartal 2005 goda utverzhden postanovieniem prizidiuma
Verkhovnogo Suda ot 23 noiabria 2005 g.", BVS (2oo6) No.3.
x56 Karinna Moskalenko and Leonid Nikitinskii (eds.), Basmannoepravosudie: uroki samooborony.
Posobie dlia advokatov (prochtiiperedaidrugomu) (Publichnaia reputatsiia, Moscow, 2004).
157 Ibid., 23, 27, 29, 6o and 67, in all of which no party objects to continuing the hearing in the
absence of live witnesses; and ibid., 52, 55 and 59, in which, while the defendant and defense
counsel did not object to continuing the proceeding in the absence of witnesses, the court
postponed the hearing on the insistence of the procurator.
158 Ibid., .The trial was postponed. Moreover, in this and other cases, judges did not read the
witness statements aloud as required but simply noted that they were in the case file.
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to read the whole written statement into evidence. However, abuse of
this exception is perhaps not as problematic as is the case for the others,
since the witness will be present in court and can be examined upon the
contents of the earlier statement as well as any live testimony he or she
might give. "59
Before leaving the issue of calling witnesses in person at trial to testif,
a few words should be said about anonymous witnesses-an innovation
of the new Code. Article 278(5) of the Code provides:
"When necessary for the security of a witness, his close relatives, other relatives
or close associates, the court may, without disclosing the true information on the
identity of the witness, question him out of the view of other participants in the
court proceedings, which decision shall be in the form of an order or ruling."
It goes without saying that this infringes on adversarial principles to the
extent that it interferes with the defendant's right to confront the witness
and test the witness' testimony through questioning. However, the use
of anonymous witnesses is permitted by the European Court of Human
Rights. Similarly to situations where witness statements are read, a con-
viction cannot be based "to a decisive extent" on anonymous testimony
and "the handicaps under which the defence labours [must] be sufficiently
counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the judicial authorities".' 6o
159 Separate and apart from any critique based on Russian constitutional rights to adversary prin-
ciples, Russia's regime could also constitute aviolation ofArt.6(3)(d), ECHR, which secures the
right of defendants "to examine or have examined the witnesses against him". The Strasbourg
Court has made it clear that there is no requirement that "in order to be used in evidence
statements of witnesses should always be made at a public hearing in court". See Kostovski v.
Netherlands, No.11454/85 (Eur.Ct.H.R., 22 November 1989), para. 4. Further, the Court has
cautioned that "admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for regulation by national law"
and that all it does is "ascertain whether the proceedings as a whole, including the way in which
evidence was taken, were fair". Van Mechelen and Others v. Netherlands, Nos.21363/93, 21364/93,
21427/93 and 22056/93 (Eur.Ct.H.R., 23 April 1997). Further, reading statements obtained in the
pretrial stage is not in itself inconsistent with the requirements of Art. 6(3)(d) but this is so only
if "the rights of the defense are respected. As a rule, these rights require that the defendant
be given an adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him
either when he was making his statements or at a later stage of the proceedings." Kostovski
v. Netherlands, supra, para. 41. See, also, Unterpertinger v. Austria, No.9 12o/8o (Eur.Ct.H.R., 24
November 1986), in which, when the victim refused to testify, the defendant was convicted
based on the statement made by the victim to the police, a violation of Art.6(3)(d); PS. V.
Germany, No.339oo/96 (Eur.Ct.H.R., 2o December 2oo1), in which an eight-year-old victim
of sexual assault was not questioned either by the court or defense, a violation of Art.6(3)(d);
and A.M. v Italy, No.37 019/9 7 (Eur.Ct.H.R., 14 December 1999), in which a conviction based
solely on a pretrial deposition taken by a police officer was held to be a violation of Art.6(3)(d).
Compare, however, Artner v. Austria, No.13161/87 (Eur.Ct.H.R., 28 July 1992), in which state-
ments to police and the investigating judge corroborated by other evidence proved sufficient
for conviction. See, generally,Trechsel, op.cit note 3,289-322; and SarahJ. Summers, "The Right
to Confrontation after Crawford v. Washington: A 'Continental European' Perspective", 2(3)
International Commentary on Evidence (2oo4), which compares ECtHR jurisprudence with the
US requirement of "confrontation".
16o Van Mechelen v. Netherlands, op.cit note 159. See, also, Kostovski v. Netherlands, op.cit note 159.
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While Russia's Code does not set out these two qualifications, practice
indicates that Russian courts nonetheless impose them.' '
To summarize, Russian law may be more inclined towards the 'live
testimony' end of the spectrum than some Western European continental
systems. However, the law falls short of its adversarial and equal rights
ideals to the extent that the case file is permitted to be used in place of
first-hand evidence directly examined at trial and is allowed in other ways
to dominate trial proceedings. 62
3.4. Components of the Investigation
3.4.1. Interrogating Witnesses
A 'witness' (cBweTerib) (videtel) is someone who has information about
the crime under investigation. However, a suspect or an accused is not
considered to be a witness, nor is the victim. Each category of participants
has a set of different rights and obligations that applies to each case.
Interrogating witnesses is probably the most common activity of
the investigator. As noted earlier, the criminal investigator in Russia has
subpoena power to compel attendance of potential witnesses. Refusal to
give testimony when summoned by the investigator is a criminal offense
punishable by up to 90 days imprisonment. I63
It is also a negative factor if the anonymous witnesses are police officers rather than private
citizens. See Doorson v. Netherlands, No.2o 5 24 / 9 2 (Eur.Ct.H.R., 26 March 1996).
161 Kassatsionnoe opredelenie SK po ugolovnym delam Verkhovnogo Suda No.4 3-Oo6-9 of I4June
2oo6, available at < http://www.supcourt.ru/arxiv-outFEXTPHP?id-text=72557&iltext>, in
which it was held that the Code's provisions were not violated when the trial judge denied a
defense motion to disclose the identity of a witness; the witness testified from an adjoining
room through a computer program that disguised his voice and defense and other parties were
permitted to ask questions and received exhaustive answers; and Nadzornoe opredelenie SK
po ugolovnym delam Verkhovnogo Suda No.24 -Do 4 -9 of i March 2005, BVS (zoo6) No.6,
in which it was held that Art.6(3)(d), ECHR had been violated when the trial court did not
permit defense counsel to confront anonymous witnesses with questions, when their evidence
was relied on for conviction. If one compares the practice Russia requires with those used in
some of the cases on anonymous witnesses decided by the ECtHR, then the Russian courts'
interpretations of Art.6(3)(d) may be stricter than the Strasbourg court's interpretations.
162 The new Georgian Criminal Procedure Code (slated to be enacted in the fall of 20o7) ensures
that the case file will not dominate the trial by eliminating it altogether, requiring instead that
the state present its evidence only at trial. See, for example, Art.2o, Draft Criminal Procedure
Code of the Republic of Georgia (unpublished), which states that "[a~ll evidence, save excep-
tions provided for by this Code, shall be examined directly and orally at the trial"; and "[oinly
the evidence examined at the trial, with both parties participating, shall form the basis for
the court judgment". A draft Ukrainian Criminal Procedure Code prepared under the auspices
ofJudge Viktor Shishkin of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine appears headed in the same
direction. Author William Burnham, once again with the sponsorship of OPDAT (see supra
note 15), participated in drafting sessions involving both these draft codes.
163 Art.3 o8, Criminal Code RF. Witnesses and victims are warned of this criminal liability at the
beginning of their questioning. See Art.164(5), Criminal Code RF. False testimony is likewise
a criminal offense, of course, about which witnesses and victims are also warned. See Art.3o 7,
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The preliminary investigation is closed to the public and the contents
of the investigator's files are secret. Any disclosure of information about--
or obtained during-the preliminary investigation is at the discretion of
the investigator or higher-level prosecutorial officials. 164 Unauthorized
disclosure to the public is a criminal offense punishable, again, by up to
90 days imprisonment.6 5
The record made of the interrogation is not a verbatim one but a
summary called a 'protocol' (npOTOKOn) 0 Orotokol), which is drafted by the
investigator (though stated in the first person) and verified by the witness
by signing it and initialing each page. The term used to describe the state-
ments given to the investigator and signed by the witness is 'testimony'
(noKa3aHwe) (pokazanie), the same term used forwhat witnesses give at trial.
A person who is questioned as a witness must be informed of his or her
rights at the start of the questioning and the session must be conducted in
the language in which the person being questioned wishes to speak.,6 6 The
witness has the right to use documents and notes. I67 Also, he or she may
request that photographs, sound and/or video recordings or filming of the
questioning be made and kept with the case file as a sealed record. 68
As noted earlier, the defense has no right to be present during wit-
ness interrogations.' 69 Unless defense counsel can persuade the investiga-
tor (or, if refusal is appealed, the judge) to give permission to attend an
interrogation-an exceptionally rare circumstance-only the criminal
Criminal Code. The right against self-incrimination and incrimination of a spouse or close rela-
tive is constitutionally protected. See Art.5 1, RF Constitution. The Code also provides statutory
privileges that protect the witness or victim from testimony that would tend to incriminate a
spouse or close relative; attorneys, priests and federal legislators also enjoy limited privileges
concerning matters related to their professional activities. See Art.5 6(3-4 ), CrPC.
164 Art.16i(2), CrPC (referencing Art.31o, Criminal Code RF).
165 Art.si(3), CrPC (permission process for disclosure).
i66 Art.189(i), CrPC. Ifawitness appears for questioning accompanied by an attorney, the attorney
has the right to be present during the interrogation and may exercise all of the rights that a
defense counsel possesses while providing legal assistance to a defendant during an investigative
action. Art.189(5), CrPC. However, ifawitness arrives for questioning without counsel, there is
no provision in the Code that would require the investigator to postpone the encounter until
a later time.
167 Art.i89(3), CrPC.
168 Art.189( 4 ), CrPC. Several practitioners, academics and a retired judge in Moscow all expressed
skepticism that an investigator would permit any electronic recording of an interrogation,
regardless of any request and even if it were technically feasible to do so. Some practitioners
doubted that such a recording would be of any benefit to the person being questioned. If the
concern was with coercion, they said, that was easy enough to apply off camera. One investigator
in Krasnoiarsk noted that, although all witnesses were informed of this right, the investigator
could not recall a single witness who had ever exercised it.
169 Defense counsel can be present when the accused gives testimony but the accused (and the
victim) are not considered to be 'witnesses'.
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investigator will be present.' 70 The defense will have an opportunity to
review the case file statements but only after the investigation is nearly
complete.'7I Anecdotal reports indicate that investigators are no more
receptive under the new Code to defense requests to examine evidence
or witnesses than they were under the old. To be sure, the investigator
has little incentive to give consent.
3.4.2. Interrogation of the Suspect or Accused
A'suspect' (nOgo3peBaeMbI) (oodozrevaemyt) or an'accused' (o6BMHqeMbIA)
(obviniaemyi) is interrogated and his or her statement taken in a similar
manner to that of a witness. However, while the statements of a suspect
or an accused-like those of a witness-are called 'testimony', neither the
suspect nor the accused is under any legal obligation to tell the truth.72
Before interrogation begins, the criminal investigator must advise the
suspect or accused of a whole list of rights, including the right "not to
give explanations or testimony" regarding the charges or suspicions. 73
This is not as emphatic as a "right to silence" but the non-waivable right
to counsel during interrogation, discussed below, compensates somewhat
for the absence of bullet-point Miranda-style warnings of this sort. 74
Perhaps the single most important right a suspect or an accused
faced with interrogation in any system can have is the right to counsel.
The Constitution provides that every arrestee or accused is entitled to
counsel and appointed counsel is provided for by statute.7 5 Approximately
6o% of criminal defendants in Moscow and St. Petersburg and 75-80%
outside of these cities are represented by appointed counsel. 76
The right to counsel in pretrial stages of a case has evolved over time.
The i96o Code provided a right to counsel only after the entire preliminary
170 See Art.53()(5), CrPC, which provides defense counsel with the right to participate in the
questioning of the suspect or the accused-but not the questioning of witnesses-and the
right to participate in "other investigative actions conducted with the participation of the
suspect or accused or pursuant to [... defense counsel's motion".
171 Art.53(l)(7), CrPC.
172 Compare Art.s6 4 (5) (on the witness) with Art.173(2 and 4) (on the accused), CrPC. A suspect
is a person who has been placed under arrest, subjected to pretrial restraint or against whom a
criminal case has been initiated. Art.4 6(), CrPC. An accused is someone against whom criminal
charges have been filed. Art.4 7 (s), CrPC.
173 Art.4 6(4)(2) (on the suspect) and Art.4 7 (4)(3) (on the accused), CrPC. Somewhat strangely, the
suspect or accused is told that what is said can be used against him or her only "upon agreeing
to give testimony" (npm cornactn [no,3o3peBaeMoro/06BwlHqeMoroI £gaTb noKa3aHma) (pH soglasii
fpodozrevaemogo/obviniaemogol dat'pokazanila) and not before.
174 See infra text accompanying note 189.
175 Art.4 8(I-2), RF Constitution; and Art.50(2), CrPC. Like several other rights in the Constitu-
tion, the right to appointed counsel exists "in those situations specified by federal statute".
Art. 4 8(2), RF Constitution.
176 Interview with Evgenii Semeniako, President, Federal Chamber of Advocates, in Rossiiskii
advokat (2oo5) No.2, available at <http://gra.litsa.ru/news.php?p=2i>.
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investigation was completed and the file was transmitted to the accused to
examine, the final step before it is presented to the procurator for approval
to be filed in court.1 77 Then, in 1972, counsel's access was possible with the
permission of the procurator at the point that charges are presented but
before the investigation was complete.7y This did not work well, since
there was no incentive for procurators ever to grant such permission. In
1992, the Code was changed to permit access to counsel for an accused
when charges were presented (without any need for procurator permis-
sion) and for anyone else in custody for suspicion of having committed a
crime or pending presentation of charges. However, the point at which
the right arose was defined as being "from the moment that lthe suspect]
is served with a protocol of his arrest or the order imposing detention".179
As a result, law enforcement officers seeking to interrogate a suspect or
an accused without counsel would simply delay the preparation and pre-
sentation of the arrest or detention documents.
In a 2000 case, Maslov, however, the Constitutional Court held this
tactic unconstitutional as a violation of Article 48(2) of the 1993 Con-
stitution, which provides that everyone is entitled to counsel "from the
point the person is arrested, detained in custody, or charged with a crime,
whichever comes first"."O The notice of the record of Maslov's arrest was
prepared and served on him only after he had been detained in fact as an
arrestee for an extended period of time and had been subjected to various
investigative measures, including a line-up and interrogation. The Court
required that counsel be provided at the point when authorities take ac-
tions "that actually restrict that person's personal security, including the
right of movement"-without regard to any paperwork that might need
to be completed or presented to the suspect. The 2001 Code codifies the
Maslov decision by providing that the right to counsel attaches "from the
point in time when a person suspected of committing a crime is actually
arrested" or "from the point in time when any other coercive procedural
actions or other procedural actions are taken that infringe on the rights
177 Arts.47 and 49, CrPC RSFSR.
178 Art.47, CrPC RSFSR, as amended by Prezidiurn Verkhovnogo Soveta, Ukaz "0 vnesenii
izmenenii i dopolnenii v ugolovno-protsessual'nyi kodeks RSFSR", signed 26 June 1972, i.
Earlier access to counsel was permitted in cases involving minors or the physically or mentally
disabled.
179 Art.47, CrPC RSFSR, as amended by the 1992 Statute on Changes and Additions to the Criminal
Procedure Code of the RSFSR, 5. This same law amended Art.51 to permit defense counsel
to be present at all investigative actions that require the participation of the accused or are
performed at the request of the defense.
I8o Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.ii-P of 27 June 2000, VKS (2ooo) No.5 (petition
of Maslov).
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and freedoms of a suspect".' It defines "point of actual arrest" as when
the person "is in fact deprived of his freedom of movement". 8,
The Maslov case also seeks to upset a favorite technique of criminal
investigators the world over who enjoy the power to compel testimony
from witnesses-interrogating someone who is really a suspect as a
'witness'. As a 'witness', the person need not be provided with counsel
and is advised that giving testimony before the investigator is required
under pain of criminal prosecution. 183 The Code provides an incomplete
solution to the problem, however. It follows Maslov in its recognition
that the official document stating that the person is being detained as a
suspect cannot be the deciding factor, focusing instead on "deprivation
of freedom of movement". However, real witnesses who are called in to
testify are similarly not free to leave and the Code does not deal with how
to distinguish between them and defacto suspects 84 The Maslov decision
does, however. The Court states that the restriction of movement must
have been "taken with the goal of incriminating him or proving suspicions
against him" or must constitute "prosecution activities directed towards
a particular person".' 85 A prominent professor of criminal procedure de-
scribes the crucial point as being when a witness "is in fact suspected by
the interrogator of committing the crime and when the subject of the
information sought from that person [... I concerns his or her participa-
tion in the crime". 8 6 While this is probably the only rule there could be,
reconstructing what the investigator was thinking at any given point in
the investigation is likely to be difficult, given that the investigator will
likely claim not to have suspected the 'witness' at the point that damaging
admissions were made.
Counsel is most important at the point in time when the suspect or
accused is sought to be interrogated. Prior to being questioned for the first
time, the new Code spells out that a suspect is entitled "to have a one-on-
181 Art.49(3)(5), CrPC.
18z Art.5(I5), CrPC.
183 See supra note 163.
184 The problem of distinguishing between witnesses and suspects is not as great in systems where
true witnesses (as opposed to someone suspected of wrongdoing) are not under compulsion
to appear or say anything to aid the authorities. See, for example, US Supreme Court, Davis
v. Mississippi, 394 US 721, 727 n.6 (969), which states that "while the police have the right to
request citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have no right
to compel them to answer".
185 Postanovlenie Konstirutsionnogo Suda No.ix-P, op.cit note 18o, 2.
186 Lupinskaia, op.cit note 19, 233. Whatever actions qualify the Maslov court gives one circular
statement of the crucial point--when the investigator provides an "explanation of the right
underArt.51(I) [...] not to incriminate oneself". Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.II-P,
op.cit note 18o.
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one meeting with [counsel] in a confidential setting"'' 7 and an "unlimited
number of one-on-one meetings of unlimited duration in a confidential
setting with defense counsel" are secured for the accused." Article 92(4)
provides that the meeting may not be limited to less than two hours, even
if the suspect is needed to participate in investigative actions.
The right to counsel, however, can be waived, so long as the waiver is
initiated by the suspect or accused and is provided in writing on a form to
be filed in the case file. I89 A majority of the working group was concerned
that the same coercive measures that could be applied to force confessions
could also coerce waivers. To deal with this issue, Article 75(2)(i) defines
as "inadmissible evidence":
"[Alny testimony of a suspect or accused that was given in the course of the pre-
trial stages of a criminal case in the absence of defense counsel, including situations
where there was a waiver of defense counsel, and not confirmed by such suspect or
accused in court."
Thus, if a defendant at trial repudiates his or her confession, the confession
is inadmissible unless defense counsel was present when it was given--even
if the defendant had waived his or her right to counsel.,90
This rather extraordinary provision was opposed by the procuracy
representatives in the working group and the procuracy continues to seek
its repeal.'9' However, Article 75(2) is not a panacea and practices have
developed to circumvent its protections.
The problem is that Article 75(2) covers only the time of the criminal
investigator's interrogation, leaving the suspect or accused to the tender
mercies of the police and jailers the rest of the time. Thus, coercive
measures can be applied before formal interrogation by the investigator
and after the confession is signed to ensure that the suspect sticks to it.
It seems to be common knowledge, confirmed by our discussions with
defense counsel, that the police routinely threaten and beat suspects prior
to and during detention in an effort to force confessions from them.9z The
187 Art.46(4)(3), CrPC.
i88 Art.47 (4)(9), CrPC. An arrested suspect must be questioned within twenty-four hours of the
point of his actual arrest (Art.46(2), CrPC), while an accused must be questioned "immediately
after presenting the charges" (Art.17 3(I), CrPC).
189 Art.5 2(i), CrPC.
190 Among Western European countries, only the Italian system has a similar rule. See Thaman,
op.cit. note 2I, 82-83.
191 Korotkov, op.cit. note 39. In 2003, Art.276 was amended--at the behest of law enforcement--to
permit prior statements of defendants to be read "when the defendant refuses to give testi-
mony in court, if the provisions of Art.4 7(4)(3) of this Code have been observed". However,
Art.47(4)(3) provides an exception for "the circumstances provided by Art.75(2)(i)", and the
2003 amendment did not change Art.75 (2). See Art.i(14 and 7o), Federal Law on Changes and
Additions to the Criminal Procedure Code RF.
192 Interviews conducted 24 and 27 October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
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procurators we interviewed did not directly deny these claims but rather
preferred to personally distance themselves from police brutality that
they had only "heard about". 93 One procurator, who explicitly requested
anonymity in exchange for candor admitted that beatings did occur, which
was precisely why police preferred detention to other forms of pretrial
restraint--to extract confessions from a suspect in the total power of law
enforcement. However, the procurator noted, defendants often lie about
their treatment in custody'94
Violence applied to suspects is confirmed by decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights. Due to the long gestation periods of proceed-
ings in that Court, most of these cases predate the implementation of the
new Code. But the old Code also prohibited violence or threats against
suspects. In one case, the petitioner had been questioned, apparently as
a witness, in connection with an investigation into an act of hooliganism.
The petitioner claimed that he was continuously beaten by police during
a three-day confinement at the police station in an ultimately successful
effort to extract a confession. The petitioner's claims were corroborated
by an undisputed medical examination completed hours after his release
from custody.' 95
Another problem with Article 75(2) as written is that it prohibits
admission of the confession itself at trial but does not appear to limit the
use of the information contained in it. As a result, procurators resorted to
the tactic of calling as witnesses at trial the criminal investigator or police
who might have been present when the defendant confessed to testify
about the admissions made. In addition, information from a confession
without counsel has been used to provide leads to admissible evidence.
However, in a 2004 determination, I9 6 the Constitutional Court held that,
while the Code permitted investigators and police to be called as witnesses
at trial to testify to various investigative actions taken:
"Those provisions [ ... do not [...] permit the court to question criminal investigators
or police investigators about the content of testimony given by a suspect or accused
in the pretrial process so as to permit reproducing the content of that testimony
without compliance with the rule established by Article 75(2), point ) [...] It is by
means of those provisions that the law, based on the dictates of Article 50(2) of
193 Interviews conducted 27 October and z November 2005 by Jeffrey Kahn.
194 The procurator said the police even have a saying: "those whom we beat do not complain" ("Te,
KOFO Mbi 66M, He sKanymcs".) ("Te, kogo my bem, ne zbaluiutsia") Interview conducted 27 October
zoo 5 by Jeffrey Kahn.
95 Sheydayev v. Russia, No.65859/oi (Eur.Ct.H.R., 7 December zoo6). See, also,
Popov v. Russia, op.cit. note 112; Mamedova v. Russia, op.cit note 9o; and Kbudoyorov v. Russia,
op.cit. note io9.
196 Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.44-O of 6 February zoo 4 , KS (2o04) No.5 (petition
of Dem'ianenko).
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the Constitution [...] , excludes the possibility of any use, direct or indirect, of the
information in such testimony"' 97
In a 20o6 case, the Supreme Court cited and followed this decision but
extended it beyond reproducing testimony given before the criminal
investigator. It held that "the same provisions of the statute exclude the
possibility of any use, direct or indirect, of the information contained in" the
confession. Ig Taken together, these decisions prevent investigators or
any other witnesses from testifying to admissions made without counsel
and prevent the information gained from being used to find other evi-
dence.'99
Other methods have been used to interfere with a defendant's right to
counsel. One lawyer in Krasnoiarsk stated that police will often refuse to
contact counsel on the ground that the suspect cannot provide a specific
phone number or address.200 Sometimes, one attorney said, the police
simply will not tell defense counsel where a particular suspect is being
held. Also, there may be rigidly fixed or inconvenient hours for visitation
at the pretrial detention facility. The rules governing meetings, includ-
ing the pass system for gaining admission to the place of detention, may
change frequently arbitrarily and without warning.For example, one day
an attorney's license might be sufficient for admission; the next day, a let-
ter of permission from the investigator might be deemed necessary for a
visit.20 ' Thus, the first contact an attorney may have with his client could
be several days after the initial detention, by which time police pressure
may have worked its toll in the form of testimony202
197 Ibid., 2. Art.50(2) is the constitutional provision on illegally obtained evidence.
198 In re Kozlov & Liasbenko, Kassatsionnoe opredelenie SK po ugolovnym delam Verkhovnogo
Suda No.4 7-Oo6-17 of 21 March 2006, available at <http://www.supcourt.ru/arxiv.outrrEXT.
PHP?id_text=69861&iitext> (emphasis added).
199 By way of comparison, the US rule is not as stringent. See US Supreme Court, Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 US 436, 444-45 (1966), in which a waiver of the right to counsel after notice of rights
was permitted; and id., United States v. Patane, 542 US 630 (2oo4), in which a gun obtained as a
result of interrogation without Miranda warnings was held admissible.
200 Interview conducted 24 October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn. A suspect's family members, who are
granted contact with the suspect at the discretion of the police, may be used as another lever to
coerce statements, circumventing the primary purpose of access to counsel-to stop coercive
questioning.
201 It should be noted that these allegations were rejected by another experienced defense attorney
in the same city, who asserted that an attorney's identification card is all that is required to
meet with a detained client.
202 Art.49(4) of the Code provides that defense counsel "shall be permitted to take part in a criminal
case as defense counsel upon presenting an advocate's identification card and an assignment
order" and the Constitutional Court has made clear that these two items are all that is required
to gain access to clients in detention. Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.14 -P of 25
October 2001, VKS (2002) No.i (petition of Golomidov etal.), which held unconstitutional
the practice of requiring the permission of authorities at the detention center. However, the
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Another way of circumventing Article 75(2) is to appoint counsel but
to use 'pocket' lawyers (KapMaHHbie aABoKaTbi) (karmannye advokaty), also
called 'police' lawyers (MmniLeAcKme aABoKaTb) (militseiskieadvokaty).203 As
the labels suggest, these are lawyers who are known to investigators to be
especially pliable or even willing to knowingly violate their obligations to
represent their client's interests, sometimes in exchange for bribes, side-
payments or favors (including future appointments). Either the advocate
attends the interrogation and does nothing or does not even attend and
just signs a back-dated protocol certifying that he or she was present
when the defendant confessed. Sometimes, the suspect already has re-
tained a lawyer but when it comes time to interrogate the defendant, the
retained lawyer is not notified of the interrogation date. Instead, other
counsel is appointed for the purposes of the interrogation and retained
counsel discovers the confession of his client only later, countersigned by
appointed counsel.204
A senior judge in Krasnoiarsk described the use of 'pocket' lawyers as
very common. 0 5 An academic participant at a roundtable at the Moscow
State Law Academy also acknowledged the practice.06 Also, a deputy
procurator who requested anonymity in exchange for candor acknowl-
edged awareness of the practice of pocket attorneys. 0 7 Such attorneys,
the procurator said, are usually former procurators and investigators. It
is a horrible thing, perhaps, the procurator said, but it is a problem that
is for the cadres in the Chambers of Advocates to resolve.208 Another
procurator in another city acknowledged having heard of the practice of
pocket attorneys but asserted a lack of any personal experience with the
practice. 20 9The procurator opined that if a suspect's written testimonywas
secured in this manner, it should be admitted at trial since it was acquired
in accordance with the strict letter of the Code.20
persistence of anecdotal evidence of difficulties suggests that these requirements have still not
filtered down to the local level.
203 Interviews conducted 2o, 24 and 25 October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
204 Correspondence with Moscow advocate conducted IJuly 2007 by William Burnham.
205 Interview with Valentin Frantsevich Baranovskii, Judge, Krasnoiarsk Krai Court, conducted
25 October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
2o6 Interviews conducted 2o October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
207 Interview conducted 27 October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
208 Advocates are organized and governed by Chambers ofAdvocates. There is a separate chamber
in every region (subject). See Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko, op.cit. note 18, 142-146.
209 Interview conducted 2 November 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
210 - -
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Some Chambers ofAdvocates have tried to take action against pocket
lawyers. At least in cases where the lawyer has signed the protocol but was
not present when the confession was given, it is a serious matter, since
making a false record in a criminal investigation is a criminal offense.21 I
However, proof is difficult unless the lawyer admits to not attending,
given that the ethics committees of the Chambers of Advocates follow
a 'presumption of good faith' on the part of the advocate involved that
the complaining client must overcome. However, in an unusual case from
Moscow, the disciplinary commission found violations of the code of eth-
ics when a client complained that the advocate had signed the protocol
but was not present and the lawyer admitted at least that he "periodically
absented himself from the interrogation to deal with another case" during
the interrogation. The Chamber Council disbarred the advocate.22 The
commission also found that the lawyer, in accepting appointment in re-
sponse to a direct request by the investigator (the investigator approached
him in the hall at the local Ministry of Internal Affairs building), violated
the rules of appointment of counsel in Moscow, which requires that all
requests for appointments of counsel go through advocate organizations,
not through direct contact with any particular advocate.213 However, not
all chambers of advocates in the other subjects of the Russian Federation
have such a procedure for appointment of counsel.214
211 Art.303(2-3), Criminal Code RF (punishable by up to three or seven years, depending on the
seriousness of the consequences).
212 Moscow Chamber ofAdvocates, "Zakliuchenie Kvalifikatsionnoi kommissii PalatyAdvokatov
goroda Moskvy po distsiplinarnomu proizvodstvu v otnoshenii advokata B.", 18 May 2007,
Chamber Council Disbarment Decision of 24 May 2007. See All-Russia Congress ofAdvocates,
Kodeks professional'noi etiki advokata (priniat Vserossiiskim s"ezdom advokatov), 31 January
2003 (with amendments and additions passed by the Second All-Russia Congress ofAdvocates
on 8 April 2005), available at <http://wwwadvokatymoscow.ru/kodeks.php>. See, also, Art.7,
Federal'nyi Zakon "Ob advokatskoi deiatel'nosti i advokature" No.63-FZ, signed 31 May 2002
(as amended through 2o December 2004), which states that "[ain advocate has an obligation
to assert the rights and legal interests of the client honestly, intelligently and in good faith by
every means not prohibited by legislation of the Russian Federation".
213 Moscow Chamber of Advocates, "Reshenie Soveta Advokatskoi palaty goroda Moskvy ob
opredelenii poriadka okazaniia iuridicheskoi pomoshchi advokatami, uchastvuiushchi v
kachestve zashchitnikov v ugolovom sudoproizvodstve po naznacheniiu" No.8, 25 March 2004,
VestnikAdvokatskoipalatyg. Moskvy (2004) Vypusk No.3-4 (5-6), i6-18 (cited on the Moscow
Chamber of Advocates website at <http:/www.advokatymoscow.ru/vestnik7__2.php>). Point I
of the decision states that: "[e]xcept when counsel has been retained by a person who is being
prosecuted, there is no right to appointment of any particular lawyer chosen by that person.
A request for legal assistance by appointed counsel does not go to a particular advocate, but
to the advocate organization, which selects the next advocate in line who is not busy with
retained representation."
214 The Samara Region Chamber of Advocates is perhaps the strictest in adopting measures to
avoidgoing out of order to pick particular advocates. See Chamber ofAdvocates of the Samara
Region, "Reshenie Soveta Palaty advokatov Samarskoi oblasti" No.o 7 -oi-oI/Cl, available at
<http://back.paso.ru/docs/reshenieo7oIO.doc>.
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Another tactic is for investigatory authorities to take the opportunity
should a retained lawyer be unable to appear for particular investigative
action, to immediately appoint a different lawyer. This is in violation of
the Code's requirement that the suspect first be given five days to retain
another lawyer.215
If the 'pocket' advocate attends the interrogation, it is more difficult
to assess performance. In the Moscow case just discussed, the committee
observed that "defense counsel does not just attend the interrogation, but
participates in it", citingArticle 51(2). 2 ,6 However, what the requisite 'par-
ticipation' should involve is more difficult to say The standard adversarial
wisdom in the United States, for example, is that "any lawyer worth his
salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to the
police under any circumstances". 1'7 After this initial position, counsel will
pursue a plea deal in which the client may agree to confess in exchange
for some guarantees of lesser charges or a lower sentence:' 8 Russian 'plea
bargaining' is more limited, so, in many cases, the advantage of confessing
is not as clear cut.2 9 Also complicating matters is the fact that, in Russia,
as in other civil law countries, both guilt and punishment are determined
in one proceeding.220 While typically in common-law jurisdictions, guilt
and punishment are determined in separate proceedings that often oc-
21 Art.5o( 3). See Moscow City Court, In re II'n, Kassatsionnoe opredelenie sudebnoi kollegii po
ugolovnym delam Gorodskogo suda goroda Moskvy No.z2-29 71 of 16 April 2007 (on file with
author William Burnham), which reversed a conviction because the investigator, instead of
informing the defendant of his right to engage other retained counselwithin five days, appointed
an advocate from Udmurt Republic. The Moscow Chamber of Advocates has prohibited its
advocates from accepting appointments from any authorities outside of Moscow but nonetheless
declined to discipline a Moscow advocate who was appointed by the Moscow Region authori-
ties. The decision does urge the Moscow Chamber to recommend to the Federal Chamber
that an appropriate regulation be adopted imposing the rule on all advocates. See Moscow
Chamber of Advocates, "Zakliuchenie Kvalifikatsionnoi komissii Advokatskoi Palaty goroda
Moskvy po distsiplinarnomu proizvodstvu v otnoshenii advokata B" of i6 February 2007, in
which a Moscow Region advocate appeared at the request of the Moscow city authorities.
zi6 Moscow Chamber ofAdvocates, op.cit. note 215,5. Art.sI(u) provides: "tdlefense counsel partici-
pating in investigatory actions in the course of providing legal assistance to his or her client has
the right to engage in short consultations with the client in the presence of the investigator, to
ask, with the investigator's permission, questions of persons being interrogated, and to make
written observations regarding the propriety and completeness of the written notes made in
the record of the particular investigatory action."
217 US Supreme Court, Watts v. Indiana, 338 US 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
218 If one counts plea bargains, advice to confess in the US is the ultimate result in an overwhelm-
ing percentage of cases. Of all cases that are resolved on the merits, close to 95% involve the
client pleading guilty, typically on the advice of counsel. See National Center for State Courts,
"Court Statistics Project: 2oos Criminal Statistics", available at <http://www.ncsconline.
org/DRESEARCH/csp/zooi-Files/zooiCriminal.pdf>.
219 See infra section 5, where guilty pleas are discussed.
220 Art.3o2(7), CrPC.
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cur weeks apart, there is no time in Russia to become contrite between
conviction and sentence. Contrition must come earlier to do much good.
Thus, advice to confess on the hope that some unspecified benefit in
sentencing will be gained is not necessarily irrational advice, assuming
the client is in fact guilty.22 I
The arrangement for paying for appointed counsel suggests possible
opportunities for manipulation based on the quality of counsel provided.
If a court appoints a lawyer for trial, the courts pay. If an investigator
appoints counsel for attendance at an investigative activity, the lawyer is
paid from the investigative agency involved, such as the procuracy or the
Ministry of Internal Affairs.222 While the rule on inadmissibility of confes-
sions without counsel, as interpreted by the courts, makes appointment
a necessity, the amount paid and when it is paid could well be affected by
how much 'trouble' a given advocate causes the investigator. The official
rates of pay indicate that appointed counsel are paid by the day-about
USD ii a day usually-and should be paid for a full day even though the
particular service performed does not last an entire day223 However, this
requirement is a new clarification in the payment regime and even now
is often not observed. Thus, a lawyer who appears only for a one-hour
pretrial investigation event could well receive pay only for the actual time
spent.2 2 4
221 Art.6x(i)(i), Criminal Code RF. See, also, Arts.75-7 6.
222 This is an inheritance from Soviet times. Currently, there is a dispute regarding who is responsible
for paying for the appointed lawyer who appears at pretrial detention hearings. The courts insist
that it is a stage of the preliminary investigation, so the investigative agencies should pay for
it, while the investigative agencies argue that it is a judicial hearing, so the courts should pay.
Communication with a Moscow advocate on 7July 2007 (on file with William Burnham).
223 Ministerstvo Iustitsii Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Ministerstvo Finansov Rossiiskoi Federatsii Prikaz
Nos.257 and 89n, "Ob utverzhdenii poriadka rascheta oplaty truda advokata, uchastvuiushchego
v kachestve zashchitnika v ugolovnom sudoproizvodstve po naznacheniiu organov doznaniia,
organov predvaritel'nogo sledstviia, prokurora ili suda, v zavisimosti ot slozhnosti ugolovnogo
dela," signed 6 October 2003, published in Rossiiskaiagazeta (21 October 2003) and Biulleten'
Ministerstvo iustitsiiRF (2003) No.x2. The basic amount is stated to be 25% of the minimum
monthly wage used to calculate government benefits (MPOT) of RUB i,1oo, which is RUB 275,
calculated at RUB 25 to a dollar. This is an upgrade from 2003 when the amount was only RUB
15o or around USD 7 at the time. Higher amounts of up to Ioo% of the minimum wage for
jury trials and other cases at the regional court level are permissible.
224 Communication from Moscow advocate, IO July 2007. Compare Advocates of the City of
Moscow, "Materialy Piatoi ezhegodnoi konferentsii advokatov g. Moskvy", 3 February 2oo7,
published in VestnikAdvokatskoipalaty (2007) No.2- 3, and available at <http://www.advokaty-
moscowruvestnikz3php>. Section 1.4 states that: "[wihile the Judicial Department pays for
all cases without delay, we see problems with payments to counsel appointed by the procuracy
and particularly the Ministry of Internal Affairs." Disputes over amounts paid can be appealed
to a judge.
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3.4.3. Other Investigative Actions
Other than acquiring testimony from victims, witnesses, suspects or the
accused, the criminal investigator conducts or oversees a variety of other
activities: crime-scene investigations, police line-ups, confrontations, etc.
The investigator is also responsible for obtaining expert reports and analy-
sis of evidence by forensic specialists (e.g., analysis of fingerprints, blood,
ballistics, etc.). Other activities are conducted either by investigators or
by operatives under their direction: searches and seizures, electronic sur-
veillance and compelled disclosure of documents.2z For each such action,
the investigator is to prepare a 'protocol' recording the actions taken and
what was observed or discovered., 6 As noted earlier, this official record is
considered 'pre-admitted' evidence by virtue of its placement in the case
file. In other words, neither the author of the report nor any participants
in the actions therein described will appear at trial to testify to what hap-
pened or be subjected thereby to questioning by the defense.227
Most of the procedures for these other investigative actions have not
changed in any major way. However, a major change is that judicial warrants
are required for important categories of searches and seizures:
(a) Searches of the person other than incident to arrest;
(b) Searches of dwellings;
(c) Searches of bank records;
(d) Surveillance of communications; and
(e) Seizures of objects or money used or received in connection with
the commission of a crime.28
All other searches and seizures (e.g., in a place of business, an office, a
warehouse, etc.) are conducted on the order of the investigator (as before).
While the dwelling part of the judicial warrant requirement is required
by the Constitution, searches of bank records are less clearly so.2 9 An
225 See, generally, Arts.'76-186, CrPC.
226 Art.166, CrPC.
227 As discussed earlier, supra at text accompanying note 142, expert findings will also be read from
the case file without any mandatory attendance and testimony by the expert.
228 See Art.29(2)(6) (personal searches), (4) and (5) (dwellings), (7) (bank records), (8) and (ii) (com-
munications); and Art.1O4(l)(I) (seizure of property connected with crime). The last category
of seizures of property was only added in 2oo6 when the Criminal Code was amended to per-
mit such seizures. Federal'nyi Zakon "0 vnesenii v otdel'nye zakonodatel'nye akty Rossiiskoi
Federatsiii v sviazi s priniatiem Federal'nogo zakona 'O ratifikatsii Konventsii Soveta Evropy
o preduprezhdenii terroizma' i Federal'nogo zakona 'O protivodeistvii terrorismu'" No.153-FZ,
signed 27 July 20o6. See, also, Art.165 (1-4) (procedure for obtaining a warrant); and Art.182
(general procedure for searches).
229 See Art.25, Constitution, which states that "n one has the right to enter a dwelling against
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exception from the judicial warrant requirement is provided for searches
of dwellings or of the person and seizures of objects or money used or
received in connection with the commission of a crime when "exceptional
circumstances" exist and there is insufficient time to get a warrant. How-
ever, even then, the investigator must seek judicial approval of the search
within twenty-four hours after the search is conducted. If the search or
seizure is not approved in this 'post-warrant' procedure, its products are
not admissible in evidence.230
An innovation of the new Code is that it addresses the admissibility
of evidence obtained by "operational investigative activity" (onepaTBHO-
PO3bICKHas gleFlTenbHOCTb) (operativno-rozysknaia deiatel'nost). This activity
is what might be called 'real' investigation in the sense that its purpose
is to find out things, not a means of recording evidence in the case file.
In fact, it is the operative investigators (onepaTBH"K") (operativniki) who
usually find the evidence that is then collected, examined and verified by
the criminal investigator in order to be included in the case file.23I The
new Code makes clear, however, that the results of operative investigative
activity may not be used as evidence unless they "meet the evidentiary
requirements imposed by this Code".232 This makes it necessary that such
information be obtained through procedures specified for the preliminary
investigation process before it can be used as proof
3.4.4. Defense Investigation
There are two kinds of defense investigation. Thefirst is what might be
called 'mediate' investigation, whereby defense counsel finds out about
leads to witnesses or other evidence and tries to convince the criminal
investigator to process them through the official investigation. Mediate
investigation is what defense counsel are generally limited to doing in civil
law countries233 and was proper under prior law. The second type of defense
the will of those living there except in circumstances established by federal statute or pursuant
to a judicial order"; and Art.23(2), which states that: "[elveryone has the right to privacy of their
correspondence, telephone calls, mail, telegraph and other communications. Limitations on
this right are permitted only on the basis of a judicial decision."
230 Art.165(5), CrPC. Interestingly, defense counsel or the lawyer for the owner of the premises
has the right to be present during the search. Art.182(i), CrPC.
23I The legal basis for these activities is the 1995 Federal Law on Operational Investigative Activi-
ties, op.cit. note 126. Before that time, such activities took place but it was not until 1995 that
an express legal basis for them was created.
232 Art.89, CrPC.
233 See, generally, Thaman, op.cit note zI, 32-33, which states that "[dlefense lawyers in Europe do
not normally investigate their own cases but are supposed to rely, by and large, on the objective,
impartial inquiries of investigative judges or public prosecutors and their powers to compel
testimony and collect evidence to get the exculpatory evidence into the investigative dossier"
(emphasis in original).
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investigation is 'direct' investigation, which was for the first time recog-
nized and legitimized-though rather timidly-by the new Code. Under
this, the defense develops leads itself, directly collects the evidence and
seeks to use it at trial without going through the criminal investigator.
Mediate investigation will involve the defense using informal contacts
with the investigator, its right to make written and oral comments on
investigatory actions taken, and formal requests during the preliminary
investigation to try to convince the investigator to interrogate certain
witnesses or obtain certain documents helpful to the defense. The law
states that the criminal investigator "can not deny any requests if the
circumstances [that the defensel seeks to ascertain by means of such
requests are relevant to the criminal case" .234 However, if the investigator
disagrees on relevance, the defense must work its way through two levels
of administrative review before being able to get review in the district
court. 235 Investigation by this route is 'mediate' because all the requested
investigative actions-if permitted-are performed and controlled by the
criminal investigator. While permitted to attend an interrogation that was
requested by the defense, defense counsel may ask questions only with
the investigator's permission.236 If a defense request for an expert analysis
is approved, the criminal investigator also retains control over it. These
will always be conducted by the state's apparatus and the investigator is in
charge, not the defense counsel at whose request the action is taken.237
Though requests for investigation can be made at any time, a final
opportunity is afforded when the entire case file is made available to the
defense once it is completed and the defense can "make written com-
ments on the accuracy and completeness of what is written in the official
record of a particular investigative action" .2z3 However, it is difficult for
234 Art.159(2), CrPC.
235 Art.iu9(4), CrPC. First, defense counsel must make awritten complaint to the supervisor of the
investigative agency See Art.124(l), CrPC. A decision by the supervisor favorable to the defense
may itself be appealed by the criminal investigator to a higher supervisor. See Art.124 (4), CrPC.
A final decision unfavorable to the defense may then be appealed to the district court in the
venue of the preliminary investigation. See Art.i25(), CrPC. If the defense wishes toprevent
an action from taking place, the filing of a complaint does not by itself result in suspension
of the intended operation, unless the supervising investigator or the court determines that
suspension is necessary See Art.125(7), CrPC. One investigator in Krasnoiarsk asserted that
investigators always grant defense motions for additional questions or investigative actions
because if the motion is denied, the investigator must provide grounds in the official record
for denying these requests. Interview conducted 27 October 20o5 byJeffrey Kahn. However,
defense counsel could not confirm the practice.
236 Art.53(I)(5) (attendance) and 53(2) (questions), CrPC. If the investigator chooses to prohibit
questions of defense counsel, the investigator must include the excluded questions in the of-
ficial record.
237 Art.198(i)(5) (attendance only with investigator permission), CrPC.
238 Art.53(3), CrPC. See, also, Art.2I7, CrPC. Actually, the defense must be granted earlier access
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the defense to assess and question the "accuracy and completeness" of
the contents of those documents if no access is provided to the working
materials that they are based on. Certainly, the defense cannot determine
if a witness statement written out by the investigator is "accurate and
complete" if the defense did not hear the interrogation. As a senior judge
on the Krasnoiarsk subject-level court, Judge V.E Baranovskii, explained,
the working materials of the investigator are not shared with the defense
counsel, who is only permitted to see the protocols summarizing witness
testimony and the conclusions of forensic examiners and experts, etc.2 39
A practitioner in Krasnoiarsk confirmed that when he makes a motion to
see the basis of an expert's conclusion, the motion is denied on the grounds
that the working material is not in evidence.240
While some defense lawyers might rail against the defense's lack of
power to compel the investigator to interrogate additional witnesses, obtain
documents and order forensic examinations of evidence, some defense
lawyers believe that improving 'mediate' efforts of this sort would not be
that helpful. As one defense attorney in Moscow pointed out, it is not
really very useful to insist that investigators call certain witnesses or to
include particular questions in their interrogation of a witness unless the
witness really does have exonerating information, since the action could
easily place the client in a worse position than before.24 ' Moreover, the
defense must keep in mind that interrogation by a skeptical and sometimes
hostile criminal investigator is not a good way to obtain information that
is in the defense's favor.
A more fruitful route might be 'direct' defense investigation. What
little the new Code says is set out in Articles 53(1) and 86(3). For the first
time, the Code makes clear that the defense has the right "to gather and
present such evidence as is necessary to provide legal representation"?42
Article 86(3) states:
"Defense counsel has the right to gather evidence by:
(I) obtaining objects, documents and other information;
(2) interviewing persons with their consent; and
(3) requesting information memoranda, references and other documents from
government agencies, agencies of local self-government, nongovernmental associa-
to the case file for the purpose of arguing in opposition to a motion for pretrial detention.
See PostanovIenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.iI-P, op.cit. note 180, 4. See, also, Opredelenie
Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.173-O, op.cit note 8o.
239 Interview with Valentin Frantsevich Baranovskii, Judge, Krasnoiarsk Krai Court, conducted
25 October 2005 by Jeffrey Kahn.
240 Interview conducted 24 October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
241 Interview conducted 3 November 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
242 Art.53(s)(2), CrPC. It is not clear what the final phrase "as is necessary to provide legal repre-
sentation" means, unless it is meant as a limit, thus emphasizing that evidence gathered by the
defense is not includable in the case file.
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tions and organizations, which shall be obliged to provide documents requested or
copies thereof"
No enforcement procedure is provided, though the general provisions
of the Code authorizing motions in court would seem to provide a basis
for seeking an order for the production of documents under point (3)
above143 If information is obtained, however, the Code is less than clear
on what can be done with it. Article 86(2) ambiguously states that the
defense "shall have the right to [...] present written documents and objects
to be included in the criminal case file as evidence". The text is unclear
as to whether this requires inclusion in the case file or only that it can be
submitted to the investigator for possible inclusion.244 Certainly, evidence
gathered by the defense is not on the list of "admissible evidence" set
out in Article 74(2), unless it comes under the catch-all heading of "other
documents".245 On the other hand, Article 86(2) states that what defense
counsel has the right to "gather" is "evidence", not just information. Article
86(2) does refer, however, only to the ability to "submit written documents
and objects" for inclusion in the case file. Commentators seem to agree
that any evidence gathered by the defense may be included in the case
file only if the investigator first verifies it and consents to its inclusion.
Certainly, evidence from a witness found by the defense can be included
in the case file only by way of the investigator interrogating the witness
and writing out a summary statement in the usual manner.246
243 See Arts.19-12O, CrPC.
244 The Russian is "npaBo f...] npegcTaBMTb [.I Aris npmo6teHH1 MX K yronOBHOMY geny" (pravo
[I... predstavit' I...] dliapriobshebeniia ikh k ugolovnomu delu). See E. Kariakin, "Dopustimost'
dokazatel'stv, sobrannykh zashchitnikom", Rossiiskaia iustitsiia (2003) No.6, which discusses
various possibilities but suggests that Art.i 7, CrPC, which provides for "free evaluation of
evidence", should permit some use of defense-gathered witness statements. See, also, V Rudnev
and G. Ben'iauev, "Vozmozhno li uchastie notariusa v ugolovnov sudoproizvodstve?", Rossiiskaia
iustitsiia (20o2) No.8, 28-29, which discusses the possibility of permitting a defense witness'
statement made before a notary to be included in the case file or used at trial.
245 See supra text at section 3.3.
246 The new article on "verification" of evidence was discussed supra at section 3.3. One commen-
tary points out that only written documents and objects can be included in the file and that,
even then, "including these written documents and items in the case file, which would mean
they acquired the status of evidence, depends on the decision made by the person or agency
conducting proceedings in the criminal case" (e.g., the investigator). Kozak and Mizulina, op.cit.
note 17, comment 7 to Art.86. A commentary edited by a Supreme Court judge observes: "Ithe
power to verify evidence is vested in the participants on the prosecution side: the investigator,
inquiry officer or procurator [...] The defense side has the right to participate in the verifica-
tion of evidence. This right is realized by means of the making of motions, presentation of
supplemental items, documents, etc."V E. Radchenko, Kommentariik Ugolovno-protsessual'nomu
kodeksu Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Iuriait-Izdat, MOsCow, 2nd ed. 2oo6), comment 3 to Art.87. See,
also, V L. Kudriavtsev, "Konstitutsionnoe pravo na poluchenie kvalifitsirovannoi iuridicheskoi
pomoshchi i nekotorye formy ee realizatsii v kontekste deiaternosti advokata-zashchitnika:
Zakonodatel'stvo, pravovye pozitsii KS RF, teoriia", Rossiiskaia iustitsiia (2oo6) No.4, which
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Even if inclusion in the case file is not possible, direct use of the witness
at trial is possible. Article 231(2)(4) provides that the judge is to determine
"what persons should be subpoenaed to appear at the trial according to the
lists submitted by the parties". Under prior law, there was no reference to
party lists and the witnesses called were usually only those called by the
criminal investigator during the preliminary investigation.247 However,
defense requests are often denied. More importantly, as discussed below
when trials are considered, Article 271(4) provides that the "court may not
deny a motion to permit a witness or forensic specialist to be questioned
at trial if that person has appeared in court at the request of the parties". ' 48
Thus, assuming that the defense can get the witness or specialist to court
on the day of trial, he or she must be permitted to testify249
Article 271(4) can also serve to spur investigators to agree to undertake
investigatory actions regarding defense evidence. Criminal investigators
who decline defense requests that they question particular witnesses or
forensic specialists give up any advance warning of the content of testi-
mony the defense may offer at trial, not to mention the opportunity to
examine the future witness or specialist with an eye towards impeach-
ment at trial.
There does not seem to be any problem with defense counsel usingAr-
ticle 271(4) without first telling the criminal investigator about the witness
or specialist before trial. Such 'sandbagging' is seemingly constitutionally
protected. In a 2004 case, the Constitutional Court held Article 234(6) of
the new Code unconstitutional. Article 234(6) had required that an accused
provide notice during the preliminary investigation of any alibi witnesses
he or she expected to call at trial, on pain of losing the right to call them
at trial, unless the defense could show that the existence of such a witness
only became known to the defendant after completion of the preliminary
investigation. The Constitutional Court held that Article 234(6) violated
the right to defend oneself in court (Arts.45(i) and 46(2), Constitution)
and the requirement for conviction of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
(Art.4 9(2), Constitution).250
states that the defense's "activity in gathering evidence does not entail recognition of the
admissibility of evidence received", as is the case of evidence gathered by the prosecution.
247 Art.228(4), CrPC RSFSR.
248 Although the language of this section is ambiguous and may be read to require a request by
allparties in agreement, it is understood by most judges to refer to witnesses appearing at the
request of any party See V. Ulianov, "Voprosy gosudarstvennogo obvineniia k novomu UPK',
Rossiiskaia iustitsiia (2002) No.xo; A. Davletov, "Pravo zashchitnikov sobrat' dokazatel'stva",
Rossiiskaia iustitsiia (2003) No.7.
249 For more on Art.271( 4) at trial, see infra, 66.
250 Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.13-P of 29 June 2004, VKS (2004) No.4. The idea
to require notice came from US law. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 12.1 and 12.2 require
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A potential problem with interviewing witnesses with their consent
is the fact that it may be necessary to reveal at least some information
that the defense might have learned from looking at the case file or at-
tending the few investigative actions the defense is permitted to attend.
Unauthorized disclosure to the public is a criminal offense punishable by
up to three months imprisonment, 25 andArticle 53(3) specificallyprohibits
defense counsel from "communicating information from the preliminary
investigation that was learned in connection with defense of a client". So
far, to our knowledge, no problems have arisen with this conflict.252
Expert witnesses are not included within Article 271(4)'s require-
ment that the court permit defense witnesses to testify at trial, though
it does include forensic specialists. However, even if the experts were
included, both specialists and experts are hard for the defense to find on
its own.253 No funding for either is provided to indigent defendants. Nor
is there sufficient demand to establish a private industry of experts and
specialists. The forensic specialists and experts who conduct autopsies,
fingerprint analyses or work with photographic or audio/visual records all
work at state-run bureaus of judicial or medical experts (6lopo cyLe6HOO
(MeqwIJ HCKOI) 3KCflepTl43bI) (biuro sudebnoi (meditsinskoi) ekspertizy) that
are independent agencies of the Ministry of Justice. Theoretically, they
could develop their own private client base. However, one investigator in
Krasnoiarsk maintained that the defense has no right to independently
contact experts there.254 One practitioner described how he brought an
expert witness and written expert's conclusions to a jury trial. The Court
rejected this evidentiary proffer on the grounds that there was no basis
not to trust the expertise provided by the criminal investigator in the case
file.255 A practitioner in Krasnoiarsk volunteered that if the defense does
find an expert, the best result the defense can hope for is that the court
might order a second expert to be appointed who would conduct another
examination under the direction of the criminal investigator.256
Some resourceful defense lawyers have used Article 271(4) to bring
to trial experts 'disguised' as forensic specialists, who do come within
Article 271(4). While most forensic specialists are technical people who
pretrial notice of intent to claim alibi or insanity as defenses. The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure are available at <http:/lww.law.cornel.edu/ruIes/frcrmp/>.
251 Art.I6i(2), CrPC (referencing Art.31o of the Criminal Code RF).
252 Actually, it is within the discretion of the investigator to permit disclosure. Art.161(3).
253 Interview conducted 21 October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
254 Interview conducted 27 October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
255 Interview conducted 24 October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
256 Interview conducted 24 October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn. See Art.198(I)(3), CrPC.
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do scientific examination and analysis of items of evidence, they can also
be called on to "explain to the parties and the court issues that fall within
their special competence"?.57 In one case, a professor of medicine was
called as a specialist by the defense to critique the autopsy report in the
case file that had been read at trial. The 'specialist' professor had taught
the doctor who prepared the autopsy report and, after a withering critique
of the report, remarked that its author "always was a weak student".58
Even without this creative use of specialists, it is a major advance that
the defense can use specialists to analyze evidence and that the court
must permit them to testify. So far, however, defense specialists have not
often been used.
The reason that the working group decided to keep direct defense
investigation rights modest was the concern that rich defendants could
utilize such rights while poor defendants could not. Thus, the idea of a more
comprehensive set of rights and the possible label 'parallel investigation'
were rejected. It is, of course, one of the by-products of the adversarial
system that giving the parties themselves greater rights and control will
mean that some will be able to take greater advantage of those rights than
others.259 Nonetheless, the Code does authorize specific additional defense
rights to gather evidence and further provides that defense counsel may
"use other ways and means of defense not prohibited by this Code" .2 6o
The real problem with any court judicial enforcement of direct defense
investigation rights and with all mediate defense investigation is that the
materials are not turned over to the defense but go to the court or inves-
tigator involved. This operates as a mandatory and immediate disclosure
to the prosecution of any such defense discovery This prospect will make
the defense reticent to use any such procedures unless they are absolutely
sure that the material will be helpful. This is another example of the in-
equality of the parties at trial. Unlike the defense, the investigator need
not disclose the 'raw' materials it obtains but can pick and choose among
them and decide which to include in the case file for the defense's later
viewing. By contrast, any materials the defense requests will immediately
be turned over to the prosecution.26,
By whatever means defense evidence is gathered, its source seems to
taint it. The problem, as explained by one investigator in Krasnoiarsk, is
257 Art.58(i), CrPC.
258 The use of the technique in this case was related by prominent defense lawyer, Elena Levi-
na.
259 See Burnham, op.cit. note 3, 119-120.
26o Art.53(I)(11), CrPC.
261 See the discussion supra, 47-49.
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that if a defense attorney independently gathers evidence, there is a danger
that this activity could adversely influence the witnesses involved.26 2 Even
defense counsel seemed to believe that a certain bias against defense-
procured evidence is only natural and to be expected, since defense counsel
are paid by their clients for effective representation.26 3 No one seemed
concerned that the same biases and propensity for taint apply equally to
the prosecution side, whose police and other investigators have strong
interests of their own in the outcome of the case. However, respondents
doubted that the investigator or police would have a sufficient stake in
the outcome of any particular case to skew investigation results.2 64
While some advocates feel constrained by the Code's limited means
for defense investigation in representation of their clients, many others fail
to avail themselves of even the most elementary steps available to them
to investigate and prepare the defense of their case for trial. As noted in
the following section on trials, many defense counsel-mainly appointed
counsel-appear at trial without having interviewed their clients, without
having conducted pretrial investigative work of any kind or without even
having read the case file.265
Upon completion of the preliminary investigation, the investigator
declares the investigation closed, at which point the state may not carry
out any further investigative actions. 66 The final form of the charges that
appear warranted is drawn up by the investigator and the entire case is
passed on to the procuracy, which has the power to approve, modify or
dismiss the charges. If formal charges are approved by the procurator, the
case is filed in court.267
Once filed, the case proceeds to the preliminary hearing stage before
the judge, an innovation of the Code. The court must hold a preliminary
hearing if a party has filed a timely motion to exclude evidence or a request
for a jury trial 68 Motions by the defense to suppress illegally obtained evi-
dence are the most common issues of substance heard at this hearing.
262 Interview conducted 27 October zooS byJeffrey Kahn.
263 Interview conducted 17 October zooS by Jeffrey Kahn.
264 Interview conducted 19 October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
265 See infra, 73.
266 See Arts.215 -22o, CrPC.
267 Art.222, CrPC.
268 Art.229(2)(i and 4), CrPC. Other grounds are if there are problems with the case necessitating
sending it back for correction of procedural errors or if the case should be dismissed.
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3.5. Rulings on Admissibility of Evidence
Article 50(2) of the 1993 Constitution provides that "the use of evidence
obtained in violation of federal law is not permitted". Article 75 of the
new Code provides that "[elvidence obtained in violation of this Code
is inadmissible".269
There are two ways of policing improper evidence-exclusionary and
justificatory. In the former case, the improper evidence is actually physi-
cally excluded so that the decision makers who determine guilt-usually a
jury-never see or hear it. Under a justificatory model, no attempt is made
to physically exclude the evidence. Instead, it is sufficient that the deci-
sion maker not use that evidence as a justification for his or her decision.
Indeed, it is hard to practice exclusion in systems where the judge who
decides on admissibility, thereby being exposed to the improper evidence,
is the same judge who goes on to decide guilt at trial.
If a jury is used, it is generally thought necessary to physically exclude
the evidence.270 In fact, in a system in which jurors do not have to give
reasons for their verdict, physical exclusion is the only way to ensure that
the jury's verdict was not based on the excluded evidence. However, when
the case is tried by judges, those judges must justify their determination of
guilt in a written decision in which they must indicate what evidence they
relied on to support their decision. This is thought to be sufficient protec-
tion against improper use of the evidence, since judges' legal training and
professionalism will allow them to exclude it from their minds and justify
their decisions solely with proper evidence. A justificatory solution to the
problem of improper evidence is relied on in most continental systems
without juries and even bench trials in common law systems.2 7'
The critique of the justificatory model is that judges, like jurors, are
affected by any improper evidence they have seen, regardless of what other
evidence they use to justify their decisions.72 Motivated by this, several
269 This has been the law since the 1993 Constitution went into effect. See Art.68, CrPC.
270 See US Supreme Court,Jackson v. Denno, 378 US 368 (964), which states that it is a violation
of due process to permit the jury to decide on the voluntariness of a confession and, if the
jury determines that the confession is not voluntary, to go on to decide guilt based on other
evidence in the case.
271 See, for example, New York Court of Appeals, People v. Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 516 NE2d 200
(1987), in which a judge heard a suppression motion of the co-defendant's confession that
implicated the defendant. The court held that: "[uinlike a lay jury, a judge 'by reasons of [...]
learning, experience and judicial discipline, is uniquely capable of distinguishing the issues and
of making an objective determination' based upon appropriate legal criteria, despite awareness
of facts which cannot properly be relied upon in making the decision." Ibid., 202.
272 See Michael J. Saks, "What Do Jury Experiments Tell us About How Juries (Should) Make
Decisions?", 6(1) Soutb California InterdisciplinaryLawjournali, 27 n.86 (997), which states that
'empirical studies on judges' ability to 'disregard [...I inadmissible information' suggest that
judges may be no better than juries at 'bas[ing] their decisions squarely on legally admissible
information"'. See, also, US Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, United States v. Walker, 473 F.2d 136,
Review of Central and East European Law 33 (2008)
continental systems have sought to shield the trial judge from its influence,
including the use of a 'double dossier' system in which a separate second
sanitized case file is created for use at trial. 2"73
In jury trials in Russia, a rule of physical exclusion is practiced.74
Jurors are not allowed to see a full copy of the case file, though they may
be shown particular documents from it that the judge has determined
beforehand are admissible at trial. In addition, even without a motion to
exclude, the Code prohibits any mention of prior convictions or evidence
of the defendant's character in jury trials75 Other problems with keeping
inadmissible evidence from the jury at trial are discussed below in the
section on jury trials.276
As for non-jury trials, the Code does not say what should happen
with evidence that is determined to be inadmissible at trial. Perhaps an
argument could be made that exclusion is required, given the strong con-
stitutional prohibition on inadmissible evidence77 However, since judges
must state precisely what evidence they relied on in their decisions,'278
138 (3rd Cir. 1972), which states that, although a "[jiudge is presumed to have a trained and
disciplined judicial intellect [...], even the most austere intellect has a subconscious".
273 Solutions take several forms. In France, to the extent that preliminary hearings are still held,
a different judge presides at the bench trial to avoid the influence of preconceived opinions
that would result from exposure to the case file at this earlier stage. See Richard S. Frase,
"France", in Craig M. Bradley (ed.), Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study (Carolina Academic
Press, Durham, NC 1999), 167-i69. In Spain (following Italy), a 'double dossier' system has been
created in which the original case file is filtered through a preliminary hearing to create a new
case file for use at trial. See Stephen C. Thaman, "Europe's NewJury Systems: The Cases of
Spain and Russia", 62(2) Law and Contemporary Problems (1999), 233-260, at 241. Italy, as noted
above, also employs a 'double dossier' system in which: "[to ensure judicial impartiality, judges
do not receive the complete dossier of the pretrial investigations. Only transcripts and reports
of evidence that will no longer be available at the trial may be annexed to the charge."Joachim
Herrmann, "Models for the Reform of the Criminal Trial in Eastern Europe: A Comparative
Perspective", 1996 St. Louis-Warsaw Transatlantic Law Journal (1996), 127-152, at 138.
274 Art.335(5-6), CrPC, requiring that the judge "exclude" inadmissible evidence.
275 Art.335(8), CrPC. This was true under the original 1993 law on the jury as well.
276 See infra, section 4.3.
277 On the other hand, Art.5o(2) of the Constitution states that "use is prohibited" (He gonycKaeTCI
mlcnonb3oBaHIe) (ne dopuskaetsia ispol'zovanie), which is perhaps ambiguous. Art.75(i) of the Code
goes somewhat further but uses similar terms: after declaring illegal evidence to be "inadmis-
sible", it states that "[ilnadmissible evidence has no legal effect and may not be used as the
basis for criminal charges or as proof" of requisite facts in a criminal case. A lawyer with a
common-law background might think that the term "inadmissible" is a sufficient basis for a rule
of exclusion, since in a common-law trial documentary evidence has to be formally "admitted
into evidence". However, the judge must see the evidence to make a ruling on admissibility
and even if it is deemed inadmissible, the evidence, "marked for identification", becomes part
of the case file. Otherwise, appellate review of evidentiary rulings would be impossible.
278 See Art.3o 7 (2), CrPC, which states that: "[tihe narrative-rationale part of a judgment of con-
viction must contain the evidence on which the court's findings regarding the defendant are
based and the reasons the court rejected other evidence."
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the justificatory system is used for judge trials. While the working group
discussed possible use of a 'double dossier' system, it was never seriously
considered.279 Under current practice, if something is placed in the case
file, it stays in the case file even if it has been ruled inadmissible.210 In
any event, confessions or other documents would be hard to physically
exclude since the documents in it are numbered sequentially and sewn
into the case file. S
l
A related question on inadmissible evidence is the possibility of the
defense moving at trial, pursuant to Articles 24o(i) and 281(2), to declare
inadmissible the witness statements of any witness who did not appear at
trial and for whom there was no exception for unavailability. One attorney
felt that there was little point in making such a motion, since the likely
result would be an adjournment of the case with renewed serious efforts
to find the witness. Incriminating testimony would only be strengthened,
he felt, by the emotional delivery of a live witness.z 82 Even if the witness
did not appear on the adjourned trial date, one attorney felt that such a
motion to dismiss would be rejected. Judges are weak in this regard, he
complained, and the much preferred approach is to keep adjourning the
trial until the witness appears, the statute of limitations has run or there
is a satisfactory agreement between the parties.83 There is nothing in the
Code that limits the number of adjournments that the judge can grant,
so it is not known how many continuances are too many and require dis-
missal .24 In an adversarial system, it is expected that the state will be able
to concentrate its vast power to ensure that it is ready to present its case
on a particular day If, with all the power it can summon, it is not ready
simple fairness requires that the case be dismissed.215
3.6. Supplemental Investigation
Under the old Code, if a trial revealed that the evidence for conviction
was not strong enough, rather than acquit the defendant the court could
(and often would) halt the proceedings and return the case file to the
279 Part of the reason was that it would not work well, since word of the fact that the defendant
confessed and perhaps even a copy of the confession would get around informally among the
judges, especially when there were only a few judges in the district or region.
28o Interviews with roundtable of scholars and practitioners at Moscow State Law Academy
conducted 2o October 2oo5 byJeffrey Kahn.
28i Interview ofJudge V. F. Baranovskii conducted 25 October 2oo5 by Jeffrey Kahn.
282 Interview conducted 17 October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
283 Interview conducted 17 October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
284 Interview conducted 19 October 2oo5 byJeffrey Kahn.
285 The issue ofadjournments is revisited in the next section, where supplementary investigations
are discussed.
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investigator for 'supplemental investigation' to gather more evidence.
The Constitutional Court held this practice unconstitutional in 1999 as
a violation of adversarial principles in Article 123(3) of the Constitution.286
Even before this case was decided, the drafters of the new Code had
set their sights on eliminating supplemental investigation, though they
believed that-at least in some circumstances-there should be a way
to send the case back to the procurator to correct legal technical errors
necessary for the case to be tried-such as problems of improper joinder,
lack of necessary signatures on the charging document and the like. The
result was Article 237(l), which provides that a court may return a case to
the procurator for the "removal of obstacles" (ycTpaHeH, e npenlTCTBMA1)
(ustraneniiaprepiatstviz) "whenever [.. . the indictment [...I has been drawn
up in violation of the requirements of this Code in a way that precludes
the court from entering a judgment or other decision on the basis of such
indictment". A five-day limit for making corrections was imposed on the
procurator. Then, for good measure, 2003 amendments to Article 237
provided that the procurator could not "conduct any form of investiga-
tive or other procedural actions that are not specified in this Article" (the
technical errors) and that "any evidence obtained after the expiration of
the [five-day] limit [...] or through procedural actions not specified in this
article shall be inadmissible".28 7
The Constitutional Court, however, held these limits to be uncon-
stitutional to the extent that they did not permit correction of all poten-
tial procedural violations that had occurred.2"S The Court distinguished
between "procedural violations", noting that "remedying them does not
contemplate supplementing the charges already brought". Thus, it made
a distinction between procedural violations, regarding which a court "may
on the motion of a party or on its own initiative return the case to the
procurator" to correct, and sending the case back in order to "supple-
ment any incompleteness of the inquiry or preliminary investigation".
According to the Court, "the correction of the violations contemplates
carrying out any investigatory and other procedural actions necessary for
that purpose".
The line between correcting procedural errors and supplementing
incompleteness, however, is hard to draw. At least one of the fact situations
represented in the case illustrates the problem. Victims were denied their
right during the pretrial stages to review the case file and to file motions and
present supplemental evidence in the case. True, this involves a procedural
286 See supra note 6.
287 Art.237 ( 4 -5 ).
288 See Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.8-P of 8 December 2003, VKS (2004) No.i.
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violation but the result of 'correcting' it is to permit supplementation of
the case file . 89 There are other requirements of the Code that the police
or the criminal investigator are supposed to follow that, if corrected later,
would involve supplementation of the case file. The Court has not resolved
the considerable confusion generated by its decision.290
The difficulty that the Constitutional Court had with supplemental
investigations in the original 1999 case was the fact that, under the old
Code, the trial court acted on its own initiative and was supposed to state
specifically what the weaknesses were in the procurator's case. This, the
Court held, violated adversarial principles, which required a "strict separa-
tion of the functions of the court in its decision of the case and the function
of the prosecution" and required the court to act as a procurator.29' The
provisions of the new Code would seem to satisfy this specific adversarial
objection to the process, which raises the question of what the current
basis is for the Court to insist that supplementing the investigation is
unconstitutional-to prohibit the procurator from "supplementing any
incompleteness of the inquiry or preliminary investigation". Though the
Court does not address the question, it would seem that the real reason
is that permitting the state multiple attempts to convict an accused also
violates adversarial principles. Thus, there should be one chance on a given
trial date and the procurator should be prepared to proceed on that day.
Once that day is set and the trial starts, the trial should be seen through
to completion or the prosecution should suffer a dismissal.29
289 The other two fact situations involved an unsigned initial charging document (o6BMHeHIe)
(obvinenie) and the defendant having been denied the right to receive qualified legal assistance
from his lawyers, to examine the case file and to make motions. At least the latter could well
involve supplementing the case file with evidence against the defendant if the prosecution
needs to respond to the defense's commentary on the case file and motions.
290 See, for example, Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.389-0 of 2 December 2004
(unpublished decision available on Garant) (petition of Kurilko), in which the court refused
to accept a petition to clarify an earlier decision; and Opredelenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda
No.57-0 of 2 February 2006, VrKS (2006) No.3.
291 See 1996 Decision,supra note 6 (Decision of the Constitutional Court No.i9-P of 28 November
1996, VKS (1996) No.5).
292 This might be thought to constitute an attempt by the state to try a person twice for the same
offense. However, the Russian Constitution only provides that "n]o one may be convictedtwice
for the same crime", see Art. 5o(i) RF Constitution. The ECHR provides in Art.4 that no one
may be "tried or punished" for the same offense but it says that it is for an offense that the
person "has already been finally acquitted or convicted". So, under both these standards, it
would seem proper to retry someone any number of times as long as the earlier trials did not
end in final decisions and did not violate the right "to be tried without undue delay" under
Art.6s), ECHR. Art.6(i) violations tend to involve longer delays than typically are involved
with trial adjournments in Russia. See, generally, Trechsel, op.cit. note 3, 381-402 (on double
jeopardy) and 134-149 (on undue delay). By contrast, in the US, being tried twice requires only
a first attempt to try the person-"jeopardy" is said to "attach" when the first trial starts-after
which point no later trial is possible. See Burnham, op.cit note 3, 310-313.
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If this is the principle involved, then the practice now used to permit
supplementation of the prosecutions proofs at trial would seem to violate
it. This is the practice of granting liberal adjournments of trials when the
prosecution is not ready to proceed because of the absence of witnesses.
Article 253 permits the postponement and suspension of the trial. Our
observations and interviews, as well as those of Russian courtroom ob-
servers, confirm the widespread use of this practice.2 93
4. The Trial
4.I. Setting of the Trial and Participants
Criminal trials can be held in the Justice of the Peace courts, district
courts or subject-level (usually called 'regional') courts, depending on the
seriousness of the offense.294 The Justice of the Peace and district courts
are single-judge courts. In regional (subject-level) federal courts, trials
can be held before a single judge or a panel of three professional judges
or before a jury and a single presiding judge.' 95 Unlike Soviet times, when
judges just wore suits, Russian judges today wear robes. They are referred
to as 'your honor' (Bawa qecTb) (vasha chest) .296
A procurator must attend the trial, unlike the rule under the old
Code.297 Procurators are entitled to wear military style uniforms but,
when appearing as a procurator at trials in the 199os, many chose to wear
ordinary business suits. However, procurators tell us that the word came
down from the procurator general's office that they were to wear their
uniforms at all trials, so they now do so.
The defendant, at this point called the "person on trial" (nogcyg"MblM)
(podsudimyi), sits or stands in a 'prisoner's dock', as in the English system,
guarded by armed bailiffs. In more serious cases, the defendant is confined
in a barred cage in the courtroom. Whether in a dock or a cage, the defen-
dant is usually some distance from defense counsel, making attorney-client
consultation somewhat difficult and the need for it a public matter.
293 See interviews conducted 19 and 20 October 2ooS byjeffrey Kahn; see, also, Moskalenko and
Nikitinskii, op.cit. note 156, 19-2o.
294 For more detail on jurisdictional divisions among trials courts, see Burnham, Maggs and Da-
nilenko, op.cit. note 8, 70-77; and Art.3I(I-4), CrPC.
295 The court of a judge and two lay assessors, the mainstay of Soviet times, was used untilJanu-
ary 2004. In one of'the first cases decided against Russia in the European Court of Human
Rights, that Court held that Russia violated Art.6(i) of the Convention requiring "a fair [...]
hearing [...I by [a] tribunal established by law" when it used lay assessors who were not picked
at random nor limited in their terms. Posokbov v. Russia, op.cit, note 55.
296 Art.257 (3), CrPC.
297 Art.246, CrPC.
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Defense counsel is not required for all trials but to proceed without
counsel there must be a clear waiver from the defendant. It is not enough
that no counsel appears and the defendant just agrees to go ahead without
counsel. 98 The physical separation of the defendant and defense counsel
reflects their separate status as parties. Thus, in the course of the trial,
the defendant and the defense lawyer are often asked separately by the
court what their respective positions are. If there is a conflict between
the two, the defendant's position prevails. Defendants usually go along
with their counsel's position but, when the issue is a complex legal one,
defendants often do not know what to say when they are separately asked
by the judge for their position on the issue.
The victim is officially a party on the prosecution side of the case 29 9
and may be represented by his or her own counsel. The victim has a right to
testify300 to ask questions of the defendant and witnesses, 30' and the right
to appeal the judgment or sentence in the case.302 Often the only evidence
victims have is relevant only to the impact the crime has had on their lives
but their lack of personal knowledge of the circumstances of the crime
is often no barrier. It is fair to say that victims generally use their right to
appear, testify and make arguments to obvious and profoundly negative
effect on the defendant's case. Judges will invariably consult victims on
the issue of punishment. Victims may also join a civil claim for damages
to be tried along with the criminal charges.303
The Constitutional Court has been particularly supportive of victims'
rights. As discussed earlier, victims can appeal dismissal of a criminal case
during the preliminary investigation.304 The old Code did not allow the
victim to participate in closing arguments except in a narrow category of
cases (e.g., assault, slander) in which the impact of the crime on the victim
was directly relevant; however, in 1999, the Court struck down this limi-
tation as a violation of victims' rights.305 Then, in a 2003 case, the Court
298 Supreme Court Criminal Division, In re Kravchuk, decision of ii June 996, BVS (997) No.4 ,
5; and Lupinskaia, op.cit. note 19, 466.
299 Art.42, CrPC (set forth at Chapter 6: 'Participants in Criminal Proceedings on the Prosecution
Side).
300 Art.277(2), CrPC.
30i Art.275(3), CrPC, which provides for questioning by the court of the defendant "after he has
been questioned by the parties"; and Art.278(3), CrPC (providing for the same).
302 Art.42(z)(19), CrPC.
303 Art.4z(3), CrPC.
304 See, supra, section 2.1. Victims can also appeal refusal to initiate a case. See, supra, text accom-
panying notes i9 and 20.
305 Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.i-P of 15 January 1999 (petition of Kliuev), VKS
6i999) No.z, Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii (SZ RI) (999) No.4 item 602. The
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examined the provisions of the new Code, which provided that a case must
be dismissed if the procurator declines to proceed for lack of sufficient
evidence and that dismissal on this basis was judicially reviewable only if
there were new or newly discovered circumstances. The Constitutional
Court interpreted the Code as requiring that the procurator state sufficient
legal reasons for the decision not to proceed or to reduce the charge and
held the limited ground for review of such dismissals to be unconstitu-
tional.306 Then, in 2005, the Court held unconstitutional Article 405 of
the new Code, which prohibited supervisory review of final judgments on
any ground that would worsen the defendant's position-a prohibition on
what the Code referred to as a "turn for the worse" (noBopoT K XytweMy)
(povorot k kbudshemu).3°7 The Court offered several bases for its decision
but the main one was that Article 405 violated the principle of equality
of the parties secured by Article 123(3) of the Constitution, since defen-
dants could seek reversal of their convictions without any limitation.30
However, all systems give rights to criminal defendants that parties on the
prosecution side do not have. That is the whole idea behind securing the
rights of individuals against government power. To the extent that these
rights handicap the victim or the state procurator in proving their case,
then all of them violate strict equality of the parties. If the Court is serious
about this basis for its decision, then many of the rights of defendants in
criminal cases are potentially unconstitutional.
Bailiffs are present to assist the presiding judge in keeping order, to
provide general security for the court and to handle specific security needs
associated with a detained defendant's attendance in court.30 9
principal constitutional ground was the victim's right of "access to justice". Art.52 provides:
"Itihe rights of victims of crimes or abuses of power shall by protected by law. The state shall
guarantee such victims access to justice and compensation for damage inflicted." Other grounds
were the right to judicial protection. See Art.4 6(i) and the adversarial principles guaranteed
by Art.x23(3).
3o6 Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda Noi8-P, op.cit. note 288, 7.
307 Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.5-P of i May zoo5, SZRF (2005) No.22 item 2194.
Art.4o5 applied only to supervisory review, which is third instance review of a decision that is
considered final following appellate or cassational review (or the opportunity for it).
308 Art.i23 is quoted, supra, in the text accompanying note 3.
309 Art.25 7. The bailiff service was formed in 1997 and replaces the former Interior Ministry
troops as providers of court security See Federal Law on Court Bailiffs.Judges have the power
to exclude persons from the court room or to fine them for obstreperous behavior (Arts.it7
and 258, CrPC), such as failure to show up or showing up late when summoned, or to impose
administrative sanctions (see Art. I7(3), Kodeks RF "ObAdministrativnykh pravonarusheniiakh"
No.I9 5-FZ, signed 30 December 2001, as amended by Federal Law No. 12o-FZ, signed 22July
zoos). Criminal liability is even possible for offensive statements made to the judge or other
participants (Art.29 7, Criminal Code RF) with up to four to six months of detention (apecr)
(arest).
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Consistent with continental practice, there is no verbatim transcript
of the trial, only a summary called a 'protocol', kept by the court 'secretary'
in longhand. The new Code beefs up the requirement, requiring that the
secretary make a "complete and accurate" account of the actions of every-
one in court,310 including "detailed content of testimony" and "questions
asked of those who were questioned and their answers"3' but provides
no better means of discharging these responsibilities than existed before.
Various means of taking down testimony are suggested, including "steno-
graphic" and other "technical means" but none are required and, from
our observations, none have been provided. As a result, trial 'protocols'
look as sketchy as they always have.312 The parties have the right to review
the record and make corrections and additions but any changes must be
approved by the judge.3'3 Judges are resistant to verbatim recordings of
'their' trials and hearings, since that would place them under more exact-
ing scrutiny However, it would seem that a record that would permit a
higher reviewing court or even the general public to find out exactly what
happened in a particular trial would substantially advance the interest in
openness and accuracy of judicial proceedings and judicial accountability
In this respect, an important amendment to the new Code was passed
in 2003 establishing that anyone present in the courtroom "has the right
to make an audio recording" of the proceedings.34 Some defense lawyers
have taken to routinely recording trials for the protection of their clients
and themselves.3Is
30 Art.245, CrPC.
3ii Art.259(3)(1o-i), CrPC. The "complete and accurate" part and the requirement that the sec-
retary take down "questions asked of those who were questioned and their answers" are new.
Compare Art.26 4 , CrPC RSFSR.
312 See, for example, Moskalenko and Nikitinskii, op.cit. note 156, 29, which states that: "[tihe
observer noted that in the course of the above dialogue the court secretary recorded next to
nothing of what occurred."
313 Arguments can arise over what changes or additions can be made and the ultimate decision
is for the judge to make. In complicated cases, many hours and sometimes days can be spent
trying to "settle the record" for appeal. In the recent Khlebnikov murder case, several weeks
were spent on it with no satisfactory resolution. Everyone remembered different versions of
what happened and the judge had already made some efforts to "clean up" the record that
other participants disagreed with. Interview with Larissa Maslenikova, counsel for the victims,
Moscow, 2 October 2006. The acquittal in the case was reversed by the Supreme Court without
the record ever having been finally settled.
314 Art.24i(5), CrPC (as amended by the Federal Law on Bringing the CrPC into Compliance).
Photographs or video recordings are possible as well but require the permission of the presid-
ing judge. The original version of Art.24 1 had provided that "making audio recordings is not
permitted if it interferes with the trial", which meant that permission had to be sought from
the judge.
315 In one case, defense counsel's audiotape of his interaction with a judge figured prominently in
his successfully defending against disciplinary charges brought by a judge. See Moscow Chamber
of Advocates, "Zakliuchenie kavalifikatsionnoi kommissii advokatskoi palaty goroda Moskvy
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A September 2006 decree of the Russian government has indicated
an interest in "the implementation of required audio-recording of judicial
proceedings" as part of its plan for development of the judicial system over
the next four years. It expresses the hope that such action would "have
an effect on compliance with procedural rules, would improve the level
of civility and forestall complaints about settlement of trial records" 3,6
So far, however, the law has not been changed to require any form of
verbatim record of trials.
4.2. Trial Procedure
Article 15 of the Code provides:
"i) Judicial proceedings in criminal cases shall be conducted in accordance with
adversarial principles.
2) The functions of prosecution, defense, and adjudication of a criminal case shall
be separate from each other and those functions may not be allocated to any single
agency or official.
3) A court is not an organ of criminal prosecution and shall not take the prosecution or
defense side in a case. The court shall create the conditions necessary for the parties
to perform their procedural duties and to exercise the rights granted to them.
4) The prosecution and the defense shall have equal rights before the court."
Article 244 of the Code fleshes out the nature of the "equal rights" be-
stowed when it requires that:
"In judicial proceedings, the prosecution and the defense shall enjoy equal rights to
make challenges and file motions, present evidence and take part in the examination
thereof, take part in closing arguments, submit written questions to the court on
the issues [relevant to proof of the crime charged] and take part in the examination
of all other issues that arise during the trial."3"7
After the presiding judge announces the case to be tried, the court reporter
verifies for the record the presence of all the participants, the presiding
judge addresses them with a long list of their various rights during the
po distsiplinarnomy proizvodstvu v otnoshenii advokata P", 20 May 2oo5. One of the charges
rejected by the disciplinary commission was that the advocate "used an audio recorder without
having warned the presiding judge" or "participants at the trial".
36 See Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii "0 federal'noi tselevoi programme 'Razvitie
sudebnoi sistemy Rossii' na 2007-2011" No.583, signed 21 September 2oo6, Rossiiskaiagazeta (3
October 2006) available at <http:I/vww.rg.rul206ho/o3/sud-dok.html>.
317 Art.IS of the Constitution makes adversarial principles applicable to "judicial proceedings"
and the context makes clear that the reference is intended to refer to proceedings in courts
before judges. See, also, supra, note 7. Art.a of the Code uses the same term, however (cygonpo-
13BogcTBo) (udoproizvodstvo), and defines it as including both "pretrial and judicial proceeding
in a criminal case". Art.5(56), CrPC. Since the Code clearly does not establish a preliminary
investigation stage that is at all adversarial, this understanding of 'cyonpoa3oJCTaO' can be
doubted. However, compare Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.2-P of 14 February
2000, SZRF(2ooo) No.8 item 991 (petition ofAulov), which states that "[a]dversarial principles
extend to all stages of the criminal process".
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trial318 Witnesses are then sequestered and the court proceeds to "estab-
lish the identity of the accused" and whether the accused received a copy
of the indictment at least seven days before trial3 '9 The court then deals
with issues of new witnesses, experts or specialists, or motions to exclude
evidence will be raised and disposed of at this time, including motions
that had been raised before trial and denied.320
Once these preliminaries are taken care of, the trial proper begins
with the procurator setting out the substance of the charges against the
defendant.321Then the judge asks the defendant (not his counsel) "whether
he understands the charge, whether he admits his guilt and whether he
or his defense counsel wishes to state the defense position with regard to
the charges that were presented".322
The Code then requires that the prosecution present its evidence
first. Only after such presentation does the defense present its case in op-
position.323 As for the internal organization of the prosecution or defense
case, these are determined by the prosecution or defense as they see it
to their best advantage and the order must be accepted by the court.324
However, even under the new Code, the defendant "may give testimony
at any point in the trial" with the court's permission.325
At whatever point witnesses testify, the first party to question the
witness is the party who called the witness. Then the opposing party and
other parties ask questions, followed finally by the judge.326 The defendant
testifies while standing in the prisoner's dock or cage. Witnesses testify
318 Some of the lists of rights are rather lengthy (the Code lists twenty-two separate rights for the
victim and twenty-one for the defendant) and the recitation of them takes on the air of ritual,
given the impossibility of anyone remembering all of them. No written explanation of rights
is required to be distributed.
319 Art.265, CrPC.
320 Art.271, CrPC.
321 Compare Art.335(), CrPC, which states that "[a) jury trial shall begin with opening statements
[BCTynMTenbHbie 3aRBneHms] [vstupitel'nyezaiavleniial made by the public prosecutor and defense
counsel"; with Art.273 (i), CrPC, which states that "[a) trial shall begin with the public prosecu-
tor setting out the charge against the defendant". However, advocates with whom we spoke
indicate that the same in-person questions are asked of the defendant in jury trials before
opening statements take place. E-mail communication from Nikolai Kipnis, IO July 2007, in
consultation with other advocates. See infra, 83-84.
322 Art.27 3(2), CrPC.
323 Art.274(2), CrPC.
324 Art.274(l), CrPC. Under the old Code, the court could order presentation of evidence in any
order and it was traditional that the defendant testified first.
325 Art.274 (3), CrPC.
326 Art.278(3), CrPC. Witnesses are also required to testify out of earshot of each other. Art.27 8(),
CrPC.
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while standing at a lectern. Any questioning by the judge, procurator or
defense lawyer is generally done while they are seated. All others tradition-
ally stand to ask a question. Witnesses and defendants may use notes while
testifying. After giving testimony, witnesses may remain in the courtroom
or, with the permission of the court, they may leave.37
A major change in terms of adversarial party-control principles is the
new Code's relaxation of the power of the court to control what witnesses
will be called to testify at trial. As noted earlier, under Article 271(4), the
court "may not deny a motion to permit a witness or forensic specialist to
testify at trial if that person has appeared at the request of the parties".321
Under prior law, in conformity with the tradition in civil law countries,
the question of which witnesses may testify at trial was determined by the
judge; and the judge's selection was, in turn, controlled by what witnesses
the criminal investigator called during the pretrial investigation.
However, while Article 271(4) is useful, it falls short of a guarantee
of compulsory process for the defense. Reluctant defense witnesses or
even defense witnesses who need to show a subpoena to get time offwork
will not attend. By contrast, the prosecution has full subpoena power to
compel its witnesses to come-a serious violation of the requisite equality
of rights of the parties at trial.329
Witnesses do not take an oath to tell the truth but are advised that
refusal to testify and giving false testimony are criminally punishable and
sign a written statement of these obligations.33° The defendant is not
considered a 'witness' even if he or she chooses to testify and no criminal
liability attaches to anything the defendant states at trial. As for the or-
der of questioning witnesses, "the party who requested that the witness
be called into court shall be the first to ask questions of the witness". 33'
Similarly, when the accused testifies, the first to ask questions is defense
327 Arts.275(2) and 279, CrPC.
328 Although the language of this section is ambiguous and may be read to require a request by
all parties in agreement, it is understood by most judges to refer to witnesses appearing at the
request of any party. See Ulianov, op.cit note 248; and Davletov, op.cit note 248.
329 Compare Art.6( 3)(d), ECHR, which lays out the right "to obtain the attendance and examina-
tion of witnesses on his behalf on the same condition as witnesses against him"; and Bricmont
v. Belgium, No.Io857/8 4 (Eur.Ct.H.R., 7July i989), 89, which states that it is normal "for the
national courts to decide whether it is necessary or advisable to call a witness". See, generally,
Trechsel, op.cit. note 3, 322-326.
330 Art.27 8(2), CrPC. Under Art.5 6, a witness "may not give false testimony knowingly or refuse
to give testimony" other than as provided by established privileges against incriminating him-
self, his spouse or close relatives. Arts.56(6)(2) and 56(4)(I), CrPC. A witness may otherwise be
compelled to testify and "shall be liable" for "knowingly giving false testimony or for refusing
to testify". Art.56( 7 -8), CrPC. This is a criminal liability that is punishable by a fine, corrective
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counsel, followed by the procurator and any other parties and finally the
court. 332
As discussed earlier when the role of the case file at trial was discussed,
the Code seems to require oral, first-hand testimony of witnesses--with
the exceptions discussed earlier. Traditionally, the testimony of the de-
fendant and witnesses has been given in narrative form, followed by any
necessary clarifying questions. The narrative was usually prompted by a
general invitation by the judge to "tell us everything you know that is rel-
evant to this case". However, testimony under the new Code is supposed
to be elicited by the parties.3 33 The drafters contemplated that the judge
would simply turn presentation of the testimony over to the parties, who
would present the evidence in question and answer format. However, "if
defendants express their wish to tell about the circumstances of the case
on their own, [ ...] they must be given the opportunity". Otherwise their
right to defense will be compromised.334
Lawyers from common-law countries often ask if 'cross examina-
tion' exists in Russian trials. The answer is 'yes and no'. Certainly, there
is nothing denominated as such and the principal form of question that
is used on cross examination-the leading question (HaaoAtquwi aonpoc)
(navodiashshiivopros)--is prohibited at trial.335 However, the ban is not what
it seems. In fact, leading questions not unlike those used in a common-
law style cross examination are asked all the time as 'clarifying questions'
(yTo4H 3ou1e Bonpocbl) (utochniaiushshie voprosy), though neither form of
question is defined anywhere in the Code.36 Whether under the rubric
of 'clarifying questions' or otherwise, it is not uncommon to see what
common-law lawyers would recognize as cross examination take place in
Russian trials.
332 Art.27 5 (I), CrPC.
333 Kozak and Mizulina, op.cit. note 17, comment 2 to Art.278.
334 Ibid., comment i to Art.275 .
335 Art.27 5(I), CrPC. Actually, Art.275(I) only prohibits asking leading questions of the defendant.
There appears to be no similar ban on leading questions asked of witnesses, victims or other
participants, though they are banned during the investigation. See Art.i89 (2), CrPC. However,
this is likely an oversight and in practice the ban is treated as applying to witnesses and victims
at trial as well.
336 When Russian lawyers and judges are asked to explain the difference between an impermis-
sible leading and a permissible clarifying question, they often give different answers. The most
oft-heard explanation is that a leading question is a question that suggests the desired answer,
while a clarifying question is a form of leading question that follows up on and seeks to clarify
a witness's earlier answer to an earlier open, non-leading question. Thus, the key to asking lead-
ing questions would seem to be that questioners must link those questions to an answer the
witness gave to an earlier open-ended question. However, whether that open-ended question
must have been asked by that very questioner or by some other questioner is not clear.
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Somewhat surprising for an otherwise mainly adversarial trial regime,
the presiding judge excludes improper questions sua sponte without wait-
ing or requiring any objection to be voiced by a party In practice, the
ban on leading questions, such that it is, is almost exclusively enforced
by the judge.337
If the evidence as it develops at trial is different from that gathered in
the preliminary investigation, the presiding judge can change the charge
against the defendant. However, the charge cannot be changed for the
worse or in such a major way that there is little overlap with the evidence
supporting the original charge.33 If the procurator and the victim decline
to prosecute, the judge may not step in and continue the prosecution.3 39
If, in the process of trial, evidence of other crimes committed either by
the accused or by others is revealed, the court may not order initiation
of a criminal case.3 4 °
Following presentation of the evidence are the closing arguments,
called npeH W(preniia) or 'debate'. For the defense, closing arguments can
be tricky because both guilt and sentence will be decided in the trial. Thus,
in cases in which there is an argument that the defendant is not guilty, it
is difficult to avoid some rhetorical inconsistency in arguing both that the
defendant did not commit the offense and that, if he did, he is sincerely
sorry and should be granted leniency in his punishment.
In addition to closing arguments, the defendant himself has the right
to a 'final word' (nocnegHee CnOBO) (poslednee slovo). During the final word,
no questions or interruptions are permitted, nor may it be limited by
the court in duration, except for clear abuse, unseemly conduct or utter
337 Art.275(x) provides that "the presiding judge shall disallow [orTKnoHer] [otkloniaetl leading
questions and questions that are irrelevant to the case". This could be read as consistent with
requiring an objection from a party first but, in practice, it is not so interpreted.
338 Art.252(2), CrPC; and Lupinskaia, op.cit. note 19,468. However, the prohibition on a change in
charges that would worsen the defendant's position is of doubtful constitutionality after two
Constitutional Court decisions: Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.5-P, op.cit. note 307,
which held that Art.4o4's ban on supervisory review that worsens the defendant's position
is unconstitutional; and Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.6-P of i6 May 2007, VKS
(2007) No.3, which held that changing an assault charge to murder after the victim had died
after a judgment of guilty of assault must be permitted and that Art.413, which bans reopening
a case based on new facts unless the criminal nature or punishability of the act, violates the
victim's right to justice.
339 This power existed under the old Code but was held unconstitutional by the Constitutional
Court as a violation of adversarial principles. See, supra, note 7. On the other hand, if the
prosecution declines to prosecute, grounds must be stated and the decision is reviewable by
the court at the instance of the victim. See, supra, section 2.1.
340 This power existed under the old Code but the Constitutional Court held that it violated
adversary principles. Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.i-P, op.cit note 6.
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lack of relevance to the trial 4' The right is considered so valuable that
reversal of the conviction is possible unless a clear indication of waiver
is indicated in the record. The final word is not evidence and, therefore,
may not be relied upon as a basis for guilt or innocence, although this
lack of evidentiary value is not explicitly set forth in the Code. Should
new and relevant information be referenced in the final word, the trial
may be reopened for the introduction of the evidence.342
The changes made by the new Code in trial procedure are clearly an
advance for adversarial principles but they fall short. First and foremost,
witness statements and other contents of the case file are 'pre-admitted'
for use at trial, which makes the right of the defense to ask questions of
witnesses at trial of considerably reduced value. The right to ask questions
and challenge the contents of such records are for naught if the witnesses in
question and the officials who participated in the investigative actions and
produced the reports in the case file are not going to appear at trial.
The other problem is with implementing those adversarial trial pro-
cedures that the Code does establish. In some trials, those procedures
work as theywere designed to work. However, in many trials, the observer
could justifiably think that trials had not changed that much from the way
they were in Soviet times. Part of the problem is that the lawyers lack the
skills necessary to discharge their new adversarial duties. The essence of
adversarial presentation of evidence-the ability to organize proof and
to use questions and answers to elicit a persuasive story from one's own
witnesses or to make a point in one's favor with opposing witnesses-is
not an inborn trait.343 The weak and unconfident trial skills of the lawyers
combine with judges who are used to dominating the courtroom, causing
party control and presentation to quickly fall by the wayside.
The Code does require that the prosecution go first with its evi-
dence, as befits a system that places the burden of proof at trial on the
prosecution and permits the judge to ask questions of the defendant only
after the defendant has been questioned by the parties. 344 However, the
Code continues judicial domination of the trial from its earliest points,




343 One of the authors has extensive experience teaching trial advocacy to lawyers from and
other former republics of the Soviet Union. See Uilliam Bernam [William Burnham), Irina V.
Reshetnikova and Alexei Proshliakov, Sudebnaia advokatura (St. Petersburg University Press,
St. Petersburg, 1996), which provides text and materials for a trial advocacy course taught in
the style of the US National Institute for Trial Advocacy.
344 Art.275(3), CrPC.
Review of Central and East European Law 33 (2008)
rogation of the defendant3 45 It provides that the defendant has the right
to give testimony at any time 346 and requires that the judge at the very
beginning of the trial "interrogate the accused about whether the charges
are clear to him, whether he admits his guilt and whether he wishes or
his counsel wishes to express their position with respect to the charges
presented".347 Given that the defendants' emotions can go into high gear
when the accusations against them are set out--often fueled by impa-
tience from long pretrial confinement under adverse conditions-this
preliminary colloquy can easily metamorphose into a full dialogue on the
substance of the case, defense counsel's instructions to the defendant to
the contrary notwithstanding. 34s The defendant's right to testify first has
almost become a requirement by sheer force of old habits.349
Similarly with witnesses, the Code's requirement that the judge first
"establish the identity of the witness tand] clarify his relationship to the
defendant and the victim" 35o makes it easy for the judge to then move
seamlessly into more substantive matters. Often even judges who try to
follow the Code and turn questioning over to the lawyers after this pre-
liminary exchange find that the parties are not up to the task, so they take
over the questioning. The lawyers, whether from relief or resignation, do
not assert their rights; and, suddenly, one has a pre-reform trial in which
judicial interrogation of witnesses predominates.
Whether through innocent slippage or direct violation of the Code's
requirements, we observed trials in which the judge routinely asked sub-
stantive questions directly of the defendant and the victim, often bypass-
ing the procurator and defense counsel entirely In other cases, with each
witness, the judge offered the defendant and victim the opportunity to ask
questions before offering the same opportunity to defense counsel35I
345 See Thaman, op.cit note 273, 105.
346 Art.274 (3), CrPC. Permission of the presiding judge is required, however.
347 Art.273 (2), CrPC.
348 Courtroom observers have reported violations of even this most basic requirement that the
defendant hear the charges against him prior to giving testimony In one case, "the procurator
noted that she would not read the bill of indictment until the defendant gave his testimony".
With no objection by his counsel (who had been willing to proceed with the case in the ab-
sence of witnesses), the defendant acknowledged his guilt for the unstated crime and stated
his readiness to give testimony See Moskalenko and Nikitinskii, op.cit. note iS6, 23.
349 It is not just the force of judicial habits. Some defense counsel believe that it is an advantage
for the defendant to testify first, even if the interrogation is by the judge.
350 Art.278(2), CrPC.
35' The problem with the weak trial skills of lawyers starts with legal education. It is not only a
matter of there being no trial advocacy courses. Perhaps most important is that, as in most
civil law countries, law students are taught the law from the standpoint of becoming judges,
not advocates. Thus, the emphasis is on knowing what the law is (often from memory) and
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Procurators have the advantage of receiving formal training in trial
skills from the Procuracy Academy in Moscow and its affiliates, which in-
cludes role-play exercises and a final full jury trial. However, their trainers,
other than occasional visiting American prosecutors, tend to be academics
from the Academywho have no trial experience to speak of 352 In addition,
there is an absence of short role-play exercises to permit development
of specific skills in isolation (e.g., impeachment of a witness with a prior
inconsistent statement, case analysis, use of demonstrative aids) before
expecting the student procurator to employ them in a longer exercise.
However, the real problem with the effectiveness of procurators in trials
is their lack of a history or tradition from Soviet times of doing much at
trial. They only appeared in about 6o% of cases and in those cases they
viewed their role as neutral supervisors of legality, not as advocates. This
causes procurators in trials to act less as advocates for their 'client'-the
state-and more like quasi-judicial helpers, seeking to get all the facts out.
As such, their closing arguments in cases are delivered more in a pontifical
than a persuasive style.
The federal Chamber of Advocates has outlined a program for con-
tinuing legal education (called 'nOBblweHlle KBanWWKau,41( ' (Povyshenie
kvalifikatsi), literally 'raising one's qualifications') but it does not include
an interactive trial advocacy component.3 53 However, as might be expected,
advocates are much better than procurators in terms of seeking to advance
their client's point of view. Some are true 'naturals' at closing arguments.
However, the advocates seem to have difficulty presenting the facts needed
to support those arguments.354
coming up with the 'correct' answer to legal problems, not on thinking critically and learning
how to argue all sides of a question.
352 The US Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance andTraining (OPDAT) has,
since 2005, cooperated with the Legal Academy in its trial advocacy trainings. These impres-
sions are from attending one of those trial advocacy training sessions.
353 Reshenie Soveta Federal'noi palaty advocatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Protocol No.7) "0
professional'noi podgotovke i perepodgotovke advokatov, pomoshchnikov advokatov i stazherov
advokatov", signed 25June 2004 (unpublished decision available on Garant); and e-mail from
Nikolai Kipnis, 10 July 2007. Another dynamic that works against providing trial skills training
in Russia is that advocates who are good in court view what they do as a professional secret,
thus making them reluctant to assist their potential competitors. By contrast, being asked to
teach (often for free) at continuing legal education events in the US is considered an honor.
The American Bar Association's Central and Eastern European Law Initiative (CEELI) has
conducted some jury trial advocacy trainings for advocates in some regions of the country.
However, these efforts do not reach even a substantial minority of advocates.
354 Tsarist advocates and prosecutors were renowned for their advocacy skills. Even a casual glance
of the legal section of any bookstore will disclose several books on famous closing arguments
byTsarist-era lawyers. See, for example, S. M. Kazantev (ed.), Sudprisiazhnykb v Rossii: Gromkie
ugolovnyeprotsessy 1864-1917 (Lenizdat, St. Petersburg, 199I), which provides closing arguments
and biographical sketches of famous Tsarist-era trial lawyers and an article on jury trials by the
most famous Russian lawyer in history, Anatolii F. Koni.
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The enormity of what the new Code tries to do with trials must be
emphasized before an overly critical attitude is adopted. What the Code
attempts is no less than a sea change in the basic concept of a trial. Russia
has, essentially, gone from a system of trials run by judges to trials run by
lawyers. However, though the law has changed, many of the other things
necessary for the law to work well in practice are not in place. There
has been insufficient effort made to ensure that the lawyers are actually
prepared for their new adversarial responsibilities and that judges are pre-
pared to repudiate their active ways. Given the enormity of the changes
mandated by the new Code and the strength of the opposing concepts
and mindsets of the participants, it is in some ways surprising that many
trials are as adversarial as they are. 355
In cases with appointed defense counsel, low pay provides few in-
centives for proper preparation for and performance at trial. While the
situation with pay has improved, it is still low. The basic pay for defense
counsel is RUB 275 (or about USD ii) for one day in court.356 However, this
is only for time spent in court (referred to as 'CyAO~eHb' (sudoden) or 'court
day'). There is no payment provided for time spent on case investigation,
legal research, studying the case file, writing motions or trial preparation.
As discussed earlier, recent versions of the federal regulation on defense
counsel pay make clear that any part of a day is to be counted as a whole
day; but advocates report that they are sometimes paid only for the frac-
tion of the day that the hearing or trial took35 There is no reimbursement
for travel expenses or time.35
355 It is hard even in common-law systems for judges to get used to their new role of being passive
arbiters ofwhat is really the lawyers' show. The difficulties are reflected in the oft-told story of
an English barrister who was newly appointed to the bench. He asked a senior judicial colleague
to observe him preside over some of his first trials and give him some feedback. The senior
colleague's suggestion was to do what he had done when he first went on the bench-to place
in front of himself on the bench a sign that only he could see reading "SHUT UP".
356 See, supra, note 223. The official amount is sometimes supplemented from a fund containing
mandatory donations by lawyers who do not want to be appointed in criminal cases. In Moscow,
the amount of the donation is RUB 1,130 or around USD 45 a month. See Proceedings of the
Moscow Bar (unpublished), para. 9 (effective i February 2007) (on file with William Burnham).
We were unable to find information on how money from this fund is distributed, though we
were told that it is primarily intended to cover civil legal services that advocates are required
by law to provide for which they get no payment from the government. See Art.z6(1), Law
on Advocate's Practice and Advocates, which addresses the civil legal problems of pensioners
and veterans, alimony and child support, death of a breadwinner and labor health and safety
cases.
357 Communication from Moscow advocate received by William Burnham, 6July 2007.
358 When advocates complain about the rates of pay, says Evgenii Semeniako, head of the Federal
Chamber of Advocates, government officials accuse advocates of 'egotism' and of shirking
their 'social role'. Interview by William Burnham with Evgeniii V Semeniako, President, Fed-
eral Chamber of Advocates, and Anastasiia M. Loginova, Public Relations Assistant for the
Chamber, Moscow, 15 May 2004. An interesting recent development relevant to free counsel
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A major problem with defense representation at trial is the system of
appointed counsel used in some jurisdictions, including Moscow. Instead
of appointing counsel to represent the client from the beginning to the
end of the case, a 'duty advocate' (gelKypHb6 aABOKaT) (dezhurnyi advokat)
defense counsel will be sent to a particular courtroom to handle all the
trials that take place there on a given day. Under such a system, the lawyer
representing the person at trial will not be the same lawyer who attended
pretrial investigation activities. Also, if the trial needs to be adjourned
to a different day (other than perhaps the next day), a different lawyer
will handle the trial from that point on. The result of this system is that
lawyers arrive in court on a given day without having met or interviewed
their client and without having familiarized themselves with the case file
or any of the earlier trial proceedings. The Samara Region Chamber of
Advocates has taken steps to ensure that the same advocate represents
the defendant from beginning to end but Moscow has not done so. 359
A different problem that seriously undercuts the adversarial trial
process set out in the new Code is the practice of procurators and judges
circumventing those protections entirely by engaging in exparte contacts
about the case-procurators going to the judge in chambers and discussing
the merits of cases without defense counsel being present.360 When we
raised the issue of exparte contact with procurators, they were nonchalant
about it. One procurator, who requested anonymity in exchange for candor,
asserted that procurators speak privately with the assigned judge before
a case is heard in court "ninety to one hundred per cent of the time".36 I
This procurator felt that this was "all just part of the adversarial process",
though readily acknowledging that such meetings gave the procurator
certain advantages over the defense. As the procurator put it:
"I myself meet with the judge and discuss some criminal cases rather often. I explain
my opinions and the circumstances of the case. But the judge would not give me his
opinion; he will only consider my opinion. I did not want to force my opinion [at
these exparte meetingsl. I was just lobbying. This was not during the trial but before
the trial. And I would say the same thing at the trial. [.. . I've never forced the judge
to make an unlawful decision, so my conscience is clean."'36
in criminal cases is the Supreme Court's approval of a system to obtain reimbursement of the
cost of appointed counsel from convicted defendants. Vladislav Kulikov, "Tiuremnyi schet za
besplatnogo advokata", Rossiiskaiagazeta (9 August 2005).
359 See, supra, note 214 (Samara rules). It should be emphasized that the 'duty advocate' system
used in Moscow is not the direct choice of the chamber. All appointments go to law firms, not
individuals, and law firms then choose how they discharge their duties to the client.
360 Exparte contacts would seem to violate even the ECHR's narrow concept of adversariality. See,
supra, note 3-
361 Interview conducted 27 October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
362 Ibid.
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Asked whether this viewpoint conflicted with the adversarial principles
set forth in the Code, the procurator expressed puzzlement. A defense at-
torney could do the same thing, this procurator said, if he knew the judge.
Of course, the procurator conceded, this would be very rare indeed. As
another procurator observed, "the defense attorney is considered an enemy
[Bparl [vrag]".363 Procurators in other cities confirmed the practice.364 As
one explained, "for a long time we were on the same side". Besides, the
procurator continued, "it is not forbidden [by the Code".365 This pros-
ecutor also asserted that there was nothing in the Code that prevented
a defense attorney from doing the same thing, while admitting that such
meetings were very rare.
There are some indications that exparte contact has come under criti-
cal review. A September 20 o 6 Russian government decree noted an interest
in the "introduction of required procedures for judges to disclose at the
start of a judicial proceeding all informal contacts they had had regarding
the case". 366 Whether anything will come of it--or whether a prosecutor's
contact with a judge would qualify as a prohibited "informal contact" at
all-remains to be seen. The decree is proffered as an anti-corruption
measure, thus suggesting that prosecutor contacts with judges maywell not
be within its purview. Moreover, as stated in the decree, what is planned
is a reporting requirement, not a prohibition on such contacts.
4.3. Trial by Jury
Trial by jury was one of the major emphases of the Concept of Judicial
Reform. 367 Articles 47(2), 123(4) and 20(2) of the 1993 Constitution secure
the right to trial by jury The first two constitutional provisions provide
for a right to trial by jury "in cases provided for by federal statute", while
Article 20(2) directly requires a jury trial in all death penalty cases. 368 After
363 Interview conducted 19 October 2oo5 byJeffrey Kahn.
364 Interview conducted 2 November 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
365 Ibid.
366 Government Decree on the Development of theJudicial System, op.cit. note 316.
367 Russian Federation, "Kontseptsiia sudebnoi reformy v Rossiiskoi Federatsii", Vedomosti Ver-
khovnogo SovetaRSFSR (1991) No.4 4 item 1435. Although the 1991 Concept was not intended to
be a legally binding document, it was officially approved by the parliament. The Russian terms
for 'jury trial' are 'cy nplc Hb1X'(sudprisiazhnyhk) (literally, 'court of jurors' or 'jury court') or
'cy, C y'4acTt4eM nlPc1)KHlbX 3aceaTenel' (uds uchastiemprisiazhnykh zasedateler) (literally, 'court
with the participation of jurors'). The term for a juror, 'npHc (Hb1A 3acegtaTenb' (prisiazhnyi
zasedatel) or simply 'npWcnseHbI' (prisiazhny) refers to someone who sits under oath (npmcnga)
(prisiaga). This is similar to the English words 'jury' and 'juror', which both derive from the
Old French lurde', for oath. See Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language,
Unabridged(Merriam-Webster, Springfield, MA, 2nd ed. 1956), 1348.
368 See Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.3-P of 2 February 1999, VKS (999) No.3, which
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considerable debate and political compromise in the State Duma, legislation
was passed injuly of 1993 implementing the right for more serious offenses
to be handled by the subject-level (regional) courts in nine subjects of the
country.369 Under this 'experiment', as it was called, the first Russian jury
trial in over 75 years was held in Saratov in December of 1993.370
The 2001 Code extended jury trials to the regional courts of the rest
of Russia, with juries available in all but Chechnia as of i January 2004,
with Chechnia scheduled to be included in 2007.37' In 20o6, jury trials
accounted for 13.7% of subject-level court cases and in 2005 for I.9%.372
At the end of the preliminary investigation, investigators must inform
defendants in cases involving jury-qualified offenses of the nature of the
jury trial and their right to request a jury trial. A preliminary hearing is
mandatory when a jury request is made, and the defendant will be asked
to confirm the request at the preliminary hearing. Once confirmed at that
point, the request becomes irrevocable. In cases of multiple defendants, a
request for a jury by any one of them results in a jury trial for all of them,
unless the case can be conveniently severed into multiple cases.373
held it a violation of equal protection to impose the death penalty when jury trials are available
in only nine regions of the country.
369 Subject-level courts handle more aggravated forms of ordinary crimes (e.g., aggravated murder,
as opposed to ordinary murder, which is handled by district courts) and crimes against state
institutions, such as treason, espionage, falsification of evidence and obstruction of justice.
Over 75% of criminal cases in subject-level courts are some form of aggravated murder. See
Burnham, Maggs and Danilenko, op.cit note 18, 73-76.
370 Russia had a jury trial system in criminal cases during the period 1865-1917. See "Sudebnye
ustavy", signed zo November 1864, Arts.20o-8z8; and Samuel Kucherov, Courts, Lawyers and
Trials under the Last Three Tsars (Praeger, New York, 1953). For a description and analysis of the
first jury trials held under the new law, see Thaman, op.cit. note 273. Good Russian-language
sources on Russian juries include MV. Nemytina, Rossiiskiisudprisiazhnykh (Izdatel'svo BEK,
Moscow, i99I); VM. Lebedev, Rassmotrenie del sudom prisiazbnykb (Iuridicheskaiia fiteratura,
Moscow, 1998); L.M. Karznova, Vozrozhdenyisudprisiazbnyk (Nota Bene, Moscow, 2000); S.A.
Nasonov, Sudebnoesledstvie vsudeprisiazhnykb: zakonodatel'stvo, teoriiapraktika (R. Valent, Moscow,
2001). See, also, Thaman, op.cit. note 21, 145 and 198.
37' The delay of their introduction in Chechniawas upheld as constitutional by the Constitutional
Court. Postanovlenie Konstitutsionnogo Suda No.3-P of 6 April 20o6, VKS (2oo6) No.3 (peti-
tion of Tuburova).
372 See the website of the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court, available at <http://www.
cdep.ru/material.asp?material-id=217>.
373 Arts.217(5) and 325(2), CrPC. In jury cases in Krasnoiarsk (and perhaps other regions), assistant
chiefjudges select a judge to hear each jury trial from a special list of qualified judges. Interview
withJudge V.E Baranovskii conducted 25 October 2005 byJeffrey Kahn. In Krasnoiarsk, out
of the fifty judges on the subject-level court who hear criminal cases, only fifteen generally
younger judges have been qualified by special training to hear jury trials, so theyget all the jury
trials even if a different judge was assigned before a jury request was made. Some believe this
violates the Code requirement in Art.24 2 that the composition of a court not be altered once
it is constituted. Interview with former Constitutional Court Judge, Tamara Morshchakova,
conducted 3 November 2005 byJeffrey Kahn.
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The Russian jury like the traditional common law jury, has twelve
members chosen at random from the community, who deliberate in secret
and independently from the judge. Thus, the Russian jury is structured
for more independent decision making than the mixed courts of Soviet
times or continental Europe and even the French jury. Statistics confirm
this independence. While the non-jury acquittal rate has traditionally been
below %,374 the acquittal rate for juries ran to around 20% in the initial
round of cases.375 The rate dropped in 200o and 2001 to around 15% and
in 2002 to 8.5%.376 However, in more recent years, it has returned to its
former levels, with a 22% rate for 2006.377
A complete picture of the independence of the Russian jury as an
institution is impossible, however, without examining appellate judicial
control. The Code prohibits a reviewing court from reversing a verdict
based on the court's disagreement with the jury's determination of the
facts. However, the higher court can reverse for legal error378 The statis-
tics on reversals of jury verdicts suggest that the intensity of the search
for legal error is influenced by hostility to the jury's view of the evidence.
Duma Deputy Mizulina, while praising the expansion of jury trials into
other regions under the new Code, noted the "dismal evidence" that
"the Cassational Panel of the RF Supreme Court [.. . during the period
1997-20oo reversed over 50% of jury acquittals and only 15-16% of guilty
374 In 2002, the reported acquittal rate in trials in the district courts, where there is no right to
a jury trial, was 0.71%. "Sudebnaia statistika", Rossiiskaia iustitsiia (2oo3) No.8, 69-78, at 74.
For 2oo6, the acquittal rate in the district courts was 0.5%. See the website of the Judicial
Department of the Supreme Court, available at <http://www.cdep.ru/uploaded-files/statistics/
aHan13%2ocTacTLTKW%2012%2oMeC%202oo6r.xml>.
375 StevenThaman, "The Resurrection ofTrial byJury in Russia", 31 StanfordJournaloflnternational
Law (995), 61-274, at 270-271.
376 Supreme Court, "Obzor praktiki kassatsionnoi palaty Verkhovnogo Suda RF za 2002 god po
delam, rassmotrennym kraevymi i oblastnymi sudami s uchastiiem prisiazhnykh zasedatelei",
BVS (2003) No.5, 21; Supreme Court, "Obzor sudebnoi praktiki rassmotreniia ugolovnykh del
s uchastiem prisiazhnykh zasedatelei", BVS (2002) No.7 , 18; and Supreme Court, "Sudebnaia
Statistika za pervoe polugodie 2002 goda", Rossiiskaia iustitsiia (2003) No.I, 71.
377 See the website of the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court, available at <http:/www.
cdep.ru/material.asp?materiaLid=217>. Cross-system comparisons of acquittal rates should be
undertaken with caution. Counting guilty plea cases, 0.99% of US defendants whose cases are
adjudicated on the merits (whether by trial or plea) are acquitted. This is a higher rate but not
radically higher than Russia's. The acquittal rate in the tiny percent of cases that are tried to a
jury (about 4% of the total) is 17%. See US Department ofJustice, "Compendium of Federal
Justice Statistics for 75 Largest Counties", (1997), Table 3.2. By contrast, Russia's guilty plea
procedure applies to only a small fraction of jury-qualified cases, so a wider range of cases get
tried. See, infra, 88-89, and supra, note 369. In France, a 7.3% acquittal rate for French jury trials
is reported, at least in Paris, described as a "more indulgent jurisdiction". Roderick Munday,
"What do the French Think of TheirJury? Views from Poitiers and Paris", 1(I) Legal Studies
(1995), 65-87, at 73-
378 See Arts.3 85 (2) and 379(2), CrPC.
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verdicts".379 More recent statistics indicate a gradual drop in the differ
ential rate, though reversals of jury acquittals still outpace reversals of
jury convictions by over five times. In 2001, the Supreme Court reversed
43% of acquittals and 6.7% of convictions. In 2002, the rate was 32.4%
of acquittals and 5.9% of convictions.30 This compares to rates in non-
jury cases of 23.I% of acquittals and 5.4% of convictions in 2002.38' The
experience of practitioners in Krasnoiarsk was consistent with this. One
defense attorney asserted that out of approximately twenty-five criminal
jury trials held in the krai, half resulted in initial acquittals but all acquit-
tals were subsequently overturned following cassational review.312 Judge
Baranovskii, on the other hand, put the number at fifty jury trials with
twenty acquittals, all ultimately overturned following appeal.383 A third
estimate was provided by the deputy chairwoman of the Krasnoiarsk Krai
court, Judge TF. Merkusheva, who stated that betweenJanuary 2003 and
June 2oo5, there had been twenty-one jury cases, of which ten had been
overturned. Seven of those ten cases were acquittals, she said, and three
were convictions. Of the eleven not overturned, one was an acquittal and
ten were convictions. 384
The form of the Russian jury verdict is unlike the general verdict
of 'guilty' or 'not guilty' rendered by the Anglo-American criminal jury.
Article 339 of the Code provides:
"(I) Three basic questions shall be asked [of the jury] as to each of the acts the
defendant is charged with committing:
i) was it proven that the act charged took place;
2) was it proven that the defendant committed that act;
3) is the defendant guilty of committing that act.
(2) The question list may instead contain one basic question about the guilt of the
defendant, which question shall be a combination of the questions referred to in
paragraph i of this Article."
The jury is to answer each question with 'yes, proven' or 'no, not prov-
en'.
The remarkable thing about Article 339(i) is that it separates the
question of whether the defendant 'did it' from the question of whether
the defendant is 'guilty'. This provision invites a 'yes, yes, no' verdict in
379 Mizulina, op.cit. note 104, 744.
38o Supreme Court, "Obzor praktiki kassatsionnoi .. ', op.cit. note 376, 21.
381 Supreme Court, "Obzor kassatsionnoi praktiki sudebnoi kollegii po ugolovnym delan Verk-
hovnogo Suda Rossiiskoi Federatsii za 2002 god", BVS (2oo3) No.8, 14. Unfortunately, more
recent statistics on cassational review of jury acquittals are not available.
382 Interview conducted 24 October 2ooS byJeffrey Kahn.
383 Interview conducted 25 October 2o5 byJeffrey Kahn.
384 Interview conducted 27 October 2oo5 byJeffrey Kahn.
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a form of officially sanctioned jury nullification.381 The 1864 law on jury
trials, on which the current law is based, had similar provisions.3 6
The Code, however, has other provisions that seem to run counter
to this, and the Russian Supreme Court has interpreted them in a way
that permits the presiding judge and reviewing courts to exercise greater
control over jury determinations and seeks to confine juries to determining
only issues of 'naked' facts. 38 7 Article 335(5) states that the jury only deter
mines the "factual circumstances of the criminal case" when it resolves
the three issues and responds to a question list, provided for in Article
339(3). That article states:
"(3) The basic question about the guilt of the defendant may be followed by separate
questions about such circumstances as affect the degree of guilt or modify its nature,
or absolve the defendant of liability."
Even though Article 339(3) states that such additional questions may
be used (Mory- COCTaBMTbCFl) (mogut stavitsia), the Supreme Court has
interpreted Article 339 to require that trial courts use them. In addition,
Article 339(5) provides:
"(5) No questions may be asked, whether separately or as part of other questions,
that require the jury [...] to provide what is essentially a legal evaluation in render-
ing its verdict."
This means, according to the Supreme Court (this is not in the Code),
that a trial judge may not pose questions that use:
"[Sluch legal terms as intentional or negligent murder, intentional murder with
special cruelty intentional murder from hooliganistic motivations or for personal
385 Jury nullification is where a jury acquits despite strong evidence of guilt, thereby effectively
'nullifying' the operation of the applicable law. See Burnham, op.cit. note 3, 87-88.
386 See Art.7 54 , I86 4 Judicial Charter, op.cit. note 370. See, also, Kucherov, op.cit. note 37
o, 65-71; and
Steven Thaman, "Questions of Fact and Law in Russian Jury Trials: The Practice of the Cas-
sational Courts under the Jury Laws of 1864 and 1993", 72(G-2) InternationalReview ofPenalLaw
(2001), 415-45o, at 439-448. The most notable instance of nullification in Tsarist times was the
acquittal of the revolutionary Vera Zasulich. The jury acquitted her of shooting and wounding
a general who had ordered that a political prisoner be flogged severely for not doffing his hat
quickly enough when the general inspected a prison-despite the fact that she admitted the
shooting. See Kucherov, op.cit. note 370, 214-225. As was perhaps to be expected, the acquittal
was set aside on appeal because the trial judge had admitted evidence on the circumstances
of the beating of the prisoner. For the reflections of A.F. Koni, who presided at the trial, see
A.F. Koni, Izbrannyeproizvedeniia, Vol.2 (Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo iuridicheskoi literatury,
Moscow, 1959). A report to a Commission of the Ministry of Justice by the Imperial Senate
noted that: "not less than one half of the g,ooo acquittals of accused persons in courts with
jurors in 1897 were based on the fact that the jury had taken into consideration [...I all the
circumstances which create the difference between the concepts of'perpetration' and 'guilt'."
See Kucherov, op.cit. note 370, 66-67.
387 See, generally, Thaman, op.cit note 386.
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gain, intentional murder committed in the heat of passion, murder using excessive
force during self-defense, rape, robbery, etc."3ss
Finally. Article 347 provides for the parties to meet after a jury verdict for
a "discussion of the effects of the verdict". This includes "examination of
the circumstances connected with the categorization of the act of the
defendant".8 9 Also, Article 351 provides that the final judgment in the
case is to be pronounced by the judge.
The Supreme Court has used these provisions to develop a model of
the jury as a decider solely of issues of historical fact. Once these facts are
determined, then the judge must decide what they mean.
There is much to contradict the Supreme Court's narrow view of the
jury as simply a determiner of historical fact. First, jurors take an oath "to
decide the criminal case", not solely to resolve factual issues.390 Moreover,
the law explicitly states that a "jury acquittal is binding on the judge and
requires the court to enter a judgment of acquittal".39' This should render
any "discussion of the effects of" a not guilty verdict rather short.392 Second,
whatever the reference to "factual circumstances" and the prohibition on
the jury "provid[ingl what is essentially a legal evaluation" mean, Article
339(1) requires the jury to determine whether the defendant is "guilty"--
separate from the question of whether the defendant "committed the
act". This clearly requires application of the law to the facts found, not
just answering some questions on the facts of the case. Third, Article
340(3)(3) supports this view when it requires that the judge "convey the
contents of the criminal statute specifying liability for the commission of
the crime the defendant is charged with" in his final instructions to the
jury. There would be no need for the judge to convey such legal knowledge
unless the jury is expected to apply the law to the facts. There is perhaps
no great harm in thinking of this as a determination of the "factual cir-
cumstances", but what is necessarily happening when the jury decides the
388 See Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda RF "0 primenenii sudami norm" No.23 of
22 November 2oo5. This ruling supplanted an earlier ruling that adopted the same position.
See Postanovlenie Plenuma Verkhovnogo Suda RF "0 primenenii sudami norm Ugolovnogo-
protsessual'ogo kodeksa Rossiiskoi Federatsii, reguliruiushchikh sudoproizvodstvo s uchastiem
prisiazhnykh zasedatelei" No.9 of 2o December 19 9 4 , BVS (1995), No. 3, at 3.
389 Art.347(3), CrPC.
390 Art.332(s), CrPC (emphasis added). The Russian phrase is "Torzbestvenno k/ianus' F.] razresbat'
ugolovnoe delo".
39' Art.348(I), CrPC.
392 In the case of a guilty verdict, there is more to do in "discussing the effects of the verdict":
determining the proper "categorization" of the offense, the proper sentence to be imposed
and disposition of the civil suit. Art.3 4 7 (3), CrPC. However, the legal discussion involved is
likely to be a simple mechanical exercise of attaching a particular offense category and article
number from the Criminal Code to the jury's verdict.
Review of Central andEast European Law 33 (2oo8)
case and determines whether the defendant is guilty is that it is applying
the law to the facts.393
Certainly, it was the sense of the 1864 law, on which the current law
is based, that this was the case then. The famous Tsarist-era expert on
criminal procedure, Ivan Foinitskii, wrote that: "jurors decide the question
of guilt in its full magnitude, from both the factual and legal perspective,
and the judges apply the established punishment to the defendant and
decide such procedural questions as arise in the case."394 This, he noted,
was in contrast to jurors under the French Criminal Procedure Code of
i8o8, who: "provide answers not as to the defendant's guilt in the crimes
charged, but as to separate factual elements specified by the presiding
judge in his questions, from which it is not the jury, but the presiding
judge who reaches a conclusion as to the presence or absence of criminal
guilt in the defendant's actions.' 395
Even with the Supreme Court's attempts to confine the jury only to
facts and to rationalize their verdicts with specific questions, there have
been some rather striking cases that clearly involved jury nullification. One
such acquittal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1995 in In re Kraskina,
a case in which a woman killed her abusive boyfriend even though the
facts failed to disclose a legally sufficient justification or excuse defense. 396
However, in In re Sbaiko, a similar verdict was vacated on appeal and at
the retrial, the trial judge refused to permit evidence of the abusive hus-
band's bad character and acts of violence. The Supreme Court affirmed
her conviction after retrial.397 More controversial cases in the news are the
acquittals of a Russian Army captain charged with ordering the shooting
of Chechen civilians, of skinhead defendants in two ethnically motivated
murders and of the defendants in the murder of Paul Khlebnikov, the
editor of the Russian edition of Forbes magazine. This spate of acquittals
has led some to call for cutbacks to the jury's powers.39 In some of these
393 It is also noteworthy that Art.335(7)'s injunction is to decide only "the factual circumstances,
proof of which are established by the jury in connection with its powers set out in Art.334 of
this Code". Art.334(l), in turn, cross references Art.229, which repeats the three questions in
Art.339(i), quoted, supra, 78.
394 Ivan Ia. Foinitskii, Kurs ugolovnogosudoproizvodstva, Vol.2 (Tipografiia Stasiulevicha, St. Peters-
burg, 3rd ed. i9io, reprinted by Izdatel'stvo "Al'fa", St. Petersburg, 1996), 451.
395 Ibid 45o. For a thorough analysis of the relationship between Tsarist and current Russian jury
trial theory and practice on this point, see Thamnan, op.cit. note 386, 430-448.
396 Ivanovo Regional Court, 20 July 1995, cited in ibid., 443.
397 Ul'ianovsk Regional Court, 26 September 1996, cited in ibid., 439 and 443.
398 Andrei Kolesnikov, "Is Russian Ready for Jury Trials?", RIA Novosti, 3 August 2oo6, available
at <http://en.rian.ru/analysis/2oo6o8o3/5zz36722.htmnl>.
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acquittals, it was clear that the investigations were botched and proof was
weak; but, in other cases, evidence of guilt was quite strong.399
Even if the jury decides the defendant is guilty, the Code gives it
another means of mitigating the effects of overly strict laws-the power
to find that the defendant deserves leniency If the jury elects leniency,
the judge may not impose the death penalty or life imprisonment, and the
defendant's sentence can be no higher than two-thirds of the maximum
sentence provided for the offense.400 To facilitate an informed decision
on leniency, the judge tells the jury of the possible range of sentences (in-
cluding the death penalty). This is unlike the Anglo-American jury, which
is not permitted to hear information about possible punishment for fear
that it will improperly influence its decision on the guilt issue.
Beyond the question of the precise scope of jury competence, there
have been problems with the submission of factual questions to the jury.
The questions the Supreme Court has required to be posed are specific
and extensive. Despite the fact that Article 339(2) requires just three ques-
tions and specifically authorizes substituting "one basic question about
the guilt of the defendant", the Supreme Court reversed the trial court in
one case for instructing the jury on the elements of the murder and other
applicable law and then posing the single question: "tils M.A. Butakov
guilty of murdering M.P Aleshina with the complicity of Pl. Simov on
27 May 1993?"401 In another case, the Supreme Court corrected the trial
court's formulation of the first question under Article 339() regarding
whether the crime had taken place:
'Among other things, the formulation of the first question-has it been proven that
on ii May 1997, in a forest strip Fevralev died of a knife wound and his automobile was
stolen-does not contain all the substantive circumstances of the act for which the
defendants were charged. Thus, in this question, it was not mentioned that Fevralev
was taken by force while being threatened with a knife to his throat to the forest strip
where he was killed, where was administered four slashes and puncture wounds to
the chest and stomach, and that, after he died from the knife wounds to the throat,
his body was taken into the strip and hidden, and that his car was stolen. "401
399 The Khlebnikov acquittal was reversed by the Supreme Court.
400 Arts.339(4) and 349(2), CrPC (referencing Art.65(I), Criminal Code RF). Under prior law, the
jury had the additional option of determining that the defendant deserved special leniency, in
which case the defendant could not be sentenced to more than the minimum sentence. While
this option is retained in Art.65(z) of the Criminal Code, it is no longer possible under the
Criminal Procedure Code.
401 Stiven Teiman [Stephen Thaman], "Postanovka voprosov pered kollegiei prisiazhnykh", Rossi-
iskaia iustitsiia (1995) No.io, 8.
402 Supreme Court, In re Daudov and Others, No.41-kp-o98-38sp of 14 April 1998, as cited and
reported byThaman, op.cit. note 386, 426 n.49.
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If any single detail of the court's suggested version of the question has not
been proven, the jury must presumably answer 'no' to the entire question,
though juries have been responding in a way that indicates what they agree
with and what they do not.
Before the verdict is announced, the judge must check the jury's an-
swers to the questions for problems and "shall point out to the jury where
it is unclear or contradictory and invite them to return to the deliberation
room to clarify the question list".4°3 Also, the judge can restart the trial if
the jury has doubts about the answers to any of the questions.4°4Aside from
the fact that many of the details in the required questions are irrelevant
to the charges being tried, the usual problem with posing questions of
this sort is anticipating what issues will have meaning for the jury In one
case where the defendant was charged with murder by setting his wife on
fire with gasoline, the only question with regard to state of mind that was
asked related solely to the offense--whether he did it intentionally The
jury answered 'no' and acquitted the defendant, though it volunteered
that he had in fact thrown the match, though without the intention of
starting the fire and killing her. Calling this verdict "contradictory", the
Supreme Court reversed the decision.45
The result of the Supreme Court's insistence on specific questions
has been that juries are swamped with scores of factual determinations
to make, many of which are not essential to the three-pronged finding
that the Code requires. Thaman reports a total of I9 questions in a simple
one-count murder case and 41, 52 and 87 questions posed in each of three
other cases involving multiple counts and multiple defendants. In one
case, there were 1,047 questions. It is no wonder that 44.8% of reversals
in jury trial cases in 2002 involved problems with the question list.4°6 This
is not a new problem. The great Russian jurist, A.F. Koni, accused the
imperial courts in the late nineteenth century of "trying to bury jurors
in a morass of concrete facts in which essential and non-essential were
indistinguishable".407
The procedure in non-jury trials implements adversarial principles





405 Supreme Court Cassational Division, In re Kondrasbin, Opredelenie Kassatsionnoi palaty
Verkhovnogo Suda RF "Nevypolnenie trebovanii St. 456 UPK RSFSR povleklo otmenu
opravdatel'nogo prigovora suda prisiazhnykh" of 19 June 1997, BVS (1998) No.2, 9.
406 See Supreme Court, op.cit note 38, para. 3.
407 As quoted by Thaman, op.cit note 387, 425.
408 See discussion, supra, section 4.2.
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However, there are additional features of jury trials that make them even
more adversarial. The most important is the fact that jurors do not have
access to the case file that is provided in advance to the judge in bench
trials. This works as a far more effective enforcement of Article 240's
requirement of orality and directness and its requirement that decisions
be based solely on the evidence presented at the trial.409 Should the issue
of the admissibility of evidence arise during the trial, the issue must be
resolved in the absence of the jury.410
There is an additional problem with jury trial procedure in the way
the trial starts. According to the Code, a jury trial "begins with opening
statements of the state procurator and defense counsel".41 The rule in a
non-jury trial--where the judge has already read the case file-is that the
trial begins with the judge personally "interrogating the defendant about
whether he admits his guilt and whether he or his counsel wishes to state
the defense position with regard to the charges".42 As with non-jury tri-
als, as discussed earlier, anything that emphasizes the judge's active role
in interrogating the defendant can upset the model of party control.413
However, apparently this personal interrogation of the defendant by the
judge takes place in jury trials as well,4' 4 which presents an additional
problem. To the extent that the exchange between the judge and the
defendant takes place in the presence of the jury, it seems contrary to
the presumption of innocence. It refocuses the issue at trial from one of
'can the prosecution prove any of these charges with evidence?' to one of
'how can the defendant explain his actions?' Certainly, at the beginning of
the trial, when no evidence of guilt has yet been presented, the assump-
tion that the defendant did anything that requires explanation is directly
contrary to the presumption of innocence. 415
An important difference between bench and jury trials is found in
Article 335(8), which provides that in a jury trial "information about the
defendant's character" may generally not be presented to the jury416 Ar-
409 See supra 29. Nor will they be privileged by exparte visits to chambers by the prosecutor to




413 See, supra, 70-71.
414 Communication between William Burnham and Russian advocates, 13 July 2007.
415 As a matter of statutory interpretation, the exchange with the defendant is superfluous in jury
trials where opening statements outlining the positions of the parties and what they intend to
prove are already required as the first thing in the trial.
416 Art.335(8), CrPC. Character evidence is admissible "to the extent that it is essential for the
determination of particular elements of the crime with which the defendant is charged".
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ticle 338(8) specifically prohibits "information about prior convictions, the
defendant's status as a chronic alcoholic or drug addict, or other informa-
tion that may prejudice the jury against the defendant". By contrast, in a
non-jury trial, all this evidence is before the judge in the case file and will
be gone into by the judge as the first step of the trial in the process of
'identifying' the defendant. 4' 7 However, the ban on character evidence in
jury trials applies to evidence of good character as well as to bad.4'8 Thus,
unlike the common-law trial, it is impermissible for the Russian defendant
to try to prove that he or she is not the kind of person who could have
committed the crime charged.
An important evidentiary limitation that works more completely
against the defendant is one created by the Supreme Court in a series of
cases that prohibits a defendant or defense counsel from asserting that
the defendant's confession was procured by violence or threats. Thus,
in In re Kniazev, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's repeated
statements at trial that his admissions in police custody were the prod-
uct of physical coercion were not proper.4 9 The basis for this was that
"tplrocedural issues of interrogation of a suspect or an accused have
nothing to do with the factual circumstances of the case" and that the
issues of admissibility of evidence are for the judge to decide without the
presence of the jury420
The Supreme Court's position, however, ignores the fundamental
distinction between the admissibility of evidence, which the judge decides,
and its weight and credibility, which the jury determines. One of the
"factual circumstances" that the jury must decide is whether it has been
proven that the act was committed by the defendant. Deciding whether
or to what extent to believe a defendant's earlier confession or his testi-
mony in court denying involvement is directly pertinent to that question.
The circumstances under which the confession was made are essential to
417 See Art.265(6), CrPC, and supra 70-71.
418 See Supreme Court, In reD., Kassatsionnoe Opredelenie SK po ugolovnym delamVerkhovnogo
Suda No.53 -o5-46SP of 8 June 2005 (unpublished decision available on Garant), in which
evidence admitted on the poor state of the defendant's health, his family and his work with
the Communist Party was listed among the grounds for reversal of the jury acquittal.
419 Supreme Court Criminal Division, In re Kniazev, Kassatsionnnoe Opredelenie SK po ugolovnym
delam, BVS (1999) No.3 , 14. For another example of the effect of this ruling, see Fred Weir,
"Russia Embraces Trial by Peers", Christian Science Monitor, 5 March 2003. In the case covered
therein, the defendant's attorney complained that: "the court has forbidden her to mention
her client's claim that his confession was coerced, because a police commission concluded that
his facial injuries were the result of a 'fall down stairs'. The judge has ordered [counsel] to stick
to 'proven facts' only"
420 Art.33 5(5 and 7), CrPC. In fact, Kniazev referred to the old articles but the content is the
same.
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evaluate the two contradictory statements. 42 In addition, Article 333(i)
states that jurors "shall have the right [...I to take part in the examina-
tion of all the circumstances of the criminal case". As one commentator
explained, a trial judge who permits testimony about the circumstances of
the confession "does not ask the jury to decide that illegal methods were
used but placed before them the question: do you believe or not believe
in the trustworthiness" of the confession given during the preliminary
investigation?422 By excluding any such information that would undercut
the believability of the confession, the Supreme Court is essentially saying
that if the confession is admissible, the jury has no option to disbelieve
it. The defense cannot even ask the defendant why he or she confessed
if the answer will be that it was because of violence, threats of violence
or other pressure.
Perhaps the real reason behind the Supreme Court's approach is the
fact that threats and violence at the hands of the police are so common
in Russia that juries often believe defendants who make such allegations.
If so, then better means exist to deal with the problem--videotaping
confessions, mandatory medical examinations of suspects who are inter-
rogated and prompt investigations of suspects' complaints of any brutality
or the threat of it and severe disciplinary action or criminal prosecution.
Certainly, in the US, the conduct of law enforcement officials is always
potentially subject to scrutiny by a jury, so those officials are careful not
to do anything that might alienate a jury. It seems likely that litigating
police tactics in front of the jury-at least to the extent that they affect
the credibility and weight of the evidence obtained thereby-would do
more to improve the situation than hiding them. As it is, jurors presently
seem to assume the worst, so even the slightest hint of irregularly is enough
for them to assume that it was the usual coerced confession. 4 3
421 See Nikolai M. Kipnis, "Spornye voprosy teorii i praktiki dopustimosti dokazatel'sv", in V.A.
Vlasihin (ed.), Dokazivanie v ugolomomprotsesse (Iurist", Moscow, 2ooo), at 196-198.
422 N.I. Stabrov, "Rassmotrenie khodataistv o nedopustimosti dokazatel'stv v RF v sude prisia-
zhnykh", ZburnalRossiiskogoprava (zoo6) No.ii.
423 See Bernarn [Burnham], Reshetnikova and Proshliakov, op.cit. note 343, 129, which describes
how, in the first jury trial in Saratov in 1993, the jury foreperson, a "solid-citizen" manager of a
factory, in explaining why he believed the defendant, stated "I got in trouble a lot as a kid and
every time the police caught me, I got a beating". One trial judge in Moscow recently described
the facts of a murder case scheduled for jury trial before her. It could possibly be an acquittal,
she said. The police had the defendant's confession (with counsel present) and a videotape of
the defendant taking the police to the place where the murder weapon was buried, at which
point it was dug up. The judge thought it entirely possible that if the defendant claimed he was
innocent and was framed, a majority of the jury could well believe him. Remarks of Thomas
Firestone, US Department of Justice Resident Legal Advisor at the US Embassy, Moscow, at
the Roundtable on Russian Jury Trials, Moscow, 19 July 2007. We are grateful to Tom for his
insight, based on many years as a federal prosecutor, about the degree to which possible jury
reactions affect law enforcement officials' conduct in the investigation of criminal cases in the
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A major problem with jury trials in terms of inadmissible evidence
and commentary is the absence of tight control by the judge over the
proceedings. Stephen C. Thaman collected several examples of witnesses
(often sitting in the public gallery) blurting out inadmissible evidence,
such as "tilt's the second person he's killed and he says he didn't kill!" 424
In another account of a jury trial, the victim's father repeatedly rose from
the galleries to "scream at the defendant, 'You are a scoundrel! You are the
devil! You murdered my daughter and sent her to hell!"' The father, the
author later learned, had been in a distant city at the time of the murders
and based his interjections on hearsay from others.425 If an exclusionary
rule of inadmissible evidence is to work at all in jury trials or, for that
matter, if proper adversarial conduct of cases is to take place at all, there
must be better judicial control over trial proceedings.
Often single outbursts lead to more general tumult, as opposing
parties and their allies and spectators feel the need to respond, followed
by surrebuttal. Our observations indicate that the reaction to outbursts
in the court are most often 'dealt with' by letting them play themselves
out, usually with the most persistent and loudest getting the last word.
The passive responses of judges are not for lack of power. In addition to
criminal contempt of court and administrative responsibility for con-
tempt of court,426 the Code provides for "money exactions" (jeHe)KHble
B3bICKaHHq) (denezhnye vzyskania) or fines of up to RUB 27,500 (about USD
i,ioo) to be levied by the judge directly, without any need to go through
the prosecution and investigation process, as well as broad powers to
order the removal of offending participants from the courtroom. 427 One
lawyer acquaintance of one of the authors from Moscow suggested that
the problem is that none of these measures works well. The problem with
threatening criminal prosecution is that investigators are too busy with
'real' criminal cases to initiate and prosecute contempt of court, so most
cases are quietly dismissed. Judges are uncomfortable with fining people
directly under the Code, as this institute has always puzzled them, being
US federal system.
424 See Thaman, op.cit. note 370, 107.
425 Scott P Boylan, "Coffee from a Samovar: The Role of the Victim in the Criminal Procedure
of Russia and the Proposed Victims Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution",
4(1) University of California Davis Journal of InternationalLaw and Poliy (1998), 103-118, at i16.
426 See Arts.9 7 (contempt of court) and 94 (interference with court proceedings), Criminal Code
RE
427 Art.258, CrPC. The amount as stated in the Code is twenty-five times the minimum monthly
wage, currently RUB iIoo. The earlier Code had similar provisions. See, also, Art.243(z) (judge
to "assure that order in the court is kept") and Art.25 7 (4 ) (court bailiffs are to "keep order in
during court hearings and enforce the orders of the presiding judge"; "directions of the court
bailiff related to keeping order are binding on all in the courtroom").
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neither administrative nor civil nor criminal. Also, in any event, this lawyer
observed, warnings and threats from judges are ineffective because "[in
our country nobody is afraid of the justice system.428
One provision of the Code that encourages some disorder and is
problematic from the standpoint of enforcing exclusionary rules is the
fact that the Code permits the defendant and the victim, with the permis-
sion of the presiding judge, to "give testimony at any moment during the
trial".429 Such testimony is not elicited in question and answer form but
is a volunteered statement, usually in response to an event that has just
taken place that is not to their liking. A somewhat similar practice with
witnesses is also problematic. After witnesses have finished testifying,
they can stay in the courtroom and are sometimes required to stay. If ad-
ditional issues arise as a result of later testimony, they may be questioned
out of turn from their place in the public seating. This most often involves
apparent inconsistencies generated by successive witnesses' testimony
Since the witness in the gallery is often sitting near witnesses or family
members linked to opposing parties, the practice cannot help but encour-
age responsive statements or heckling from the audience.43
While jury trial procedure-both as set out in the Code and as ap-
plied-more closely approximates adversarial ideals than does non-jury
trial procedure, much is still necessary to achieve an orderly adversarial
trial. The balance between judicial and party activity still falls too much
on the judicial side. The Code retains some of the more flexible trial
organization of the old Code and fails to impose the necessary rigid trial
structure that would insure orderly alternating opportunities for both
sides to present proofs and arguments.
5. Guilty Pleas
The possibility of defendants, in effect, pleading guilty to the charges
against them and, thereby, foregoing the necessity of a full trial is an
innovation of the new Code. In common-law jurisdictions, the right to
plead guilty is considered perfectly normal and follows directly from the
principle of party control over litigation--that a party has control over
both how vigorously he or she litigates and whether to litigate at all. The
guilty plea is largely seen to perform three functions. First, it promotes
428 Communication from Moscow lawyer Olga Svarts received by William Burnham on io July
2007; being from Moscow may have influenced her remark.
429 Arts.274(3) (defendant) and 277(2) (victim), CrPC.
430 Art.27 8(4 ), CrPC provides that witnesses "who have been questioned mayleave the courtroom
before the end of the trial with the permission of the presiding judge, who, before excusing
such witnesses, shall consider the views of the parties".
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judicial efficiency. The economies are especially great in common-law
adversarial systems because the usual alternative, a jury trial, is complex
and expensive. Second, accepting responsibility for one's transgressions
is thought to be the first step down the road to effective rehabilitation.
Finally, guilty pleas with a discounted sentence can be a way of coaxing
defendants to provide evidence against co-conspirators or others, which
promotes the effectiveness of law enforcement.43'
The "special trial procedure" (oco6bO nopI gOK cyge6Horo pa36w-
paTenbcTBa) (osobyiporiadok sudebnogo razbiratel'stva) that is the Russian
version of the guilty plea was debated vigorously by members of the work-
ing group on the Criminal Procedure Code. The most commonly made
objections were three: the tradition and efficacy of the 'legality principle'
of mandatory prosecution; an aversion to reliance solely on confessions
as proof (based on negative historical experiences, both in European
inquisitorial systems and in Soviet times); and the related perception of
the obligation of the state to satisfy itself in every case that the defendant
committed the crime regardless of the defendant's wishes. Given these
concerns, the drafters thought that the difficulties could be tolerated
better if guilty pleas were limited to relatively minor cases.
In light of the concerns expressed, it is not surprising that the Russian
procedure was copied more from continental than common-law systems-
in particular, the Italian procedure, calledpattegiamento or 'deal'.432 Italian
commentaries make the point that the accused is not pleading guilty. In-
stead, the accused is acceding to the charges and requesting punishment.
It remains for the court to determine guilt with the aid of the dossier, not
based on the defendant's unsubstantiated plea. So, too, in the Russian
approach. Pattegiamento in Italian procedure is also limited to cases involv-
ing up to three years imprisonment. 433 So, as originally approved by the
working group and passed by the legislature, the procedure applied only
43' Of course, an adversary system dominated by guilty pleas and plea bargains could be criticized
as not worthy of the name. Certainly, the foundational principle of an adversarial system-
that a public contest between parties will produce a fair hearing of all evidence relevant for
judgment-is weakened. Geraldine Szott Moohr, "Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System:
Lessons from Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model", 8() Buffalo Criminal
Law Review (2004), 165-22o.
432 See Art.4 44(I-2), Criminal Procedure Code of Italy.
433 Ibid. Italian guilty pleas of this type, where punishment is based on agreeing to the charges,
are limited to cases in which no more than two years imprisonment is possible after applica-
tion of a one-third discount applied (i.e., crimes punishable by a maximum of three years) as
an incentive for the defendant to make the plea. Other forms of guilty pleas apply to more
serious cases.
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to crimes punishable by up to five years. However, the limit was quietly
raised to ten years in 2003.434
Guilty plea cases must go through the same full investigation required
for every other case, so the procedure in those cases up through issu-
ance of the indictment by the procurator and filing of the case in court
for trial are the same. The request, made to the court by a motion, can-
not be presented prior to the submission of the case file to the court.435
Indeed, as noted earlier, these motions are not called 'guilty pleas' but
rather 'special trial procedures'.436 At the close of the investigation, the
investigator must explain to the defendant the right to request the special
trial procedure.437
This request takes the form of a "motion for entry of judgment
of guilty and sentence without trial based on the defendant's stipula-
tion to the charges brought". The defendant can only file this motion if
represented by counsel and waivers of counsel are not permitted.43 An
important limitation is that the victim must give his or her consent.439
Appeal is limited to legal errors and is prohibited if based on the ground
that the judgment does not correspond with the underlying facts.440 In
addition to getting the sentence discounted, costs may not be imposed
on the defendant.
The motion is then heard at the preliminary hearing, the main pur
pose of which is to determine "whether [the defendant] understands the
434 Art.314(), CrPC, as amended by the Federal Law No.92-FZ, signed 4July 2003, point 73 of
Article i. For a discussion of the Russian system in operation with comparative comments,
see Stanislaw Pomorski, "Consensual Justice in Russia: Guilty Pleas under the 2001 Code of
Criminal Procedure", in Robert Sharlet and Ferdinand Feldbrugge (eds.), Public Policy andLaw in
Russia: In Search ofa UnifiedLegal and Political Space. Essays in Honor ofDonaldD. Barry, William B.
Simons (ed.), Law in Eastern Europe, No.55 (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, Boston, 2oos), 187-198.
435 Art.315(2), CrPC, which provides that the accused has the right to make the motion either after
completing his or her review of the case file or at a preliminary hearing. See, also, Art.229(3),
CrPC.








440 Art.317 , CrPC. A recent Supreme Court Plenum Decree on guilty pleas is: PostanovIenie
PlenumaVerkhovnogo Suda "O primenenii sudami osobogo poriadka sudebnogo razbiratel'stva
ugolognykh del" No.6o of 5 December 2006, BVS (2007) No.2, available at <http://www.
supcourt.ru/news-detale.php?id=465o>. A simplified trial procedure similar to a guilty plea
was provided for in the original 1993 jury trial law. It permitted the judge to jump ahead to the
point of closing arguments in the event that the confession was free from doubt. However,
the jury would continue to make a decision on guilt based on the confession of the defendant
and any corroborating evidence. This procedure was eliminated in favor of the current guilty
plea procedure.
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charges, whether he agrees with the charges made and whether he sup-
ports his motion for entry of judgment without trial, whether the motion
is made voluntarily and after consultation with the defense counsel, and
whether he understands the consequences of entry of a judgment without
trial".-' The judge may not conduct a hearing or evaluation of the evidence
gathered in the criminal case. However, "any circumstances illuminating
the character of the defendant and any circumstances mitigating or ag-
gravating punishment may be examined".442 Only if the judge "concludes
that the charges, that the defendant has stipulated to, are well-founded
and supported by the evidence gathered in the criminal case file" may
the judge enter a judgment of conviction. The sentence imposed may not
exceed two-thirds of the maximum term. There is a complete judgment in
the case, the narrative-rationale part ofwhich "must contain a description
of the criminal conduct with which the defendant is charged and to which
he has stipulated, as well as the findings of the court regarding compliance
with the conditions for rendering the judgment without trial". However,
"no analysis or evaluation of the evidence by the judge shall be reflected
in the judgment".443
There is, arguably, a contradiction between prohibiting the judge from
conducting an "evaluation of the evidence gathered in the criminal case"
and the requirement that the judge conclude that the charges are "sup-
ported by the evidence gathered in the criminal case file". The sense seems
to be that, although basic principles of justice require the judge to satisfy
himself or herself that there is some basis for the charges (and may do so
through an examination of the dossier), the judge should not engage in a
close scrutiny of the evidence in light of the willingness of the defendant
to proceed in this fashion. In this respect, the "special trial procedure" is
not unlike the common-law guilty plea or nolo contendre hearing, during
which the judges will often consult police reports or interrogate counsel
to satisfy themselves that evidence exists to support the plea beyond the
admissions of the defendant.
For 2006, in the Justice of the Peace courts, io8,ooo cases were de-
cided using guilty pleas, which constituted 22.4% of all decided cases, up
from 72,000 and 17.1% in 2005444 and this up from only 20,000 and 12%




444 See the website of the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court, available at <http://www.
cdep.ru/material.asp?material-id=217>.
445 See the website of the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court, available at <http://www.
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213,800 criminal cases or 37.5% of the total number of decided cases, up
from i68,ioo or 30% in 2005.446 The largest portion of such cases con-
sisted of theft (42.2%), robbery (30.5%) and unlawful activity with drugs
(4o.6%).447 In the subject-level courts, only about 2% of decided cases were
disposed of on this basis, although the number of guilty pleas in these
courts is increasing as well.448 The low number of guilty plea cases in the
subject-level courts is attributable to the fact that a high percentage of
cases in these courts involve maximum sentences of over ten years, thus
making them ineligible for guilty pleas. The relatively modest use of guilty
pleas in the Justice of the Peace courts is probably attributable to the
fact that the offenses tried there are so minor and involve low penalties.
Thus, it is probably easier to just go ahead and try them than go through
the special procedures.
In terms of economy of judicial resources, the procedure may econo-
mize in the wrong courts. It is the subject-level courts--where the more
complicated cases and the only jury trials are held-that need the extra
breathing room, not the district courts. Yet, the rate of cases disposed of
by guilty pleas in the subject-level courts is only 2%. If the ten-year limit
were raised, this would change, of course.
The flat one-third discount on the sentence is another impediment
to the full realization of the benefits of guilty pleas. First, in common-law
systems, the amount of the discount from the original charge or sentence
is within the discretion of the prosecutor and, ultimately, the judge, thus
allowing consent to a greater discount in return for information that will
help law enforcement. Second, some Russian judges have suggested that a
one-third discount is neither a sufficient reward for the economies gained
nor a sufficient incentive to attract guilty pleas.449 Some manipulation
of the discount is always possible via procuratorial manipulation of the
final version of the charges that are brought, thus keeping the maximum
within the ten-year maximum. However, alert judges with the legality
principle firmly in mind could well derail such efforts if examination of
the facts in the case file discloses a major disconnect between facts and
charges brought.
cdep.ru/material.asp?material-id=3>.
446 See the website of the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court, available at <http://www.
cdep.ru/material.asp?material-id=217>.
447 See the website of the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court, op.cit. note 445.
448 Ibid.
449 Monitoring meeting, Sochi, 2 October 2006. One judge suggested that a one-half discount
would be better.
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6. Conclusion: The Future of Reform
Five years after the implementation of the new Code is an appropriate
time to take stock but it is an insufficient amount of time to draw firm
conclusions about the ultimate reception of adversarial principles in
Russia. While the new Code contains some striking innovations, it falls
short in other respects, particularly in its retention of the formal pretrial
investigation and the dominant force that this has over the trial of the
case. There are also other instances of practices that remain unchanged
and now are in a constant battle with more adversarial reforms.
The problems with implementation of the reforms that were made
by the new Code are largely a story of redefining the respective roles of
the lawyers and judges in the process. To accomplish as fundamental a
change as the one that this Code and the 1993 Constitution envision will
take some considerably greater time, effort and funding than has so far
been expended. Appropriate skills training is needed. For the majority of
cases that involve appointed defense counsel, better funding is needed.
Also, for both prosecution and defense, at least some substantive standards
of conduct spelling out their adversarial duties and obligations must be
developed and implemented.
Future steps towards more complete adversariality do not seem to be
looming on the horizon. The enthusiasm of the early 199os for reform has
largely disappeared, replaced by the interests of law enforcement agencies.
Elena Mizulina, though undimmed in her enthusiasm for continued reform,
lost her seat in the Duma in the 2003 election. Experts from former times
who held important government policy positions, such as Sergei Pashin,
author of the jury trial law, have been largely marginalized.450 Moreover,
the Constitutional Court seems to have changed. After a long string of
progressive decisions protecting the rights of criminal defendants that
were gradually reforming the old Criminal Procedure Code, the Court has
taken a decidedly pro-prosecution turn under the guise of helping victims.45I
450 Mizulina is now the representative of the Duma in the Constitutional Court and Pashin teaches
at the Moscow Institute of Economics, Politics and Law. Pashin does have an interesting televi-
sion show in Moscow, in which he plays the judge in a mock criminal trials.
451 See, supra, 62-63. There are indications that this direction is likely to continue. In a meeting
between President Putin and Chief Judge Valerii Zor'kin-one of a series of presidential
meetings held throughout the year with the chief judges of all three court systems-Zor'kin
commented that he had just informed the president about the 15,000 petitions his court has
received about the Criminal Procedure Code. He commented that "having turned its attention
to the protection of defendants, the Criminal Procedure Code seems to have forgotten the
victims of crime". Vremia-Novosti, "Zhalobnyi kodeks: Valerii Zor'kin rasskazal prezidentu o
kharaktere obrashchenii v KS" No.19o, 13 October 2005.
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There is some talk of reforming the pretrial stages and of expanding guilty
pleas, but nothing specific has yet been proposed.452
One bright spot seems to be jury trials, which-whatever their dif-
ficulties have been--have forced proceedings to be more adversarial. Most
important, they supply for the first time a truly neutral tribunal before
which the state can be held to its burden of proof. In a country where the
president seems to set the tone for many things, it is encouraging to hear
him tell law enforcement officials complaining about jury acquittals that,
"in my view, many of these problems have to do with the low quality of
preliminary investigations and prosecutions in court".453 However, as we
note here, jury trials have their own problems and may require some adjust-
ment. Some of the problems with Russian juries-such as their ingrained
negative attitudes towards law enforcement--are problems that are more
deeply rooted in Russian society and will take longer to work out.
452 Author William Burnham attended meetings of the working group in April 2006, which were
devoted to a discussion of future directions for reform of the pretrial stages. As this article
went to press, a draft law was introduced in the Duma that would authorize written agree-
ments between suspects and the prosecution for even more lenient treatment in return for
pleading guilty if they also rendered substantial assistance in pursuing criminal cases against
others. The baseline benefit for such cooperating defendants would be one-half the maximum
sentence and in some cases they would qualify for conditional sentences and even for complete
exemption from punishment. See Proekt Federal'nogo Zakona "0 wedenii osobogo poriadka
vneseniia sudebnogo resheniia pri zakliuchenii dosudebnogo soglasheniia o sotrudnichestve"
(introduced 31 October 2007) (on file with author William Burnham). For a summary of the
bill, see <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=82o68&print=true>.
453 The full passage was: "[t]he new, for our legal system, institution of trial by jury has exposed
several problems. However, in my view, many of these problems are linked to the low quality
of preliminary investigations and state prosecutions in court. Appropriate note of this must
be taken without delay" Vladimir Putin, "Vstupitel'noe slovo na Vserossiiskom soveshchanii
rukovoditelei pravookhranitel'nyh organov", 21 November 2006, available at <http://www.
president.kremlin.ru/text/news/zoo6/n/14256.shtml>.

